The impact that the COVID-19 pandemic had on the lives of many is indisputable. Among the possible strategies to cope with the feeling of insecurity that comes with this, religion can play a significant role. Using first-hand data from the ResPOnsE COVID-19 rolling cross-section survey, this article shows that Italian people who reported a COVID-19 contagion in their family reported also higher religiosity both in terms of attendance at religious services (via web, radio and tv) and prayer during the pandemic. The result holds primarily for those who received religious socialization during their childhood, and this reinforces the role of family transmission as a way to shape religious beliefs and behaviours and to provide individuals with religious coping strategies. These findings suggest that under dramatic circumstances a short-term religious revival is possible, even in contexts where the process of secularization is ongoing.
Religious change continues to be a controversial topic that involves both theoretical and methodological issues. As to the European context, the main dispute is between secularization and individualization theory, especially considering the ‘believing without belonging’ thesis. This article will tackle this dispute given these three choices: firstly, we assume that cohort replacement is the main driver of religious change; secondly, religious tradition has to be taken fully into account to explain religious change; thirdly, we consider religiosity as a complex phenomenon that requires a multidimensional approach. Results from a multilevel multiple responses model based on EVS (European Values Study) data show that practice is declining across cohorts in all the countries whereas trends for belief and self-definition diverge only for Eastern Orthodox countries. Depending on the interpretation, such exception seems supporting rather than undermining the ‘believing without belonging’ theory.
5 March 2015 in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion
While official science has given its answer to the question on the origin of the Coronavirus (animal to human transmission), alternative theories on human creation of the virus – purposely or inadvertently – have flourished. Those alternative theories can be easily located among the family of conspiracy theories, as they always assume some secretive activity of some groups acting on their self-interest and against the good of the many. The article assesses the prevalence of these beliefs during the COVID-19 pandemic in Italy, studies its development during the pandemic, and investigates its potential determinants. In particular, it analyses the relationship between beliefs in alternative theories on the origin of the virus and political orientation, by arguing that the association cannot be attributed to (politically) motivated reasoning, as the issue has not been highly politicized in the Italian context. Alternatively, the article suggests that the main factor driving beliefs in alternative accounts on the origins of the virus is institutional trust. Political orientation moderates its effects, depending on specific conditions (e.g. cue taking, position of the supported party either in government or opposition), and eventually reinforcing scepticism towards epistemic authorities for those with low trust in institutions. Data come from the ResPOnsE COVID-19 survey, carried out with daily samples from April to July 2020 (N > 15.000) to monitor the development of the Italian public opinion during the Coronavirus pandemic.
Despite the long-lasting interest in religious change, debates on the topic have been heated and are still far from being settled. In order to provide a reliable data source through which to study these dynamics, the CARPE project harmonizes well-known international surveys containing items concerning religiosity (the ESS, Eurobarometer, EVS, ISSP and WVS). This makes it possible to broaden the available observation window, both across countries and over time. Moreover, the opportunities this provides for comparing different survey programmes also enable researchers to analyse the consistency of the results, minimizing the impact of random fluctuations and providing useful information with respect to the degree of confidence which can be placed on the relevant estimates. The main focus of this cumulative approach is the variable regarding church attendance, which has been harmonized in various ways. All in all, the CARPE dataset contains figures of religious practice for 45 countries spanning the period of 1970–2016 and derived from 1665 national surveys. This results in a sample of approximately 1.8 million individual observations. The aim of this contribution is to present the dataset’s composition, the harmonization procedure adopted, the strategy used to combine the single datasets and the reliability tests which have been performed. Finally, some possible applications of the CARPE dataset will be introduced.
Si les chercheurs ont souvent souligné le fait que la France est peut-être un pays exceptionnellement irréligieux, cette hypothèse n’a pas encore été testée avec des données longitudinales ; et les chercheurs n’ont pas non plus tenté d’expliquer cette prétendue irréligiosité. Le présent article tente de combler cette lacune de la littérature en comparant la France à d’autres pays catholiques d’Europe occidentale. Pour ce faire, nous utilisons l’ensemble de données européennes qui est, à ce jour, le plus complet sur l’appartenance et la fréquentation des églises dans les pays européens (CARPE), ainsi que les données du Programme international d’enquête sociale (ISSP) qui permettent de mesurer les croyances religieuses rétrospectivement, dès les années 1910. La France affiche une religiosité globale significativement plus faible que les autres pays catholiques d’Europe occidentale, bien que cet écart ait diminué au cours des dernières décennies (et ce faible niveau de religiosité ne peut s’expliquer par des effets de période, spécifiques à la France, opérant au cours des quarante dernières années). La sécularisation en France prend plutôt la forme d’un remplacement de cohortes, ce qui a conduit à la reproduction des différences de religiosité entre les pays d’une génération à l’autre. En d’autres termes, si la France est plus irréligieuse c’est qu’elle a pris la voie de la transition séculière plus tôt que les autres pays, ou en partant d’un niveau plus bas.