Ernst G. Maug

Ernst G. Maug

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Ernst G. Maug

University of Mannheim Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

32Years (1995-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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2 January 1995 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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EMErnst G. Maug
Ernst G. Maug
NNNarayan Y. Naik
Narayan Y. Naik
This paper investigates the effect of fund managers' performance evaluation on their asset allocation decisions. We derive optimal contracts for delegated portf

1 January 1999 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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EMErnst G. Maug
Ernst G. Maug
This paper analyzes the efficiency of shareholder voting as a mechanism to resolve differences of opinion and conflicts of interest among shareholders. Passing

25 August 2008 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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IDIngolf Dittmann
Ingolf Dittmann
EMErnst G. Maug
Ernst G. Maug
We investigate biases of valuation methods and document that these depend largely on the choice of error measure (percentage vs. logarithmic errors) used to compare valuation procedures. We analyze four multiple valuation methods (averaging with the arithmetic mean, harmonic mean, median, and the geometric mean) and three present value approaches (dividend discount model, discounted cash flow model, residual income model). Percentage errors generate a positive bias for most multiples, and they imply that setting company values equal to their book values dominates many established valuation methods. Logarithmic errors imply that the median and the geometric mean are unbiased while the arithmetic mean is biased upward as much as the harmonic mean is biased downward. The dividend discount model dominates the discounted cash flow model only for percentage errors, while the opposite is true for logarithmic errors. The residual income model is optimal for both error measures.

1 January 1999 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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EMErnst G. Maug
Ernst G. Maug
This paper analyzes the impact of insider trading legislation on corporate governance. In a context where large, dominant shareholders can monitor underperformi

15 November 2002 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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IDIngolf Dittmann
Ingolf Dittmann
EMErnst G. Maug
Ernst G. Maug
JKJohannes Kemper
Johannes Kemper
This paper studies how the use of alternative valuation methodologies affects investment performance for a sample of 53 German venture capitalists. We measure investment performance by the amount of investments they need to write off and by the number of companies they take public. We find that a significant number of investment managers use discounted cash flow (DCF) techniques, but only a minority appears to use a discount rate related to the cost of capital. The majority applies DCF using subjective discount rates. We present evidence that the use of DCF is correlated with superior investment performance only if applied in conjunction with an objectifiable discount rate. Also, funds that invest with a longer horizon perform better. The use of multiples is not significantly correlated with investment performance. We conclude that a focus on fundamental values confers an advantage.

1 January 2004 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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IDIngolf Dittmann
Ingolf Dittmann
EMErnst G. Maug
Ernst G. Maug
CSChristoph Schneider
Christoph Schneider
In the period 1997-2004, Preussag, a diversified German conglomerate of old economy businesses, changed itself into TUI, a company focused almost entirely on tourism and logistics. This paper analyzes how this strategy was executed and how it contributed to Preussag's underperformance of the stock market. We collect 417 announcements of acquisitions, financial disclosures and other news and disentangle the impact of different parts of the company's strategy. We find that only the divestitures created value, that the strategy to invest in tourism destroyed value, and that the acquisition premiums Preussag paid were mostly unjustified. Bad luck like the events of September 11, 2001 cannot account for the poor performance of the stock. Poor management resulted from poor governance, combining a state-owned bank as the largest shareholder, board interlocks, and insufficient managerial incentives. The case shows how divestiture programs increase the liquid resources available to management beyond free operating cash flows and casts doubt on the positive governance role of institutional blockholders.