Christopher Portmann

Christopher Portmann

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Christopher Portmann

ETH Zurich

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 March 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CPChristopher Portmann
Christopher Portmann
CMChristian Matt
Christian Matt
UMUeli Maurer
Ueli Maurer
RRRenato Renner
Renato Renner
BTBjorn Tackmann
Bjorn Tackmann
Complex information-processing systems, for example, quantum circuits, cryptographic protocols, or multi-player games, are naturally described as networks composed of more basic information-processing systems. A modular analysis of such systems requires a mathematical model of systems that is closed under composition, i.e., a network of these objects is again an object of the same type. We propose such a model and call the corresponding systems causal boxes. Causal boxes capture superpositions of causal structures, e.g., messages sent by a causal box A can be in a superposition of different orders or in a superposition of being sent to box B and box C. Furthermore, causal boxes can model systems whose behavior depends on time. By instantiating the abstract cryptography framework with causal boxes, we obtain the first composable security framework that can handle arbitrary quantum protocols and relativistic protocols.

1 April 2019 in New Journal of Physics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
VVV Vilasini
V Vilasini
CPChristopher Portmann
Christopher Portmann
LRLídia Del Rio
Lídia Del Rio
Relativistic protocols have been proposed to overcome certain impossibility results in classical and quantum cryptography. In such a setting, one takes the location of honest players into account, and uses the signalling limit given by the speed of light to constraint the abilities of dishonest agents. However, composing such protocols with each other to construct new cryptographic resources is known to be insecure in some cases. To make general statements about such constructions, a composable framework for modelling cryptographic security in Minkowski space is required. Here, we introduce a framework for performing such a modular security analysis of classical and quantum cryptographic schemes in Minkowski space. As an application, we show that (1) fair and unbiased coin flipping can be constructed from a simple resource called channel with delay; (2) biased coin flipping, bit commitment and channel with delay through any classical, quantum or post-quantum relativistic protocols are all impossible without further setup assumptions; (3) it is impossible to securely increase the delay of a channel, given several short-delay channels as ingredients. Results (1) and (3) imply in particular the non-composability of existing relativistic bit commitment and coin flipping protocols.

22 November 2019
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
FBFabio Banfi
Fabio Banfi
UMUeli Maurer
Ueli Maurer
CPChristopher Portmann
Christopher Portmann
JZJiamin Zhu
Jiamin Zhu