Marina Chernikova

Marina Chernikova

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Marina Chernikova

University of Maryland, College Park, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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4 November 2015 in Social Psychological and Personality Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CDCalogero Lo Destro
Calogero Lo Destro
MCMarina Chernikova
Marina Chernikova
APAntonio Pierro
Antonio Pierro
AKArie W. Kruglanski
Arie W. Kruglanski
EHE. Tory Higgins
E. Tory Higgins
Locomotion is the self-regulatory aspect concerned with movement from state to state, whereas assessment is the self-regulatory aspect concerned with critical evaluation of options. Successful goal pursuit usually requires that both locomotion and assessment work together; however, there may be situations in which such complementarity is unnecessary for optimal performance. In this article, we aim to shed light on the circumstances in which locomotion and assessment complementarity are necessary for adequate performance. In a two-part study, we find that high locomotion alone is sufficient to ensure optimal performance on simple tasks. On complex tasks, however, both high locomotion and high assessment are necessary for optimal performance. We also find that after individuals have had practice on a task, high locomotors are again the best performers, regardless of whether the task is simple or complex. These findings have implications for work performance and goal pursuit more generally.

23 June 2017 in Journal of Applied Social Psychology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
MCMarina Chernikova
Marina Chernikova
AKArie Kruglanski
Arie Kruglanski
DGDino Giovannini
Dino Giovannini
LVLoris Vezzali
Loris Vezzali
JSJunjie Su
Junjie Su

27 June 2018 in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SKSvetlana Komissarouk
Svetlana Komissarouk
MCMarina Chernikova
Marina Chernikova
AKArie W. Kruglanski
Arie W. Kruglanski
EHE. Tory Higgins
E. Tory Higgins
In general, people prefer to view themselves positively. But some individuals are more prone to self-flattery than others, that is, holding an unjustifiably high opinion of oneself. Applying regulatory mode theory, we identify motivational factors that predict which individuals are and are not prone to self-flattery. In four studies, using both chronic (Studies 1-3) and experimental (Study 4) conditions, we found that those with high locomotion concerns about effecting change (control) are more inclined to flatter themselves, whereas those with high assessment concerns about making the right choices (truth) are less inclined to flatter themselves. The relation between stronger locomotion and greater self-flattery, and stronger assessment and lesser self-flattery, was mediated by locomotors’ low self-criticism and assessors’ high self-criticism. These results shed light on how locomotion and assessment differ in the motivation to flatter oneself.

15 May 2015
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
AKArie W. Kruglanski
Arie W. Kruglanski
MCMarina Chernikova
Marina Chernikova
CKCatalina Kopetz
Catalina Kopetz

3 October 2017 in PsyArXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
AKArie W. Kruglanski
Arie W. Kruglanski
KJKatarzyna Jasko
Katarzyna Jasko
MMMaxim Milyavsky
Maxim Milyavsky
MCMarina Chernikova
Marina Chernikova
DWDavid Webber
David Webber
DSDaniela Di Santo
Daniela Di Santo
From the 1950s onward, psychologists have generally assumed that people possess a general need for cognitive consistency whose frustration by an inconsistency elicits negative affect. We offer a novel perspective on this issue by introducing the distinction between epistemic and motivational impact of consistent and inconsistent cognitions. The epistemic aspect is represented by the updated expectancy of the outcome addressed in such cognitions. The motivational aspect stems from value (desirability) of that outcome. We show that neither the outcome’s value nor its updated expectancy are systematically related to cognitive consistency or inconsistency. Consequently, we question consistency’s role in the driving of affective responses, and the related presumption of a universal human need for cognitive consistency.