20 September 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
DDoS attacks are rampant in cloud environments and continually evolve into more sophisticated and intelligent modalities, such as low-rate DDoS attacks. But meanwhile, the cloud environment is also developing in constant. Now container technology and microservice architecture are widely applied in cloud environment and compose container-based cloud environment. Comparing with traditional cloud environments, the container-based cloud environment is more lightweight in virtualization and more flexible in scaling service. Naturally, a question that arises is whether these new features of container-based cloud environment will bring new possibilities to defeat DDoS attacks. In this paper, we establish a mathematical model based on queueing theory to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the container-based cloud environment in defeating low-rate DDoS attack. Based on this, we propose a dynamic DDoS mitigation strategy, which can dynamically regulate the number of container instances serving for different users and coordinate the resource allocation for these instances to maximize the quality of service. And extensive simulations and testbed-based experiments demonstrate our strategy can make the limited system resources be utilized sufficiently to maintain the quality of service acceptable and defeat DDoS attack effectively in the container-based cloud environment.
15 June 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Cloud attack provenance is a well-established industrial practice for assuring transparency and accountability for a service provider to tenants. However, the multi-tenancy and self-service nature coupled with the sheer size of a cloud implies many unique challenges to cloud forensics. Although Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) is a powerful tool for attack provenance due to the privilege isolation, the stealthiness of state-of-the-art attacks and the lack of precise information make existing attack provenance solutions difficult to fulfill real-time forensics when tracking enormous suspicious behaviors. To this end, we propose an instruction-level tracing framework for inspecting the presence of attacks by dynamically tracking shared processor hardware event patterns and analyzing the attack traces. To overcome the challenges of real-time detection and provenance, we advocate Last Branch Record (LBR) profiling, to extract the suspicious execution flows. With the hardware assistance and software-based virtualization introspection, we show that the framework can provide an effective response to threats in different cases, thereby enabling a quick attack provenance with high fidelity. The evaluation shows that our prototype introduces negligible performance penalties.
30 June 2026 in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have become a cornerstone of confidential computing, attracting significant attention from academia and industry. To support secure and scalable application deployment on confidential clouds, TEE containers (Tcons) have been introduced as middleware to shield applications from malicious operating systems and orchestration layers while preserving usability. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive analysis of Tcons, focusing on three critical layers: OS interfaces, encrypted I/O, and orchestration mechanisms. To enable systematic evaluation, we design TBouncer, an automated analyzer that precisely exercises and benchmarks Tcon isolation boundaries. Our study uncovers fundamental flaws in existing Tcons, leading to exploitable vulnerabilities such as code execution, denial-of-service, and information leakage. In total, we identify six attack vectors, twelve new bugs, and three CVEs. These findings provide new insights into the underestimated attack surface of Tcons and highlight key directions for building more secure and trustworthy container solutions.