Cesar Pereida García

Cesar Pereida García

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Cesar Pereida García

Tampere University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 May 2019
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
AAAlejandro Cabrera Aldaya
Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya
BBBilly Bob Brumley
Billy Bob Brumley
SHSohaib Ul Hassan
Sohaib Ul Hassan
CGCesar Pereida Garcia
Cesar Pereida Garcia
NTNicola Tuveri
Nicola Tuveri
Simultaneous Multithreading (SMT) architectures are attractive targets for side-channel enabled attackers, with their inherently broader attack surface that exposes more per physical core microarchitecture components than cross-core attacks. In this work, we explore SMT execution engine sharing as a side-channel leakage source. We target ports to stacks of execution units to create a high-resolution timing side-channel due to port contention, inherently stealthy since it does not depend on the memory subsystem like other cache or TLB based attacks. Implementing our channel on Intel Skylake and Kaby Lake architectures featuring Hyper-Threading, we mount an end-to-end attack that recovers a P-384 private key from an OpenSSL-powered TLS server using a small number of repeated TLS handshake attempts. Furthermore, we show that traces targeting shared libraries, static builds, and SGX enclaves are essentially identical, hence our channel has wide target application.

24 October 2016
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
CGCesar Pereida García
Cesar Pereida García
BBBilly Bob Brumley
Billy Bob Brumley
YYYuval Yarom
Yuval Yarom
TLS and SSH are two of the most commonly used protocols for securing Internet traffic. Many of the implementations of these protocols rely on the cryptographic primitives provided in the OpenSSL library. In this work we disclose a vulnerability in OpenSSL, affecting all versions and forks (e.g. LibreSSL and BoringSSL) since roughly October 2005, which renders the implementation of the DSA signature scheme vulnerable to cache-based side-channel attacks. Exploiting the software defect, we demonstrate the first published cache-based key-recovery attack on these protocols: 260 SSH-2 handshakes to extract a 1024/160-bit DSA host key from an OpenSSH server, and 580 TLS 1.2 handshakes to extract a 2048/256-bit DSA key from an stunnel server.

9 August 2019 in IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
AAAlejandro Cabrera Aldaya
Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya
CGCesar Pereida García
Cesar Pereida García
LTLuis Manuel Alvarez Tapia
Luis Manuel Alvarez Tapia
BBBilly Bob Brumley
Billy Bob Brumley
During the last decade, constant-time cryptographic software has quickly transitioned from an academic construct to a concrete security requirement for real-world libraries. Most of OpenSSL’s constant-time code paths are driven by cryptosystem implementations enabling a dedicated flag at runtime. This process is perilous, with several examples emerging in the past few years of the flag either not being set or software defects directly mishandling the flag. In this work, we propose a methodology to analyze security-critical software for side-channel insecure code path traversal. Applying our methodology to OpenSSL, we identify three new code paths during RSA key generation that potentially leak critical algorithm state. Exploiting one of these leaks, we design, implement, and mount a single trace cache-timing attack on the GCD computation step. We overcome several hurdles in the process, including but not limited to: (1) granularity issues due to word-size operands to the GCD function; (2) bulk processing of desynchronized trace data; (3) non-trivial error rate during information extraction; and (4) limited high-confidence information on the modulus factors. Formulating lattice problem instances after obtaining and processing this limited information, our attack achieves roughly a 27% success rate for key recovery using the empirical data from 10K trials.

4 December 2018
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PDF file
NTNicola Tuveri
Nicola Tuveri
SHSohaib Ul Hassan
Sohaib Ul Hassan
CGCesar Pereida Garcia
Cesar Pereida Garcia
BBBilly Bob Brumley
Billy Bob Brumley
SM2 is a public key cryptography suite originating from Chinese standards, including digital signatures and public key encryption. Ahead of schedule, code for this functionality was recently mainlined in OpenSSL, marked for the upcoming 1.1.1 release. We perform a security review of this implementation, uncovering various deficiencies ranging from traditional software quality issues to side-channel risks. To assess the latter, we carry out a side-channel security evaluation and discover that the implementation hits every pitfall seen for OpenSSL's ECDSA code in the past decade. We carry out remote timings, cache timings, and EM analysis, with accompanying empirical data to demonstrate secret information leakage during execution of both digital signature generation and public key decryption. Finally, we propose, implement, and empirically evaluate countermeasures.

13 November 2021
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
CGCesar Pereida García
Cesar Pereida García
SSSampo Sovio
Sampo Sovio

6 June 2019
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
IGIaroslav Gridin
Iaroslav Gridin
CGCesar Pereida García
Cesar Pereida García
NTNicola Tuveri
Nicola Tuveri
BBBilly Bob Brumley
Billy Bob Brumley