9 March 2023 in Open Mind
Many social and legal conflicts hinge on semantic disagreements. Understanding the origins and implications of these disagreements necessitates novel methods for identifying and quantifying variation in semantic cognition between individuals. We collected conceptual similarity ratings and feature judgements from a variety of words in two domains. We analyzed this data using a non-parametric clustering scheme, as well as an ecological statistical estimator, in order to infer the number of different variants of common concepts that exist in the population. Our results show at least ten to thirty quantifiably different variants of word meanings exist for even common nouns. Further, people are unaware of this variation, and exhibit a strong bias to erroneously believe that other people share their semantics. This points to one factor that likely interferes with productive political and social discourse.
28 October 2025 in Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making
High-consequence domains such as medical triage for critical casualties often involve decisions for which there is no single right answer, and for which expert decision makers will disagree. These decisions thus represent a particular challenge for trustworthy and ethical AI in these domains, as simply training AI to make “the right decision” is not possible. In the current research, we offer a framework for aligning AI systems to the key, domain-specific attributes of decision-makers in order to produce trust in human experts. In Study 1, we investigate six possible attributes and find that the degree of alignment predicts rated trust ratings and delegation using short vignettes for assessment and delegation. In Study 2, we extend these results to demonstrate that alignment predicts trust in decisions from two different AI systems across two distinct attributes. The results thus offer a dimensionality-reducing approach to AI trustworthiness in high-consequence domains.
2 August 2021 in PsyArXiv
COVID-19 and the 2021 U.S. Capitol attacks have highlighted the potential dangers of pseudoscientific and conspiratorial belief adoption. Approaches to combating misinformed beliefs have tried to “pre-bunk” or “inoculate” people against misinformation adoption and have yielded only modest results. These approaches presume that some citizens may be more gullible than others and thus susceptible to multiple misinformed beliefs. We provide evidence of an alternative account it’s simply too hard for all people to be accurate in all domains of belief, but most individuals are trying. We collected data on a constellation of human beliefs across domains from more than 1,700 people on Amazon Mechanical Turk. We find misinformed beliefs to be broadly, but thinly, spread among the population. Further, we do not find that individuals who adopt one misinformed belief are more likely to engage in pseudo-scientific or conspiratorial thinking across the board, in opposition to “slippery slope” notions of misinformation adoption.
2 August 2021 in PsyArXiv
Analyses of political discourse typically focus on the semantic content of politicians’ statements. The approach treats the meaning of a speaker’s words as independent from the speaker’s identity itself; however, there are reasons to believe that one might influence the other. Features of a speaker’s identity influence others’ judgements of their character (e.g., Kinzler & DeJesus, 2013), and thus speaker identity could influence listeners’ assessment of the semantics and validity of the statements themselves. Here, we collect U.S. participants’ judgements of the political orientation of different statements, from liberal to conservative, heard with one of three accents, a generic U.S. accent, a Southern U.S. accent or an Australian accent. In comparison to identical statements conveyed in the generic U.S. accent, participants tended to perceive the U.S. Southern accented statements as more conservative and the Australian accented statements as more liberal.
2 August 2021 in PsyArXiv
Many social and legal conflicts come down to differences in semantics. Yet, semantic variation between individuals and people’s awareness of this variation have been relatively neglected by experimental psychology. Here, across two experiments, we quantify the amount of agreement and disagreement between ordinary semantic concepts in thepopulation, as well as people’s meta-cognitive awareness of these differences. We collect similarity ratings and feature judgements, and analyze them using a non-parametricclustering scheme with an ecological statistical estimator to infer the number of different meanings for the same word that is present in the population. We find that typically atleast ten to twenty variants of meanings exist for even common nouns, but that people are unaware of this variation. Instead, people exhibit a strong bias to erroneously believe that other people share their particular semantics, pointing to one factor that likely interfereswith political and social discourse.