Inbar Maimon

Inbar Maimon

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Inbar Maimon

Department of software and Information Systems Engineering, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva, Israel

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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12 August 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LBLavi Ben-Shimol
Lavi Ben-Shimol
EGEdita Grolman
Edita Grolman
AEAviad Elyashar
Aviad Elyashar
IMInbar Maimon
Inbar Maimon
DMDudu Mimran
Dudu Mimran
ASAsaf Shabtai
Asaf Shabtai
In fully managed serverless environments, cloud service providers handle the underlying infrastructure, reducing application developers' operational and maintenance efforts. However, these environments limit the use of traditional cybersecurity frameworks and tools, compromising observability and situational awareness capabilities for security tasks (e.g., risk assessment, incident response). Additionally, existing security frameworks for serverless applications often lack generalizability across architectures and require specialized expertise. In this paper, we propose a three-layer security stack for fully managed serverless applications. The first layer establishes a foundational generic ontology that models serverless application resources and their interactions using API logs. In the second layer, the ontology is leveraged via perimeterless pipeline, to map the logs into a unified application activity KG, and in the third layer, two situational awareness tools that utilize the graph-based representation are implemented: (1) an incident response dashboard that leverages the ontology to visualize and examine application activity logs in the context of cybersecurity alerts; our user study showed that this dashboard enabled participants to respond 10% more accurately and almost twice as fast than the examined baseline tool, and (2) a criticality of asset (CoA) risk assessment framework that enables efficient expert-based prioritization in cybersecurity contexts; our expert-based questionnaire demonstrated strong agreement, achieving a Kendall-W score of 0.7179.

8 April 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MNMor Nahum
Mor Nahum
EGEdita Grolman
Edita Grolman
IMInbar Maimon
Inbar Maimon
DMDudu Mimran
Dudu Mimran
OBOleg Brodt
Oleg Brodt
ASAsaf Shabtai
Asaf Shabtai
Open-source software (OSS) libraries have become popular among developers due to their ability to reduce development time and costs. However, OSS can be exploited as a means of conducting OSS supply chain attacks where malicious code is injected into those libraries. Previous studies have proposed various methods for preventing and detecting such attacks, however most of them focused on untargeted attacks. In contrast, this paper focuses on targeted OSS supply chain attacks which are crafted towards a specific target (e.g., developer) and performed by skilled and persistent attackers with strong technical aptitude. Since these attacks do not appear in the general OSS repositories, they tend to go under the radar for a long period of time, allowing an attacker to gain access to sensitive data or systems. In this paper, we propose (SC)2V - a novel, distributed framework for secure crowdsource-based code verification of OSS libraries, which is integrated into the software production build phase. (SC)2V aims to prevent targeted supply chain attacks, involving users and verifiers in a collaborative effort. (SC)2V was evaluated on 900 OSS libraries in different attack scenarios where it took our framework an average of just 26 seconds to issue an alert for various threats.