12 August 2021 in Philosophy & Technology
The introduction of self-driving vehicles gives rise to a large number of ethical issues that go beyond the common, extremely narrow, focus on improbable dilemma-like scenarios. This article provides a broad overview of realistic ethical issues related to self-driving vehicles. Some of the major topics covered are as follows: Strong opinions for and against driverless cars may give rise to severe social and political conflicts. A low tolerance for accidents caused by driverless vehicles may delay the introduction of driverless systems that would substantially reduce the risks. Trade-offs will arise between safety and other requirement on the road traffic system. Over-reliance on the swift collision-avoiding reactions of self-driving vehicles can induce people to take dangerous actions, such as stepping out in front of a car, relying on its fast braking. Children travelling alone can violate safety instructions such as the use of seatbelts. Digital information about routes and destinations can be used to convey commercial and political messages to car users. If fast passage can be bought, then socio-economic segregation of road traffic may result. Terrorists and other criminals can hack into a vehicle and make it crash. They can also use self-driving vehicles for instance to carry bombs to their designed places of detonation or to wreak havoc on a country’s road system.
7 May 2018 in Housing, Theory and Society
The term social housing has been characterized as a “floating signifier”, i.e. a term with no agreed-upon meaning. The lack of a definition often leads to misunderstandings, rather than constructive dialogue on the advantages and disadvantages of such a system. The aim of this article is to contribute to clarity by providing a discussion on the potential defining criteria of social housing and suggesting a definition of the concept. Definitions of the term social housing and descriptions of European social housing systems used in the last eight years will be presented and discussed. Five potential defining criteria derived from the literature are evaluated as to their sufficiency and necessity for a definition.
15 November 2017 in Science and Engineering Ethics
This article proposes a new definition of information security, the ‘Appropriate Access’ definition. Apart from providing the basic criteria for a definition—correct demarcation and meaning concerning the state of security—it also aims at being a definition suitable for any information security perspective. As such, it bridges the conceptual divide between so-called ‘soft issues’ of information security (those including, e.g., humans, organizations, culture, ethics, policies, and law) and more technical issues. Because of this it is also suitable for various analytical purposes, such as analysing possible security breaches, or for studying conflicting attitudes on security in an organization. The need for a new definition is demonstrated by pointing to a number of problems for the standard definition type of information security—the so-called CIA definition. Besides being too broad as well as too narrow, it cannot properly handle the soft issues of information security, nor recognize the contextual and normative nature of security.
6 April 2020 in AI & SOCIETY
The philosophical–ethical literature and the public debate on autonomous vehicles have been obsessed with ethical issues related to crashing. In this article, these discussions, including more empirical investigations, will be critically assessed. It is argued that a related and more pressing issue is questions concerning safety. For example, what should we require from autonomous vehicles when it comes to safety? What do we mean by ‘safety’? How do we measure it? In response to these questions, the article will present a foundation for a continued discussion on these issues and an argument for why discussions about safety should be prioritized over ethical concerns related to crashing.
28 January 2020 in The Journal of Ethics
Although popular, control accounts of privacy suffer from various counterexamples. In this article, it is argued that two such counterexamples—while individually resolvable—can be combined to yield a dilemma for control accounts of privacy. Furthermore, it is argued that it is implausible that control accounts of privacy can defend against this dilemma. Thus, it is concluded that we ought not define privacy in terms of control. Lastly, it is argued that since the concept of privacy is the object of the right to privacy if the former cannot be defined in terms of control, neither can the latter.
17 January 2023 in AI and Ethics
Recently, Luke Munn attacked “AI ethics” generally, or guidelines, principles, codes of ethics, ethical frameworks. In particular, he argued that ethical guidelines are useless. Here I respond to this critique, arguing that Munn’s criticism is mostly unfair and misguided, and that his own proposal is already implemented in various guidelines.