Christian Hofmann

Christian Hofmann

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Christian Hofmann

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

33Years (1994-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 July 2005 in Technovation
Verified
Journal Article
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CHChristian Hofmann
Christian Hofmann
Stuart OrrStuart Orr
Stuart Orr

1 March 2012 in The Accounting Review
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Journal Article
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MHMirko S. Heinle
Mirko S. Heinle
CHChristian Hofmann
Christian Hofmann
AKAlexis H. Kunz
Alexis H. Kunz
We examine the impact of identity preferences on the interrelation between incentives and performance measurement. In our model, a manager identifies with an organization and loses utility to the extent that his actions conflict with effort-standards issued by the principal. Contrary to prior arguments in the literature, we find conditions under which a manager who identifies strongly with the organization receives stronger incentives and faces more performance evaluation reports than a manager who does not identify with the organization. Our theory predicts that managers who experience events that boost their identification with the firm can decrease their effort in short-term value creation. We also find that firms are more likely to employ less precise but more congruent performance measures, such as stock prices, when contracting with managers who identify little with the organization. In contrast, they use more precise but less congruent measures, such as accounting earnings, when contracting with managers who identify strongly with the firm.

5 May 2013 in Journal of Management and Governance
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Journal Article
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MAMartin Arnegger
Martin Arnegger
CHChristian Hofmann
Christian Hofmann
KPKerstin Pull
Kerstin Pull
KVKarin Vetter
Karin Vetter

20 November 2017 in Contemporary Accounting Research
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Journal Article
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SDShane S. Dikolli
Shane S. Dikolli
VDViktoria Diser
Viktoria Diser
CHChristian Hofmann
Christian Hofmann
TPThomas Pfeiffer
Thomas Pfeiffer

1 January 2009 in Journal of Management Accounting Research
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Journal Article
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SDShane S. Dikolli
Shane S. Dikolli
CHChristian Hofmann
Christian Hofmann
SKSusan L. Kulp
Susan L. Kulp
This study uses principal-agent analysis to investigate how the principal's use of performance measures in the agent's compensation contract are affected by (1) links between performance measures and (2) substitute and complementary characteristics of an agent's efforts. We show that the directional effect of changes in performance measure interrelations on linear incentive weights depends on how the agent's tasks interact with each other (i.e., substitute or complementary interactions). For example, increases in performance measure interrelations do not necessarily imply higher incentive weights on more sensitive and precise performance measures. If efforts are substitutes for each other, the costs of effort are relatively high and the principal induces lower levels of total effort by offering lower incentives. We also show that differences in the combination of performance measure interrelations and effort interactions affect profits in distinctly different ways. When efforts are substitutes for each other, increases in the sensitivities of profit to the other performance metrics (i.e., increased interrelations), and thus to effort, may actually lead to lower profits.

6 October 2012 in Review of Accounting Studies
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Journal Article
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SDShane S. Dikolli
Shane S. Dikolli
CHChristian Hofmann
Christian Hofmann
TPThomas Pfeiffer
Thomas Pfeiffer