Roger Giner-Sorolla

Roger Giner-Sorolla

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Roger Giner-Sorolla

University of Kent, Canterbury, UK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

22Years (2005-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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12 February 2024 in Personality and Social Psychology Review
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
RGRoger Giner-Sorolla
Roger Giner-Sorolla
AMAmanda K. Montoya
Amanda K. Montoya
ARAlan Reifman
Alan Reifman
TCTom Carpenter
Tom Carpenter
NJNeil Lewis Jr
Neil Lewis Jr
CSCourtney Soderberg
Courtney Soderberg
Academic In the wake of the replication crisis, social and personality psychologists have increased attention to power analysis and the adequacy of sample sizes. In this article, we analyze current controversies in this area, including choosing effect sizes, why and whether power analyses should be conducted on already-collected data, how to mitigate the negative effects of sample size criteria on specific kinds of research, and which power criterion to use. For novel research questions, we advocate that researchers base sample sizes on effects that are likely to be cost-effective for other people to implement (in applied settings) or to study (in basic research settings), given the limitations of interest-based minimums or field-wide effect sizes. We discuss two alternatives to power analysis, precision analysis and sequential analysis, and end with recommendations for improving the practices of researchers, reviewers, and journal editors in social-personality psychology. Public Recently, social-personality psychology has been criticized for basing some of its conclusions on studies with low numbers of participants. As a result, power analysis, a mathematical way to ensure that a study has enough participants to reliably “detect” a given size of psychological effect, has become popular. This article describes power analysis and discusses some controversies about it, including how researchers should derive assumptions about effect size, and how the requirements of power analysis can be applied without harming research on hard-to-reach and marginalized communities. For novel research questions, we advocate that researchers base sample sizes on effects that are likely to be cost-effective for other people to implement (in applied settings) or to study (in basic research settings). We discuss two alternatives to power analysis, precision analysis and sequential analysis, and end with recommendations for improving the practices of researchers, reviewers, and journal editors in social-personality psychology.

8 December 2016 in Psychological Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RGRoger Giner-Sorolla
Roger Giner-Sorolla
HCHanah A. Chapman
Hanah A. Chapman
Previous studies support a link between moral disgust and impurity, whereas anger is linked to harm. We challenged these strict correspondences by showing that disgust is activated in response to information about moral character, even for harm violations. By contrast, anger is activated in response to information about actions, including their moral wrongness and consequences. Study 1 examined disgust and anger in response to an action that suggests bad moral character (animal cruelty) versus an action that is seen as inherently more wrong (domestic abuse). Animal cruelty was associated with more disgust than domestic abuse was, whereas domestic abuse was associated with more anger. Studies 2 and 3 manipulated character by varying the agent’s desire to cause harm and also varied the action’s harmful consequences. Desire to harm predicted only disgust (controlling for anger), whereas consequences were more closely related to anger (controlling for disgust). Taken together, these results indicate that disgust arises in response to evidence of bad moral character, not just to impurity.

1 April 2023 in Psychological Methods
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PIPeder Mortvedt Isager
Peder Mortvedt Isager
RARobbie C. M. van Aert
Robbie C. M. van Aert
ŠBŠtěpán Bahník
Štěpán Bahník
MBMark J. Brandt
Mark J. Brandt
KDK. Andrew DeSoto
K. Andrew DeSoto
DLDaniël Lakens
Daniël Lakens
Robust scientific knowledge is contingent upon replication of original findings. However, replicating researchers are constrained by resources, and will almost always have to choose one replication effort to focus on from a set of potential candidates. To select a candidate efficiently in these cases, we need methods for deciding which out of all candidates considered would be the most useful to replicate, given some overall goal researchers wish to achieve. In this article we assume that the overall goal researchers wish to achieve is to maximize the utility gained by conducting the replication study. We then propose a general rule for study selection in replication research based on the replication value of the set of claims considered for replication. The replication value of a claim is defined as the maximum expected utility we could gain by conducting a replication of the claim, and is a function of (a) the value of being certain about the claim, and (b) uncertainty about the claim based on current evidence. We formalize this definition in terms of a causal decision model, utilizing concepts from decision theory and causal graph modeling. We discuss the validity of using replication value as a measure of expected utility gain, and we suggest approaches for deriving quantitative estimates of replication value. Our goal in this article is not to define concrete guidelines for study selection, but to provide the necessary theoretical foundations on which such concrete guidelines could be built. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

1 January 2012 in Cognition and Emotion
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RGRoberto Gutierrez
Roberto Gutierrez
RGRoger Giner-Sorolla
Roger Giner-Sorolla
MVMilica Vasiljevic
Milica Vasiljevic
Are verbal reports of disgust in moral situations specific indicators of the concept of disgust, or are they used metaphorically to refer to anger? In this experiment, participants read scenarios describing a violation of a norm either about the use of the body (bodily moral) or about harm and rights (socio-moral). They then expressed disgust and anger on verbal scales, and through facial expression endorsement measures. The use of disgust words in the socio-moral condition was largely predicted by anger words and only secondarily by disgust faces, whereas in the bodily moral condition the use of disgust words was predicted to a similar extent by disgust faces and anger words. Angry faces, however, never predicted disgust words independently of anger words. These results support a middle-ground position in which disgust words concerning socio-moral violations are not entirely a metaphor for anger, but bear some relationship to other representations of disgust. In the case of socio-moral violations, however, the use of disgust language is more strongly related to anger language, and less strongly to facial representations of disgust than in the case of bodily moral violations.

13 March 2012 in Cognition and Emotion
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RGRoger Giner-Sorolla
Roger Giner-Sorolla
JBJennifer K. Bosson
Jennifer K. Bosson
TCT. Andrew Caswell
T. Andrew Caswell
VHVanessa E. Hettinger
Vanessa E. Hettinger
Recent work suggests that negative moral judgements of sexual activities are informed by disgust and anger. A correlational study (N=62) and an experiment (N=176) examined the specific antecedents that elicit these distinct, though correlated, moral emotions. Participants in Study 1 rated their emotional reactions to, and judgements of, 10 sexual scenarios. Across scenarios, judgements of abnormality predicted disgust independent of anger, and judgements of harm/rights violation predicted anger independent of disgust. Study 2 replicated these results in an experimental design. Participants rated their emotions and judgements in response to behaviours that varied in degree of potential sexual morality violation (non-sexual, heterosexual, homosexual) and rights violation (no harm, indirect harm, direct harm). Judgement of rights violation mediated the effects of harm on anger. Judgements of abnormality, but not other antecedents proposed to elicit moral disgust, mediated the effects of sexual immorality on disgust.

10 November 2018 in European Review of Social Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RGRoger Giner-Sorolla
Roger Giner-Sorolla
Current controversies in social psychology have sparked the promotion of new rules for evidence in the field. This “crisis of evidence” echoes prior concerns from the 1970s about a so-called “crisis of social psychology”, with such issues as replication and statistical significance once more under examination. I argue that parallel concerns about the relevance of our research, raised but not completely resolved in the 1970s crisis, also deserve a fresh look. In particular, the advances made in the current crisis of evidence came about because of changes in academic career incentives, particularly publishing. Today, many voices in psychology urge greater respect for relevance in topics, methods and communication, but the lack of clear and concrete incentives to do so has stood in the way of answers. I diagnose the current incentive structures, propose partial solutions that are within the reach of journal editors and professional societies, and conclude by discussing the links between relevance and evidence, as well as special challenges to the relevance of social psychology post-2016.