This paper presents a simple model to characterize explicitly the role that an intervening third party plays in raising the cost of rebellion in an intrastate conflict. Extending the Gershenson‐Grossman ( 2000 Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. 2000. Civil conflict: ended or never ending?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 807–821. [Google Scholar] ) framework of conflict in a two‐stage game to the case involving outside intervention in a three‐stage game as in Chang et al. ( 2007b Chang, Y.‐M. , Potter, J. and Sanders, S. 2007b. War and peace: third‐party intervention in conflict. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(4): 954–974. [Google Scholar] ), we examine the conditions under which an outside party optimally intervenes such that (i) the strength of the rebel group is diminished or (ii) the rebellion is deterred altogether. We also find conditions in which a third party optimally intervenes but at a level insufficient to deter rebellion. Such behavior, which improves the incumbent government’s potential to succeed in conflict, is overlooked in some conflict studies evaluating the effectiveness of intervention. One policy implication of the model is that an increase in the strength of inter‐governmental trade partnerships increases the likelihood that third‐party intervention deters rebellion.
Using a contest model of a professional sports league, we show that pool revenue sharing has a negative effect on total expenditure for player talent. There are ``moral hazard'' problems with lower revenue teams in that they may pocket the money they receive from the pool without increasing talent investments. Based on four alternative measures of competitive balance, we find that pool revenue sharing increases the variance of expected winning percentages for a match and thus reduces the degree of competition in the league. Policy recommendations that combine pool revenue sharing with the requirement of a minimum payroll on players are shown to be procompetitive.