1 March 2015 in Acta Psychologica
2 June 2023 in Journal of Medical Internet Research
Background: The current methods of evaluating cognitive functioning typically rely on a single time point to assess and characterize an individual’s performance. However, cognitive functioning fluctuates within individuals over time in relation to environmental, psychological, and physiological contexts. This limits the generalizability and diagnostic utility of single time point assessments, particularly among individuals who may exhibit large variations in cognition depending on physiological or psychological context (eg, those with type 1 diabetes [T1D], who may have fluctuating glucose concentrations throughout the day). Objective: We aimed to report the reliability and validity of cognitive ecological momentary assessment (EMA) as a method for understanding between-person differences and capturing within-person variation in cognition over time in a community sample and sample of adults with T1D. Methods: Cognitive performance was measured 3 times a day for 15 days in the sample of adults with T1D (n=198, recruited through endocrinology clinics) and for 10 days in the community sample (n=128, recruited from TestMyBrain, a web-based citizen science platform) using ultrabrief cognitive tests developed for cognitive EMA. Our cognitive EMA platform allowed for remote, automated assessment in participants’ natural environments, enabling the measurement of within-person cognitive variation without the burden of repeated laboratory or clinic visits. This allowed us to evaluate reliability and validity in samples that differed in their expected degree of cognitive variability as well as the method of recruitment. Results: The results demonstrate excellent between-person reliability (ranging from 0.95 to 0.99) and construct validity of cognitive EMA in both the sample of adults with T1D and community sample. Within-person reliability in both samples (ranging from 0.20 to 0.80) was comparable with that observed in previous studies in healthy older adults. As expected, the full-length baseline and EMA versions of TestMyBrain tests correlated highly with one another and loaded together on the expected cognitive domains when using exploratory factor analysis. Interruptions had higher negative impacts on accuracy-based outcomes (β=−.34 to −.26; all P values <.001) than on reaction time–based outcomes (β=−.07 to −.02; P<.001 to P=.40). Conclusions: We demonstrated that ultrabrief mobile assessments are both reliable and valid across 2 very different clinic versus community samples, despite the conditions in which cognitive EMAs are administered, which are often associated with more noise and variability. The psychometric characteristics described here should be leveraged appropriately depending on the goals of the cognitive assessment (eg, diagnostic vs everyday functioning) and the population being studied.
22 July 2019 in Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry
1 January 2016 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
The congruency effect in distracter interference tasks is often reduced after incongruent relative to congruent trials. Moreover, this congruency sequence effect (CSE) is influenced by learning related to concrete stimulus and response features as well as by learning related to abstract cognitive control processes. There is an ongoing debate, however, over whether interactions between these learning processes are best explained by an episodic retrieval account, an adaptation by binding account, or a cognitive efficiency account of the CSE. To make this distinction, we orthogonally manipulated the expression of these learning processes in a novel factorial design involving the prime-probe arrow task. In Experiment 1, these processes interacted in an over-additive fashion to influence CSE magnitude. In Experiment 2, we replicated this interaction while showing it was not driven by conditional differences in the size of the congruency effect. In Experiment 3, we ruled out an alternative account of this interaction as reflecting conditional differences in learning related to concrete stimulus and response features. These findings support an episodic retrieval account of the CSE, in which repeating a stimulus feature from the previous trial facilitates the retrieval and use of previous-trial control parameters, thereby boosting control in the current trial. In contrast, they do not fit with (a) an adaptation by binding account, in which CSE magnitude is directly related to the size of the congruency effect, or (b) a cognitive efficiency account, in which costly control processes are recruited only when behavioral adjustments cannot be mediated by low-level associative mechanisms.
18 March 2024 in npj Digital Medicine
Type 1 diabetes (T1D) is a chronic condition characterized by glucose fluctuations. Laboratory studies suggest that cognition is reduced when glucose is very low (hypoglycemia) and very high (hyperglycemia). Until recently, technological limitations prevented researchers from understanding how naturally-occurring glucose fluctuations impact cognitive fluctuations. This study leveraged advances in continuous glucose monitoring (CGM) and cognitive ecological momentary assessment (EMA) to characterize dynamic, within-person associations between glucose and cognition in naturalistic environments. Using CGM and EMA, we obtained intensive longitudinal measurements of glucose and cognition (processing speed, sustained attention) in 200 adults with T1D. First, we used hierarchical Bayesian modeling to estimate dynamic, within-person associations between glucose and cognition. Consistent with laboratory studies, we hypothesized that cognitive performance would be reduced at low and high glucose, reflecting cognitive vulnerability to glucose fluctuations. Second, we used data-driven lasso regression to identify clinical characteristics that predicted individual differences in cognitive vulnerability to glucose fluctuations. Large glucose fluctuations were associated with slower and less accurate processing speed, although slight glucose elevations (relative to person-level means) were associated with faster processing speed. Glucose fluctuations were not related to sustained attention. Seven clinical characteristics predicted individual differences in cognitive vulnerability to glucose fluctuations: age, time in hypoglycemia, lifetime severe hypoglycemic events, microvascular complications, glucose variability, fatigue, and neck circumference. Results establish the impact of glucose on processing speed in naturalistic environments, suggest that minimizing glucose fluctuations is important for optimizing processing speed, and identify several clinical characteristics that may exacerbate cognitive vulnerability to glucose fluctuations.
14 December 2022 in Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging