21 January 2010 in Physical Review A
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a secure key generation method between two distant parties by wisely exploiting properties of quantum mechanics. In QKD, experimental measurement outcomes on quantum states are transformed by the two parties to a secret key. This transformation is composed of many logical steps (as guided by security proofs), which together will ultimately determine the length of the final secret key and its security. We detail the procedure for performing such classical postprocessing taking into account practical concerns (including the finite-size effect and authentication and encryption for classical communications). This procedure is directly applicable to realistic QKD experiments and thus serves as a recipe that specifies what postprocessing operations are needed and what the security level is for certain lengths of the keys. Our result is applicable to the BB84 protocol with a single or entangled photon source.
8 August 2013 in Physical Review A
Quantum key distribution (QKD) utilizes the laws of quantum mechanics to achieve information-theoretically secure key generation. This field is now approaching the stage of commercialization, but many practical QKD systems still suffer from security loopholes due to imperfect devices. In fact, practical attacks have successfully been demonstrated. Fortunately, most of them only exploit detection-side loopholes, which are now closed by the recent idea of measurement-device-independent QKD. On the other hand, little attention is paid to the source, which may still leave QKD systems insecure. In this work, we propose and demonstrate an attack that exploits a source-side loophole existing in qubit-based QKD systems using a weak coherent state source and decoy states. Specifically, by implementing a linear-optics unambiguous state discrimination measurement, we show that the security of a system without phase randomization\char22{}which is a step assumed in conventional security analyses but sometimes neglected in practice\char22{}can be compromised. We conclude that implementing phase randomization is essential to the security of decoy-state QKD systems under current security analyses.
18 December 2013 in Physical Review A
Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDIQKD) is proposed to be secure against any possible detection attacks. The security of the original proposal relies on the assumption that the legitimate users can fully characterize the encoding systems including sources. Here, we propose a MDIQKD protocol where we allow uncharacterized encoding systems as long as qubit sources are used. A security proof of the MDIQKD protocol is presented that does not need the knowledge of the encoding states. Simulation results show that the scheme is practical.
14 November 2014 in Physical Review A
In the postprocessing of quantum key distribution, the raw key bits from the mismatched-basis measurements, where two parties use different bases, are normally discarded. Here, we propose a postprocessing method that exploits measurement statistics from mismatched-basis cases and prove that incorporating these statistics enables uncharacterized qubit sources to be used in the measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution protocol and the Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol, which is otherwise impossible.
30 June 2011 in Computers & Security
9 March 2012 in Physical Review A
Privacy amplification (PA) is an essential postprocessing step in quantum key distribution (QKD) for removing any information an eavesdropper may have on the final secret key. In this paper, we consider delaying PA of the final key after its use in one-time pad encryption and prove its security. We prove that the security and the key generation rate are not affected by delaying PA. Delaying PA has two applications: it serves as a tool for significantly simplifying the security proof of QKD with a two-way quantum channel, and also it is useful in QKD networks with trusted relays. To illustrate the power of the delayed PA idea, we use it to prove the security of a qubit-based two-way deterministic QKD protocol which uses four states and four encoding operations.