1 September 2011 in Games and Economic Behavior
There is a wide range of economic problems that involve the exchange of indivisible goods with no monetary transfers, starting from the housing market model of the seminal paper by Shapley and Scarf (1974) to problems such as the kidney exchange or the school choice problem. The classical solution to many of these models is to apply a mechanism called Top Trading Cycles, attributed to David Gale, which satisfies good properties for the case of strict preferences. In this paper, we propose a family of mechanisms, called Top Trading Absorbing Sets mechanisms, which generalize the Top Trading Cycles to the general case in which individuals are allowed to report indifferences, while preserving a maximal possible set of its desirable properties.Authors acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science, through the projects ECO2009-11213 and ECO2009-12836, from Basque Government through the project GIC07/146-IT-377-07, from Andalusian Government through the project P07.SEJ.02547 and from Belgian Federal Government through the IAP Project (contract 6/09)
1 March 2015 in Games and Economic Behavior
The cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which requires the cooperation of different authorities, is a problematic issue, especially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-defined. Following Ni and Wang (2007) we assume that a river is a segment divided into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides useful information for estimating some limits in regard to the responsibility of each region. We propose a cost allocation rule, the Upstream Responsibility rule, which takes into account these limits in distributing costs “fairly” and we provide an axiomatic characterization of this rule via certain properties based on basic ideas concerning the responsibility of regions.Jorge Alcalde-Unzu acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Government through the project ECO2012–34202 and Fundación Ramón Areces. María Gómez-Rúa acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Government through the project ECO2011-23460 and the Galician Government through the project 2013XGCEDU08072013EMER. Elena Molis acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Government through the projects ECO2012–31346 and ECO2013–44879–R, from the Consejería de Economía, Innovación, Ciencia y Empleo, Junta de Andalucía through the projects SEJ–492 and SEJ–1436 and from the Basque Government through the project IT568–13
12 May 2007 in International Journal of Game Theory
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1 January 2016 in Mathematical Social Sciences