Chau Yi Li

Chau Yi Li

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Chau Yi Li

Centre for Intelligent Sensing, Queen Mary University of London, 4617 London, London United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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16 April 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Multimedia
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RSRicardo Sanchez-Matilla
Ricardo Sanchez-Matilla
CLChau Yi Li
Chau Yi Li
ASAli Shahin Shamsabadi
Ali Shahin Shamsabadi
RMRiccardo Mazzon
Riccardo Mazzon
ACAndrea Cavallaro
Andrea Cavallaro
Adversarial perturbations can be added to images to protect their content from unwanted inferences. These perturbations may, however, be ineffective against classifiers that were not seen during the generation of the perturbation, or against defenses based on re-quantization, median filtering or JPEG compression. To address these limitations, we present an adversarial attack that is specifically designed to protect visual content against unseen classifiers and known defenses. We craft perturbations using an iterative process that is based on the Fast Gradient Signed Method and that randomly selects a classifier and a defense, in each iteration. This randomization prevents an undesirable overfitting to a specific classifier or defense. We validate the proposed attack in both targeted and untargeted settings on the private classes of the Places365-Standard dataset. Using ResNet18, ResNet50, AlexNet and DenseNet161 as classifiers, the performance of the proposed attack exceeds that of eleven state-of-the-art attacks.

1 June 2022 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
CLChau Yi Li
Chau Yi Li
RSRicardo Sánchez-Matilla
Ricardo Sánchez-Matilla
ASAli Shahin Shamsabadi
Ali Shahin Shamsabadi
RMRiccardo Mazzon
Riccardo Mazzon
ACAndrea Cavallaro
Andrea Cavallaro
Adversarial attacks modify images with perturbations that change the prediction of classifiers. These modified images, known as adversarial examples, expose the vulnerabilities of deep neural network classifiers. In this paper, we investigate the predictability of the mapping between the classes predicted for original images and for their corresponding adversarial examples. This predictability relates to the possibility of retrieving the original predictions and hence reversing the induced misclassification. We refer to this property as the reversibility of an adversarial attack, and quantify reversibility as the accuracy in retrieving the original class or the true class of an adversarial example. We present an approach that reverses the effect of an adversarial attack on a classifier using a prior set of classification results. We analyse the reversibility of state-of-the-art adversarial attacks on benchmark classifiers and discuss the factors that affect the reversibility.