20 September 2006 in Physical Review Letters
The first step in any quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol consists of sequences of measurements that produce correlated classical data. We show that these correlation data must violate some Bell inequality in order to contain distillable secrecy, if not they could be produced by quantum measurements performed on a separable state of larger dimension. We introduce a new QKD protocol and prove its security against any individual attack by an adversary only limited by the no-signaling condition.
1 June 2011 in New Journal of Physics
15 March 2011 in Nature Communications
Device-independent quantum key distribution (QKD) aims to provide key distribution schemes, the security of which is based on the laws of quantum physics, but which does not require any assumptions about the internal working of the devices used in the protocol. This strong form of security is possible only when using correlations that violate a Bell inequality. Here, we provide a general security proof for a large class of protocols in a model in which the raw key is generated by independent measurements. This independence condition may be justifiable in several implementations and is necessarily satisfied when the raw key is generated by N separate pairs of devices. Our work shows that device-independent QKD is possible with key rates comparable to those of standard schemes.
7 December 2016 in Nature
30 January 2006 in Physical Review A
This article identifies a series of properties common to all theories that do not allow for superluminal signaling and predict the violation of Bell inequalities. Intrinsic randomness, uncertainty due to the incompatibility of two observables, monogamy of correlations, impossibility of perfect cloning, privacy of correlations, bounds in the shareability of some states; all these phenomena are solely a consequence of the no-signaling principle and nonlocality. In particular, it is shown that for any distribution, the properties of (i) nonlocal, (ii) no arbitrarily shareable, and (iii) positive secrecy content are equivalent.
14 March 2017 in Nature Communications
The most accepted version of the third law of thermodynamics, the unattainability principle, states that any process cannot reach absolute zero temperature in a finite number of steps and within a finite time. Here, we provide a derivation of the principle that applies to arbitrary cooling processes, even those exploiting the laws of quantum mechanics or involving an infinite-dimensional reservoir. We quantify the resources needed to cool a system to any temperature, and translate these resources into the minimal time or number of steps, by considering the notion of a thermal machine that obeys similar restrictions to universal computers. We generally find that the obtainable temperature can scale as an inverse power of the cooling time. Our results also clarify the connection between two versions of the third law (the unattainability principle and the heat theorem), and place ultimate bounds on the speed at which information can be erased.