8 May 2014 in Water Resources Research
Ecosystem characteristics and processes provide significant value to human health and well-being, and there is growing interest in quantifying those values. Of particular interest are water-related ecosystem services and the incorporation of their value into local and regional decision making. This presents multiple challenges and opportunities to the hydrologic-modeling community. To motivate advances in water-resources research, we first present three common decision contexts that draw upon an ecosystem-service framework: scenario analysis, payments for watershed services, and spatial planning. Within these contexts, we highlight the particular challenges to hydrologic modeling, and then present a set of opportunities that arise from ecosystem-service decisions. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations regarding how we can prioritize our work to support decisions based on ecosystem-service valuation.
1 January 2020 in Elementa: Science of the Anthropocene
Given the slow policy response by governments, climate leadership by other institutions has become an essential part of maintaining policy momentum, driving innovation, and fostering social dialogue. Despite growth in carbon pricing in government and the private sector, our review suggests low, but growing, adoption of internal carbon prices (ICPs) by higher education institutions (HEIs), who may be uniquely suited to implement and refine these tools. We analyze the range of ICP tools in use by eleven U.S. HEIs and discuss tradeoffs. Our analysis identifies several reasons why proxy carbon prices may be especially well-suited to decisions (especially at the system-scale) around carbon neutrality at a wide range of institutions. Using a unique dataset covering 10 years of real-world analysis with a proxy carbon price, we analyze the interaction of ICPs with life cycle cost analysis to start to identify when and how internal carbon pricing will be most likely to shift decisions. We discuss how schools and other institutions can collaborate and experiment with these tools to help drive good climate decision-making and inform climate policy at larger scales.
27 April 2012 in Water Resources Management
30 September 2011 in Environmental and Resource Economics
4 April 2016 in Climatic Change
Downscaled climate change projections for California, when translated into changes in irrigation water delivery and then into profit from agriculture in the Central Valley, show an increase in conventional measures of variability such as the variance. However, these increases are modest and mask a more pronounced increase in downside risk, defined as the probability of unfavorable outcomes of water supply or profit. This paper describes the concept of downside risk and measures it as it applies to outcomes for Central Valley agriculture projected under four climate change scenarios. We compare the effect of downside risk aversion versus conventional risk aversion or risk neutrality when assessing the impact of climate change on the profitability of Central Valley agriculture. We find that, when downside risk is considered, the assessment of losses due to climate change increases substantially.
7 October 2010 in Strategic Behavior and the Environment
Both developing and developed countries constantly face problems related to illdefined property rights in common-pool resource systems. These problems are especially acute in water resource ecosystems. A natural consequence of incomplete property rights is the substitution of market-determined exchange by negotiationdetermined exchange. Water rights in the western region of the United States provide an excellent example. This paper is a case study of the negotiations over a water transfer from California's Imperial Valley to San Diego County in light of the transfer's impact on the inland Salton Sea. We analyze these negotiations as a multi-issue, multi-party, non-cooperative negotiating game. We construct stylized representations of the payoff functions for each party as well as of the physical, economic, and political constraints. To model the default outcome, we assign probabilities to various contingencies that might have arisen had the parties been unable to negotiate an agreement. We calibrate the model to the final agreement and then focus on the impact on the negotiated outcome of certain features of the institutional landscape: the influence of the allocation and specification of property rights; what would have happened if a producer group had negotiated directly with the urban stakeholder; the role of certain critical features of the Law of the River; and the impact of environmental regulations.