Christina Rott

Christina Rott

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Christina Rott

Department of Management & Organization, School of Business and Economics, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 August 2019 in The Journal of Human Resources
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JFJeffrey A. Flory
Jeffrey A. Flory
ALAndreas Leibbrandt
Andreas Leibbrandt
CRChristina Rott
Christina Rott
OSOlga Stoddard
Olga Stoddard

1 May 2015 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JBJordi Brandts
Jordi Brandts
VGValeska Groenert
Valeska Groenert
CRChristina Rott
Christina Rott
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how advice by a more experienced and better-informed person affects an individual's entry into a real-effort tournament and the gender gap. Our experiment is motivated by the concerns raised by approaching the gender gap through affirmative action policies. Overall, advice improves the entry decision of subjects, in that forgone earnings due to wrong entry decisions go significantly down. The improvements are mainly driven by increased entry of strong-performing women, who also become more confident, and reduced entry of weak-performing men. We find that the overall gender gap persists even though it disappears among low and strong performers. The persistence is due to an emerging gender gap among intermediate performers driven by women (men) following more the advice to stay out of (enter) the tournament in this performance group. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.

1 December 2016 in Experimental Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JBJordi Brandts
Jordi Brandts
CRChristina Rott
Christina Rott
CSCarles Solà
Carles Solà
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how, after a history of decay, cooperation in a repeated voluntary contribution game can be revived in an enduring way. Simply starting the repeated game over—a simple fresh start—leads to an initial increase of cooperation, but to a subsequent new decay. Motivated by cooperation decay in organizations we study the potential of three interventions of triggering higher and sustained cooperation, which take place at the same time as a restart. Surprisingly, we find that the detailed explanation of the causes of the decay in cooperation of Fischbacher and Gächter (Am Econ Rev 100:541–556, 2010) combined with an advice on how to prevent decay do not have an effect beyond that of just starting over. In contrast, a one-way free form communication message sent by the leader to the followers strongly revives cooperation. We find evidence that repeated free form communication by the leader further strengthens the reviving effect on cooperation. Combining the two previous interventions does not outperform the pure effect of communication. Our content analysis reveals that leader communication is more people oriented than the expert advice.

26 July 2019
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
JBJordi Brandts
Jordi Brandts
DCDavid J. Cooper
David J. Cooper
CRChristina Rott
Christina Rott

1 September 2018 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
OGOrsola Garofalo
Orsola Garofalo
CRChristina Rott
Christina Rott
Decision makers frequently have a spokesperson communicate their decisions. In this paper, we address two questions. First, does it matter who communicates an unfair decision? Second, does it matter how the unfair decision is communicated? We conduct a modified dictator game experiment in which either the decision maker or a spokesperson communicates the decided allocation to recipients, who then determine whether to punish either of them. We find that receivers punish both the decision maker and the spokesperson more often, and more heavily, for unfair allocations communicated by the spokesperson if there is room for shifting blame. The increased punishment results from the messenger’s style of delivery: spokespersons are more likely than decision makers to express emotional regret instead of rational need. Receivers seem to punish the former style of communication because they view it as an attempt to shift blame. Our results establish more generally that the design of communication schemes shapes relationships among organizational members. Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2782 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.

1 August 2022 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
FCFortuna Casoria
Fortuna Casoria
ERErnesto Reuben
Ernesto Reuben
CRChristina Rott
Christina Rott
We investigate the effects of group identity on hiring decisions with adverse selection problems. We run a laboratory experiment in which employers cannot observe a worker’s ability or verify the veracity of the ability the worker claims to have. We evaluate whether sharing an identity results in employers discriminating in favor of ingroup workers and whether it helps workers and employers overcome the adverse selection problem. We induce identities using the minimal group paradigm and study two settings: one in which workers cannot change their identity and one in which they can. Although sharing a common identity does not make the worker’s claims more honest, employers strongly discriminate in favor of ingroup workers when identities are fixed. Discrimination cannot be explained by employers’ beliefs and, hence, seems to be taste-based. When possible, few workers change their identity. However, the mere possibility of changing identities erodes the employers’ trust toward ingroup workers and eliminates discrimination. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.