Zhi Li

Zhi Li

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Zhi Li

Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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20 September 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ZLZhi Li
Zhi Li
HJHai Jin
Hai Jin
DZDeqing Zou
Deqing Zou
BYBin Yuan
Bin Yuan
DDoS attacks are rampant in cloud environments and continually evolve into more sophisticated and intelligent modalities, such as low-rate DDoS attacks. But meanwhile, the cloud environment is also developing in constant. Now container technology and microservice architecture are widely applied in cloud environment and compose container-based cloud environment. Comparing with traditional cloud environments, the container-based cloud environment is more lightweight in virtualization and more flexible in scaling service. Naturally, a question that arises is whether these new features of container-based cloud environment will bring new possibilities to defeat DDoS attacks. In this paper, we establish a mathematical model based on queueing theory to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the container-based cloud environment in defeating low-rate DDoS attack. Based on this, we propose a dynamic DDoS mitigation strategy, which can dynamically regulate the number of container instances serving for different users and coordinate the resource allocation for these instances to maximize the quality of service. And extensive simulations and testbed-based experiments demonstrate our strategy can make the limited system resources be utilized sufficiently to maintain the quality of service acceptable and defeat DDoS attack effectively in the container-based cloud environment.

15 June 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WLWeijie Liu
Weijie Liu
Ximeng LiuXimeng Liu
Ximeng Liu
ZLZhi Li
Zhi Li
BLBin Liu
Bin Liu
RYRongwei Yu
Rongwei Yu
LWLina Wang
Lina Wang
Cloud attack provenance is a well-established industrial practice for assuring transparency and accountability for a service provider to tenants. However, the multi-tenancy and self-service nature coupled with the sheer size of a cloud implies many unique challenges to cloud forensics. Although Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) is a powerful tool for attack provenance due to the privilege isolation, the stealthiness of state-of-the-art attacks and the lack of precise information make existing attack provenance solutions difficult to fulfill real-time forensics when tracking enormous suspicious behaviors. To this end, we propose an instruction-level tracing framework for inspecting the presence of attacks by dynamically tracking shared processor hardware event patterns and analyzing the attack traces. To overcome the challenges of real-time detection and provenance, we advocate Last Branch Record (LBR) profiling, to extract the suspicious execution flows. With the hardware assistance and software-based virtualization introspection, we show that the framework can provide an effective response to threats in different cases, thereby enabling a quick attack provenance with high fidelity. The evaluation shows that our prototype introduces negligible performance penalties.

15 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ZLZhi Li
Zhi Li
WLWeijie Liu
Weijie Liu
XWXiaoFeng Wang
XiaoFeng Wang
BYBin Yuan
Bin Yuan
HTHongliang Tian
Hongliang Tian
SYShoumeng Yan
Shoumeng Yan
Filesystem isolation enforced by today's container technology has been found to be less effective in the presence of host-container interactions increasingly utilized by container tools. This weakened isolation has led to a type of path misresolution (Pamir) vulnerabilities, which have been considered to be highly risky and continuously reported over the years. In this paper, we present the first systematic study on the Pamir risk and the existing fixes to related vulnerabilities. Our research reveals that in spite of significant efforts being made to patch vulnerable container tools and address the risk, the Pamir vulnerabilities continue to be discovered, including a new vulnerability (CVE-2023-0778) we rediscovered from patched software. A key insight of our study is that the Pamir risk is inherently hard to prevent at the level of container tools, due to their heavy reliance on third-party components. While security inspections should be applied to all components to mediate host-container interactions, third-party component developers tend to believe that container tools should perform security checks before invoking their components, and are therefore reluctant to patch their code with the container-specific protection. Moreover, due to the large number of components today's container tools depend on, re-implementing all of them is impractical. Our study shows that kernel-based filesystem isolation is the only way to ensure isolation always in place during host-container interactions. In our research, we design and implement the first such an approach that extends the filesystem isolation to dentry objects, by enforcing access control on host-container interactions through the filesystem. Our design addresses the fundamental limitation of one-way isolation characterizing today's container, uses carefully-designed policies to ensure accurate and comprehensive interaction control, and implants the protection into the right kernel location to minimize the performance impact. We verify our approach using model checking, which demonstrates its effectiveness in eliminating the Pamir risk. Our evaluation further shows that our approach incurs negligible overheads, vastly outperforming all existing Pamir patches, and maintains compatibility with all mainstream container tools. We have released our code and filed a request to incorporate our technique into the Linux kernel.

30 June 2026 in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
WLWeijie Liu
Weijie Liu
HCHongbo Chen
Hongbo Chen
SHShuo Huai
Shuo Huai
ZXZhen Xu
Zhen Xu
WWWenhao Wang
Wenhao Wang
Zheli LiuZheli Liu
Zheli Liu
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have become a cornerstone of confidential computing, attracting significant attention from academia and industry. To support secure and scalable application deployment on confidential clouds, TEE containers (Tcons) have been introduced as middleware to shield applications from malicious operating systems and orchestration layers while preserving usability. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive analysis of Tcons, focusing on three critical layers: OS interfaces, encrypted I/O, and orchestration mechanisms. To enable systematic evaluation, we design TBouncer, an automated analyzer that precisely exercises and benchmarks Tcon isolation boundaries. Our study uncovers fundamental flaws in existing Tcons, leading to exploitable vulnerabilities such as code execution, denial-of-service, and information leakage. In total, we identify six attack vectors, twelve new bugs, and three CVEs. These findings provide new insights into the underestimated attack surface of Tcons and highlight key directions for building more secure and trustworthy container solutions.