Christopher E. Overton

Christopher E. Overton

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Christopher E. Overton

United Kingdom Health Security Agency

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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31 May 2021 in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
LPLorenzo Pellis
Lorenzo Pellis
FSFrancesca Scarabel
Francesca Scarabel
HSHelena B. Stage
Helena B. Stage
COChristopher E. Overton
Christopher E. Overton
LCLauren H. K. Chappell
Lauren H. K. Chappell
UGUniversity of Manchester COVID-19 Modelling Group
University of Manchester COVID-19 Modelling Group
Early assessments of the growth rate of COVID-19 were subject to significant uncertainty, as expected with limited data and difficulties in case ascertainment, but as cases were recorded in multiple countries, more robust inferences could be made. Using multiple countries, data streams and methods, we estimated that, when unconstrained, European COVID-19 confirmed cases doubled on average every 3 days (range 2.2–4.3 days) and Italian hospital and intensive care unit admissions every 2–3 days; values that are significantly lower than the 5–7 days dominating the early published literature. Furthermore, we showed that the impact of physical distancing interventions was typically not seen until at least 9 days after implementation, during which time confirmed cases could grow eightfold. We argue that such temporal patterns are more critical than precise estimates of the time-insensitive basic reproduction number R0 for initiating interventions, and that the combination of fast growth and long detection delays explains the struggle in countries' outbreak response better than large values of R0 alone. One year on from first reporting these results, reproduction numbers continue to dominate the media and public discourse, but robust estimates of unconstrained growth remain essential for planning worst-case scenarios, and detection delays are still key in informing the relaxation and re-implementation of interventions. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Modelling that shaped the early COVID-19 pandemic response in the UK’.

22 July 2021 in BMC Infectious Diseases
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
BVBindu Vekaria
Bindu Vekaria
COChristopher Overton
Christopher Overton
AWArkadiusz Wiśniowski
Arkadiusz Wiśniowski
SAShazaad Ahmad
Shazaad Ahmad
AAAndrea Aparicio-Castro
Andrea Aparicio-Castro
MEMark J. Elliot
Mark J. Elliot
Background: Predicting hospital length of stay (LoS) for patients with COVID-19 infection is essential to ensure that adequate bed capacity can be provided without unnecessarily restricting care for patients with other conditions. Here, we demonstrate the utility of three complementary methods for predicting LoS using UK national- and hospital-level data.Method: On a national scale, relevant patients were identified from the COVID-19 Hospitalisation in England Surveillance System (CHESS) reports. An Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) survival model and a truncation corrected method (TC), both with underlying Weibull distributions, were fitted to the data to estimate LoS from hospital admission date to an outcome (death or discharge) and from hospital admission date to Intensive Care Unit (ICU) admission date. In a second approach we fit a multi-state (MS) survival model to data directly from the Manchester University NHS Foundation Trust (MFT). We develop a planning tool that uses LoS estimates from these models to predict bed occupancy.Results: All methods produced similar overall estimates of LoS for overall hospital stay, given a patient is not admitted to ICU (8.4, 9.1 and 8.0 days for AFT, TC and MS, respectively). Estimates differ more significantly between the local and national level when considering ICU. National estimates for ICU LoS from AFT and TC were 12.4 and 13.4 days, whereas in local data the MS method produced estimates of 18.9 days.Conclusions: Given the complexity and partiality of different data sources and the rapidly evolving nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is most appropriate to use multiple analysis methods on multiple datasets. The AFT method accounts for censored cases, but does not allow for simultaneous consideration of different outcomes. The TC method does not include censored cases, instead correcting for truncation in the data, but does consider these different outcomes. The MS method can model complex pathways to different outcomes whilst accounting for censoring, but cannot handle non-random case missingness. Overall, we conclude that data-driven modelling approaches of LoS using these methods is useful in epidemic planning and management, and should be considered for widespread adoption throughout healthcare systems internationally where similar data resources exist.

1 January 2020 in Infectious Disease Modelling
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
COChristopher E. Overton
Christopher E. Overton
HSHelena B. Stage
Helena B. Stage
SAShazaad Ahmad
Shazaad Ahmad
JCJacob Curran-Sebastian
Jacob Curran-Sebastian
PDPaul Dark
Paul Dark
LWLuke Webb
Luke Webb
During an infectious disease outbreak, biases in the data and complexities of the underlying dynamics pose significant challenges in mathematically modelling the outbreak and designing policy. Motivated by the ongoing response to COVID-19, we provide a toolkit of statistical and mathematical models beyond the simple SIR-type differential equation models for analysing the early stages of an outbreak and assessing interventions. In particular, we focus on parameter estimation in the presence of known biases in the data, and the effect of non-pharmaceutical interventions in enclosed subpopulations, such as households and care homes. We illustrate these methods by applying them to the COVID-19 pandemic.

6 July 2022 in Science Translational Medicine
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
RPRobert S. Paton
Robert S. Paton
COChristopher E. Overton
Christopher E. Overton
TWThomas Ward
Thomas Ward
The emergence of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) B.1.1.529 (Omicron) variant caused international concern due to its rapid spread in Southern Africa. It was unknown whether this variant would replace or coexist with (either transiently or long term) the then-dominant Delta variant on its introduction to England. We developed a set of hierarchical logistic growth models to describe changes in the frequency of S gene target failure (SGTF) PCR tests, a proxy for Omicron. The doubling time of SGTF cases peaked at 1.56 days (95% CI: 1.49 to 1.63) on 5 December, whereas triple-positive cases were halving every 5.82 days (95% CI: 5.11 to 6.67) going into Christmas 2021. We were unable to characterize the replacement of Delta by Omicron with a single rate. The replacement rate decreased by 53.56% (95% CrI: 45.38 to 61.01) between 14 and 15 December, meaning the competitive advantage of Omicron approximately halved. Preceding the changepoint, Omicron was replacing Delta 16.24% (95% CrI: 9.72 to 23.41) faster in those with two or more vaccine doses, indicative of vaccine escape being a substantial component of competitive advantage. Despite the slowdown, Delta was almost entirely replaced in England within a month of the first sequenced domestic case. The synchrony of changepoints across regions at various stages of Omicron epidemics suggests that the growth rate advantage was not attenuated because of biological mechanisms related to strain competition. The step change in replacement could have resulted from behavioral changes, potentially elicited by public health messaging or policies, that differentially affected Omicron.

7 June 2021 in medRxiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
RCRobert Challen
Robert Challen
UWUniversity Warwick
University Warwick
COChristopher E. Overton
Christopher E. Overton
LGLaura M. Guzman-Rincon
Laura M. Guzman-Rincon
EHEdward Hill
Edward Hill
LDLeon Danon
Leon Danon
The rapid emergence of SARS-CoV-2 mutants with new phenotypic properties is a critical challenge to the control of the ongoing pandemic. B.1.1.7 was monitored in the UK through routine testing and S-gene target failures (SGTF), comprising over 90% of cases by March 2021. Now, the reverse is occurring: SGTF cases are being replaced by an S-gene positive variant, which we associate with B.1.617.2. Evidence from the characteristics of S-gene positive cases demonstrates that, following importation, B.1.617.2 is transmitted locally, growing at a rate higher than B.1.1.7 and a doubling time between 5-14 days. S-gene positive cases should be prioritised for sequencing and aggressive control in any countries in which this variant is newly detected. One-Sentence Summary The B.1.617.2 variant of SARS-CoV-2 is replacing B.1.1.7 and emerging as the dominant variant in England, evidenced by sustained local transmission.

31 May 2021 in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MFMartyn Fyles
Martyn Fyles
EFElizabeth Fearon
Elizabeth Fearon
COChristopher Overton
Christopher Overton
UGUniversity of Manchester COVID-19 Modelling Group
University of Manchester COVID-19 Modelling Group
TWTom Wingfield
Tom Wingfield
THThomas House
Thomas House
We explore strategies of contact tracing, case isolation and quarantine of exposed contacts to control the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic using a branching process model with household structure. This structure reflects higher transmission risks among household members than among non-household members. We explore strategic implementation choices that make use of household structure, and investigate strategies including two-step tracing, backwards tracing, smartphone tracing and tracing upon symptom report rather than test results. The primary model outcome is the effect of contact tracing, in combination with different levels of physical distancing, on the growth rate of the epidemic. Furthermore, we investigate epidemic extinction times to indicate the time period over which interventions must be sustained. We consider effects of non-uptake of isolation/quarantine, non-adherence, and declining recall of contacts over time. Our results find that, compared to self-isolation of cases without contact tracing, a contact tracing strategy designed to take advantage of household structure allows for some relaxation of physical distancing measures but cannot completely control the epidemic absent of other measures. Even assuming no imported cases and sustainment of moderate physical distancing, testing and tracing efforts, the time to bring the epidemic to extinction could be in the order of months to years. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Modelling that shaped the early COVID-19 pandemic response in the UK’.