Marina Blanton

Marina Blanton

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Marina Blanton

University of Notre Dame

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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23 September 2016 in International Journal of Information Security
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Journal Article
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MAMehrdad Aliasgari
Mehrdad Aliasgari
MBMarina Blanton
Marina Blanton
FBFattaneh Bayatbabolghani
Fattaneh Bayatbabolghani

3 October 2015 in International Journal of Information Security
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Journal Article
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MBMarina Blanton
Marina Blanton
EAEveraldo Aguiar
Everaldo Aguiar

14 July 2016 in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
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Journal Article
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MBMarina Blanton
Marina Blanton
FBFattaneh Bayatbabolghani
Fattaneh Bayatbabolghani
Computation based on genomic data is becoming increasingly popular today, be it for medical or other purposes. Non-medical uses of genomic data in a computation often take place in a server-mediated setting where the server offers the ability for joint genomic testing between the users. Undeniably, genomic data is highly sensitive, which in contrast to other biometry types, discloses a plethora of information not only about the data owner, but also about his or her relatives. Thus, there is an urgent need to protect genomic data. This is particularly true when the data is used in computation for what we call recreational non-health-related purposes. Towards this goal, in this work we put forward a framework for server-aided secure two-party computation with the security model motivated by genomic applications. One particular security setting that we treat in this work provides stronger security guarantees with respect to malicious users than the traditional malicious model. In particular, we incorporate certified inputs into secure computation based on garbled circuit evaluation to guarantee that a malicious user is unable to modify her inputs in order to learn unauthorized information about the other user’s data. Our solutions are general in the sense that they can be used to securely evaluate arbitrary functions and offer attractive performance compared to the state of the art. We apply the general constructions to three specific types of genomic tests: paternity, genetic compatibility, and ancestry testing and implement the constructions. The results show that all such private tests can be executed within a matter of seconds or less despite the large size of one’s genomic data.

1 January 2015
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Book Chapter
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MBMarina Blanton
Marina Blanton
SSSiddharth Saraph
Siddharth Saraph
The increasing availability and use of biometric data leads to situations when sensitive biometric data is to be handled by entities who may not be fully trusted or otherwise are not authorized to have full access to such data. This calls for mechanisms of provably protecting biometric data while still allowing the computation to take place. Our focus is on privacy-preserving matching of two fingerprints (authentication or identification purposes) using traditional minutia-based representation of fingerprints that leads to the most discriminative fingerprint comparisons. Unlike previous work in the security literature, we would like to focus on algorithms that are guaranteed to find the maximum number of minutiae that can be paired together between two fingerprints leading to more accurate comparisons. To address this problem, we formulate it as a flow network problem and reduce it to finding maximum matching size in bipartite graphs. The resulting problem is in turn reduced to computing the rank of a (non-invertible) matrix, formed as a randomized adjacency matrix of the bipartite graph. We then provide data-oblivious algorithms for matrix rank computation and consecutively finding maximum matching size in a bipartite graph and also extend the algorithms to solve the problem of accurate fingerprint matching. These algorithms lead to their secure counterparts using standard secure two-party or multi-party techniques. Lastly, we implement secure fingerprint matching in the secure two-party computation setting using garbled circuit evaluation. Our experimental results demonstrate that the techniques are efficient, leading to performance similar to that of other fastest secure fingerprint matching techniques, despite higher complexity of our solution that higher accuracy demands.

2 October 2017 in IEEE Security & Privacy
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Journal Article
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MBMarina Blanton
Marina Blanton
FBFattaneh Bayatbabolghani
Fattaneh Bayatbabolghani
In many genomic applications, especially nonmedical applications, computations are carried out in a server-mediated setting where the server enables joint genomic computations between users. Thus, it's sensible to utilize the server's computational capabilities to aid data protection.