William Enck

William Enck

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William Enck

North Carolina State University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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26 May 2025 in ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
LWLaurie Williams
Laurie Williams
GBGiacomo Benedetti
Giacomo Benedetti
SHSivana Hamer
Sivana Hamer
RPRanindya Paramitha
Ranindya Paramitha
IRImranur Rahman
Imranur Rahman
WEWilliam Enck
William Enck
Reusable software libraries, frameworks, and components, such as those provided by open source ecosystems and third-party suppliers, accelerate digital innovation. However, recent years have shown almost exponential growth in attackers leveraging these software artifacts to launch software supply chain attacks. Past well-known software supply chain attacks include the SolarWinds, log4j, and xz utils incidents. Supply chain attacks are considered to have three major attack vectors: through vulnerabilities and malware accidentally or intentionally injected into open source and third-party dependencies/components/containers ; by infiltrating the build infrastructure during the build and deployment processes; and through targeted techniques aimed at the humans involved in software development, such as through social engineering. Plummeting trust in the software supply chain could decelerate digital innovation if the software industry reduces its use of open source and third-party artifacts to reduce risks. This article contains perspectives and knowledge obtained from intentional outreach with practitioners to understand their practical challenges and from extensive research efforts. We then provide an overview of current research efforts to secure the software supply chain. Finally, we propose a future research agenda to close software supply chain attack vectors and support the software industry.

14 April 2023 in IEEE Security & Privacy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
NZNusrat Zahan
Nusrat Zahan
ELElizabeth Lin
Elizabeth Lin
MTMahzabin Tamanna
Mahzabin Tamanna
WEWilliam Enck
William Enck
LWLaurie Williams
Laurie Williams
Executive order 14028 on improving the nation’s cybersecurity highlights the software bill of materials (SBOM) as an essential security practice for software security. This article outlines the top five benefits and challenges of adopting SBOMs, identified by reviewing 200 Internet articles.

2 December 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
NBNathaniel Bennett
Nathaniel Bennett
WZWeidong Zhu
Weidong Zhu
BSBenjamin Simon
Benjamin Simon
RKRyon Kennedy
Ryon Kennedy
WEWilliam Enck
William Enck
KBKevin R. B. Butler
Kevin R. B. Butler
Cellular network infrastructure serves as the backbone of modern mobile wireless communication. As such, cellular cores must be proactively secured against external threats to ensure reliable service. Compromised base station attacks against the core are a rising threat to cellular networks, while user device inputs have long been considered as an attack vector; despite this, few techniques exist to comprehensively test RAN-Core interfaces against malicious input. In this work, we devise a fuzzing framework that performantly fuzzes cellular interfaces accessible from a base station or user device, overcoming several challenges in fuzzing specific to LTE/5G network components. We also introduce ASNFuzzGen, a tool that compiles ASN.1 specifications into structure-aware fuzzing modules, thereby facilitating effective fuzzing exploration of complex cellular protocols. We run fuzzing campaigns against seven open-source and commercial cores and discover 119 vulnerabilities, with 93 CVEs assigned. Our results reveal common implementation mistakes across several cores that lead to vulnerabilities, and the successful coordination of patches for these vulnerabilities across several vendors demonstrates the practical impact ASNFuzzGen has on hardening user-exposed cellular systems.

1 July 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
TDTrevor Dunlap
Trevor Dunlap
ELElizabeth Lin
Elizabeth Lin
WEWilliam Enck
William Enck
BRBradley Reaves
Bradley Reaves
Security advisories are the primary channel of communication for discovered vulnerabilities in open-source software, but they often lack crucial information. Specifically, 63% of vulnerability database reports are missing their patch links, also referred to as vulnerability fixing commits (VFCs). This paper introduces VFCFinder, a tool that generates the top-five ranked set of VFCs for a given security advisory using Natural Language Programming Language (NL-PL) models. VFCFinder achieves a 96.6% recall for finding the correct VFC within the Top-5 commits, and an 80.0% recall for the Top-1 ranked commit. VFCFinder generalizes to nine different programming languages and outperforms state-of-the-art approaches by 36 percentage points in terms of Top-1 recall. As a practical contribution, we used VFCFinder to backfill over 300 missing VFCs in the GitHub Security Advisory (GHSA) database. All of the VFCs were accepted and merged into the GHSA database. In addition to demonstrating a practical pairing of security advisories to VFCs, our general open-source implementation will allow vulnerability database maintainers to drastically improve data quality, supporting efforts to secure the software supply chain.

13 May 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
IPIsaac Polinsky
Isaac Polinsky
PDPubali Datta
Pubali Datta
ABAdam Bates
Adam Bates
WEWilliam Enck
William Enck
Serverless computing is supplanting past versions of cloud computing as the easiest way to rapidly prototype and deploy applications. However, the reentrant and ephemeral nature of serverless functions only exacerbates the challenge of correctly specifying security policies. Unfortunately, with role-based access control solutions like Amazon Identity and Access Management (IAM) already suffering from pervasive misconfiguration problems, the likelihood of policy failures in serverless applications is high. In this work, we introduce GRASP, a graph-based analysis framework for modeling serverless access control policies as queryable reachability graphs. GRASP generates reusable models that represent the principals of a serverless application and the interactions between those principals. We implement GRASP for Amazon IAM in Prolog, then deploy it on a corpus of 731 open source Amazon Lambda applications. We find that serverless policies tend to be short and highly permissive, e.g., 92% of surveyed policies are comprised of just 10 statements and 30% exhibit full reachability between all application functions and resources. We then use GRASP to identify potential attack vectors permitted by these policies, including hundreds of sensitive access channels, a dozen publicly-exposed resources, and four channels that may permit an attacker to exfiltrate an application's private resources through one of its public resources. These findings demonstrate GRASP's utility as a means of identifying opportunities for hardening application policies and highlighting potential exfiltration channels.

4 July 2019 in IEEE Security & Privacy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WEWilliam Enck
William Enck
TBTerry Benzel
Terry Benzel