Jiahao Yu

Jiahao Yu

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Jiahao Yu

Northwestern University, Evanston, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
23 February 2026 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YSYangguang Shao
Yangguang Shao
JYJiahao Yu
Jiahao Yu
HMHanwen Miao
Hanwen Miao
GGGaopeng Gou
Gaopeng Gou
ZLZhen Li
Zhen Li
JSJunzheng Shi
Junzheng Shi
Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained widespread use in various applications due to their powerful capability to generate human-like text. However, prompt injection attacks, which involve overwriting a model’s original instructions with malicious prompts to manipulate the generated text, have raised significant concerns about the security and reliability of LLMs. In this paper, we propose PromptFuzz, a novel testing framework that leverages fuzzing techniques to systematically assess the robustness of LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Inspired by software fuzzing, PromptFuzz selects promising seed prompts and generates a diverse set of prompt injections to evaluate the target LLM’s resilience. PromptFuzz operates in two stages: the prepare phase, which involves selecting promising initial seeds and collecting few-shot examples, and the focus phase, which uses the collected examples to generate diverse, high-quality prompt injections. By deploying the generated attack prompts from PromptFuzz in a real-world competition, we achieved the 7th ranking out of over 4000 participants (top 0.14%) within 2 hours, demonstrating PromptFuzz’s effectiveness compared to experienced human attackers. Additionally, we also deploy the generated attack prompts on 50 popular LLM-integrated online applications, including those from Coze and OpenAI, and found that 92% of them can be exploited by PromptFuzz. We also run PromptFuzz on 15 online LLM-based resume judging applications and found that 13 of these applications’ responses can be hijacked by PromptFuzz.

14 April 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
WSWenxuan Shi
Wenxuan Shi
HLHongwei Li
Hongwei Li
JYJiahao Yu
Jiahao Yu
WGWenbo Guo
Wenbo Guo
XXXinyu Xing
Xinyu Xing
In recent years, the technique of collaborative fuzzing has gained prominence as an efficient method for identifying software vulnerabilities. This paper introduces BandFuzz, a distinctive collaborative fuzzing framework designed to intelligently coordinate the use of multiple fuzzers. Unlike previous tools, our approach employs reinforcement learning to enhance both the efficiency and effectiveness of fuzz testing.

12 April 2026
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JZJie Zhu
Jie Zhu
CSChihao Shen
Chihao Shen
ZLZiyang Li
Ziyang Li
JYJiahao Yu
Jiahao Yu
YCYizheng Chen
Yizheng Chen
KPKexin Pei
Kexin Pei

10 May 2025 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
YSYangguang Shao
Yangguang Shao
XLXinjie Lin
Xinjie Lin
HLHaozheng Luo
Haozheng Luo
CHChengshang Hou
Chengshang Hou
GXGang Xiong
Gang Xiong
JSJunzheng Shi
Junzheng Shi
Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in various domains, primarily due to their strong capabilities in reasoning and generating human-like text. Despite their impressive performance, LLMs are susceptible to hallucinations, which can lead to incorrect or misleading outputs. This is primarily due to the lack of up-to-date knowledge or domain-specific information. Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is a promising approach to mitigate hallucinations by leveraging external knowledge sources. However, the security of RAG systems has not been thoroughly studied. In this paper, we study a poisoning attack on RAG systems named POISONCRAFT, which can mislead the model to refer to fraudulent websites. Compared to existing poisoning attacks on RAG systems, our attack is more practical as it does not require access to the target user query's info or edit the user query. It not only ensures that injected texts can be retrieved by the model, but also ensures that the LLM will be misled to refer to the injected texts in its response. We demonstrate the effectiveness of POISONCRAFTacross different datasets, retrievers, and language models in RAG pipelines, and show that it remains effective when transferred across retrievers, including black-box systems. Moreover, we present a case study revealing how the attack influences both the retrieval behavior and the step-by-step reasoning trace within the generation model, and further evaluate the robustness of POISONCRAFTunder multiple defense mechanisms. These results validate the practicality of our threat model and highlight a critical security risk for RAG systems deployed in real-world applications. We release our code\footnote{https://github.com/AndyShaw01/PoisonCraft} to support future research on the security and robustness of RAG systems in real-world settings.

1 January 2023 in International Journal of Modelling, Identification and Control
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CLChuan-jiang Li
Chuan-jiang Li
YGYa Gu
Ya Gu
JYJiahao Yu
Jiahao Yu
YZYanfei Zhu
Yanfei Zhu