Recent years have seen the development of a multitude of tools for the security analysis of Android applications. A major deficit of current fully automated security analyses, however, is their inability to drive execution to interesting parts, such as where code is dynamically loaded or certain data is decrypted. In fact, security-critical or downright offensive code may not be reached at all by such analyses when dynamically checked conditions are not met by the analysis environment. To tackle this unsolved problem, we propose a tool combining static call path analysis with byte code instrumentation and a heuristic partial symbolic execution, which aims at executing interesting calls paths. It can systematically locate potentially security-critical code sections and instrument applications such that execution of these sections can be observed in a dynamic analysis. Among other use cases, this can be leveraged to force applications into revealing dynamically loaded code, a simple yet effective way to circumvent detection by security analysis software such as the Google Play Store's Bouncer. We illustrate the functionality of our tool by means of a simple logic bomb example and a real-life security vulnerability which is present in hunderd of apps and can still be actively exploited at this time.
As Android is entering the business domain, leaks of business-critical and personal information through apps become major threats. Due to the context-insensitive nature of the Android permission model, information flow policies cannot be enforced by on-board mechanisms. We therefore propose AppCaulk, an approach to harden any existing Android app by injecting a targeted dynamic taint analysis, which tracks and blocks unwanted information flows at runtime. Critical data flows are first discovered using a static taint analysis and the relevant data propagation paths are instrumented by a taint tracking code at register level. At runtime the dynamic taint analysis woven into the app detects and blocks data leaks as they are about to occur. In contrast to existing taint analysis approaches like Taint droid, AppCaulk does not require modification of the Android middleware and can thus be applied to any stock Android installation. In this paper, we explain the design of AppCaulk, describe the evaluation of its prototype, and compare its effectiveness with Taintdroid.
Through automatically checking whether cloud services satisfy customers' requirements, cloud service certification promises cloud providers competitive advantages, e.g. by attracting new customers. However, certification can increase costs of cloud providers, creating incentives for fraudulent providers to save costs by only pretending to satisfy customers' requirements. Opportunistic providers are fraudulent providers who will only cheat if they are not caught. In this paper, we propose an approach to support cloud service certification of opportunistic providers. To that end, we introduce a method to model the behavior of opportunistic providers and propose a framework supporting test-based certification which builds on randomized testing and is non-invasive. We show how our framework reduces the willingness of opportunistic providers to cheat, and present experimental results of tests supporting the certification of requirements related to resource availability, resource provisioning, and quality of service.
On the Android platform, antivirus software suffers from significant deficiencies. Due to platform limitations, it cannot access or monitor an Android device's file system, or dynamic behavior of installed apps. This includes the downloading of malicious files after installation, and other file system alterations. That has grave consequences for device security, as any app - even without openly malicious code in its package file - can still download and execute malicious files without any danger of being detected by antivirus software. In this paper, we present a proposal for an antivirus interface to be added to the Android API. It allows for three primary operations: (1) on-demand file system scanning and traversal, (2) on-change file system monitoring, (3) a set of basic operations that allow for scanning of arbitrary file system objects without disclosing their contents. This interface can enable Android antivirus software to deploy techniques for malware recognition similar to those of desktop antivirus systems. The proposed measures comply with Android's security architecture and user data privacy is maintained. Through our approach, antivirus software on the Android platform would reach a level of effectiveness significantly higher than currently, and comparable to that of desktop antivirus software.