1 October 2015 in Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Risk communication takes many forms, can serve a number of different purposes, and can inform people about a wide variety of risks. We outline three challenges that must often be met when communicating about risk, irrespective of the form or purpose of that communication, or the type of risk that this involves. The first challenge is how best to help people understand the phenomenology of the risks that they are exposed to: The nature of the risk, the mechanism(s) by which they arise, and, therefore, what can be done to manage these risks. Each risk has its own phenomenology; therefore, rather than offering generic guidance, we illustrate with the case of climate change risk how evidence from behavioral science can guide the design of messages about risk. The second challenge is how best to present quantitative risk information about risk probabilities. Here, there is potential for: Ambiguity, difficulty in evaluating quantitative information, and weak numeracy skills among those being targeted by a message. We outline when each of these difficulties is most likely to arise as a function of the precision of the message and show how messages that cover multiple levels of precision might ameliorate these difficulties. The third challenge is the role played by people’s emotional reactions to the risks that they face and to the messages that they receive about these risks. Here, we discuss the pros and cons of playing up, or playing down, the emotional content of risk communication messages.
8 November 2012 in Memory & Cognition
Probability matching in sequential decision making is a striking violation of rational choice that has been observed in hundreds of experiments. Recent studies have demonstrated that matching persists even in described tasks in which all the information required for identifying a superior alternative strategy—maximizing—is present before the first choice is made. These studies have also indicated that maximizing increases when (1) the asymmetry in the availability of matching and maximizing strategies is reduced and (2) normatively irrelevant outcome feedback is provided. In the two experiments reported here, we examined the joint influences of these factors, revealing that strategy availability and outcome feedback operate on different time courses. Both behavioral and modeling results showed that while availability of the maximizing strategy increases the choice of maximizing early during the task, feedback appears to act more slowly to erode misconceptions about the task and to reinforce optimal responding. The results illuminate the interplay between “top-down” identification of choice strategies and “bottom-up” discovery of those strategies via feedback.
1 February 2007 in Judgment and Decision Making
It has been proposed that recognition can form the basis of simple but ecologically rational decision strategies (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Borges, Goldstein, Ortmann, & Gigerenzer (1999) found that constructing share portfolios based on simple name recognition alone often yielded better returns than the market index. We describe four studies with seven samples of participants from three countries (total N = 319) in which the returns of recognized and unrecognized shares from several stock markets were tracked over various periods of time. We find no support for the claim that a simple strategy of name recognition can be used as a general strategy to select stocks that yield better-than-average returns. However, there was some suggestion in the data that recognition performs better when the market is falling and worse when it is rising. A follow-up study indicated that the absence of an overall recognition effect could not easily be attributed to our reliance on student participants or smaller samples than Borges et al. (1999) had used. We conclude that, with respect to changes in value, selecting stocks on the basis of name recognition is a near-random method of portfolio construction that offers little, if any, benefit to the personal investor.
27 July 2020 in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
It is often assumed that most people are loss averse, placing more weight on losses than commensurate gains; however, some research identifies variability in loss sensitivity that reflects features of the environment. We examined this plasticity in loss sensitivity by manipulating the size and distribution of possible outcomes in a set of mixed gambles, and assessing individual stability in loss sensitivity. In each of two sessions, participants made accept-reject decisions for 64 mixed-outcome gambles. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions defined by the relative range of losses and gains (wider range of losses vs. wider range of gains), and the currency-units at stake (‘pennies’ vs. ‘pounds’). Participants showed modest but non-trivial consistency in their sensitivity to losses; though loss sensitivity also varied substantially with our manipulations. When possible gains had greater range than possible losses, most participants were loss averse; however, when possible losses had the greater range,reverseloss aversion was the norm (i.e., more weight on gains than losses). This is consistent with decision-by-sampling theory, whereby an outcome’s rank within a consideration-set determines its value, but can also be explained by the gamble’s expected-value rank within the decision-set, or by adapting aspirations to the decision-environment. Loss aversion was also reduced in the second session of decisions when the stakes had been higher in the previous session. This illustrates the influence of prior context on current sensitivity to losses, and suggests a role for idiosyncratic experiences in the development of individual differences in loss sensitivity.
9 May 2015 in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
In a perfect world, the choice of any course of action would lead to a satisfactory outcome, and we would obtain feedback about both our chosen course and those we have chosen to forgo. In reality, however, we often face harsh environments in which we can only minimize losses, and we receive impoverished feedback. In these studies, we examined how decision makers dealt with these challenges in a simple task in which we manipulated three features of the decision: The outcomes from the available options were either mostly positive or mostly negative (kind or harsh environment); feedback was either full or partial (outcomes revealed for all options or only for the chosen option); and for the final 20 trials in a sequence, participants either chose on each trial or set an “advance-directive” policy. The propensity to choose the better option was explained by several factors: Full feedback was more beneficial in harsh than in kind environments; policy decisions encouraged better decisions and ameliorated the adverse impact of a harsh environment; and beliefs about the value of strategy diversification predicted switch rates and choice quality. The results suggest a subtle interplay between bottom-up and top-down processes: Although harsh environments encourage poor choices, and some decision makers choose less well than others, this need not imply that the decision maker has failed to identify the better option.
23 January 2018 in Applied Cognitive Psychology