This paper outlines the theory-based view of strategy and markets. We argue that novel or “great” strategies come from theories. Entrepreneurs and managers originate theories and hypotheses about which activities they should engage in, which assets they might buy, and how they will create value. A firm’s strategy, then, represents a set of contrarian beliefs and a theory—a unique, firm-specific point of view—about what problems to solve, and how to organize and govern the overall process of value creation. We outline the cognitive and perceptual, organizational, and economic foundations of the theory-based view of strategy. We also discuss the essential attributes needed for a firm-level theory of strategy. Throughout the paper we offer informal examples of our argument, by briefly discussing the strategies of companies like Apple, Uber, Disney, Wal-Mart, and Airbnb. The theory-based view of strategy and markets also offers important insights for how firms govern themselves (including ownership, boards, and organization design) and how firms interact with capital markets and external evaluators and stakeholders. We conclude with a discussion of the practical and managerial applications of the theory-based view.
Research Summary: Ownership is fundamental to firm strategy, organization, and governance. Standard ownership concepts—mainly derived from agency and incomplete contracting theories—focus on its incentive effects. However, these concepts and theories neglect ownership's role as an instrument to match judgment about resource use and governance with the firm's evolving environment under uncertainty. We develop the concept of ownership competence—the skill with which ownership is used as an instrument to create value—and decompose it into matching competence ( what to own), governance competence ( how to own), and timing competence ( when to own). We describe how property rights of use, appropriation, and transfer relate to the three ownership competences and show how our theory offers a fresh perspective into the role of ownership for value generation. Managerial Summary: Business owners own with different levels of competence, and differences in ownership competence matter for value creation. We argue that ownership competence consists of competence about what to own (matching competence), competence about how to own (governance competence), and competence about when to own (timing competence). We clarify the role played by each of the three competences for value creation. We also show how the importance of ownership competence for value creation alters depending on ownership concentration, life cycle effects, uncertainty of the environment, and the efficiency of resource markets. With our paper, we prepare the ground for a fuller understanding of the strategic role of owners for value creation.
The growth and diversity of strategic management research raise important questions about the field’s identity. In response to the increasing breadth of topics addressed in the field, scholars have suggested the need for a more topical focus, improved theoretical and empirical rigor, or additional integrative reviews. We suggest an alternative approach, one that emphasizes the distinctive contributions of strategic management. We highlight three unique characteristics of strategic decisions: interdependence across contemporaneous decisions, across the decisions of other economic actors, and across time. We suggest that this threefold characterization of strategic decisions improves on existing definitions that rely on the perceived importance of decisions or the trade-offs presented by a decision. Our definition of strategic decisions highlights patterns of interdependent choices that are complementary or superadditive to value creation. Moreover, this characterization of strategic decisions offers a ready way for scholars with multiple disciplinary or topical interests to connect with the field’s core. These characteristics of strategic decisions also relate to theories of resource allocation and strategic investment, competitive advantage, and firm boundaries that suggest opportunities to better connect these streams of research.
We suggest and provide empirical evidence that the bargaining power of alliance partners stemming from their prominence in alliance networks influences the ex-ante allocation of value capturing rights in high-tech alliance contracts. Network prominence can enhance the availability of alternative partners for a firm and thereby elevates the firm’s bargaining power and enables the firm to receive (i) more value capturing rights vis-à-vis its partner (i.e., more net value capturing rights) and (ii) more rights to the unexpected outcomes vis-à-vis its partner. We empirically investigate the content of research and development (R&D) collaboration contracts between biotech and pharmaceutical firms and show that as the prominence of the client (i.e., pharmaceutical firm) increases, it is able to attain (i) more net value capturing rights to outcomes within the area of collaboration and (ii) more rights to unexpected outcomes. By contrast, increased prominence of the R&D firm (i.e., biotech firm) decreases both the number of net value capturing rights the client receives as well as the rights to unexpected outcomes that the client captures in an alliance contract. The bargaining power that the R&D firm attains from its prominent position in alliance networks becomes less important during hot IPO markets, which provide the R&D firm more outside options to obtain financial resources. By documenting the importance of firms’ network positions as sources of bargaining power during alliance contracting, our paper contributes to the literature on strategic alliances, bargaining, and contract design.