Wei You

Wei You

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Wei You

Renmin University of China, Beijing, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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8 January 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JHJianjun Huang
Jianjun Huang
SHSongming Han
Songming Han
WYWei You
Wei You
WSWenchang Shi
Wenchang Shi
BLBin Liang
Bin Liang
YWYanjun Wu
Yanjun Wu
Smart contract vulnerabilities have attracted lots of concerns due to the resultant financial losses. Matching-based detection methods extrapolating known vulnerabilities to unknown have proven to be effective in other platforms. However, directly adopting the technique to smart contracts is obstructed by two issues, i.e., diversity of bytecode generation resulting from the rapid evolution of compilers and interference of noise code easily caused by the homogeneous business logics. To address the problems, we propose contract bytecode-oriented normalization and slicing techniques to augment bytecode matching. Specifically, we conduct data- and instruction-level normalizations to uniform the bytecode generated by different compilers, and enforce contract-specific slicing by tracking data- and control-flows with simulated bytecode executions to prune the noise code as far as possible. Based on the above techniques, we design an unsupervised graph embedding algorithm to encode the code graphs into quantitatively comparable vectors. The potentially vulnerable smart contracts can be identified by measuring the similarities between their vectors and known vulnerable ones. Our evaluations have shown the efficiency (0.47 seconds per contract on average), effectiveness (160 verified true positives) and high precision (91.95% for top-ranked). It is worth noting that, we also identify dozens of honeypot contracts, further demonstrating the capability of our method.

15 August 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WYWei You
Wei You
BLBin Liang
Bin Liang
WSWenchang Shi
Wenchang Shi
PWPeng Wang
Peng Wang
XZXiangyu Zhang
Xiangyu Zhang
Dynamic taint analysis (DTA), as a mainstream information flow tracking technique, has been widely used in mobile security. On the Android platform, the existing DTA approaches are typically implemented by instrumenting the Dalvik virtual machine (DVM) interpreter or the Android emulator with taint enforcement code. The most prominent problem of the interpreter-based approaches is that they cannot work in the new Android RunTime (ART) environment introduced since the 5.0 release. For the emulator-based approaches, the most prominent problem is that they cannot be deployed on real devices. In addition, almost all the existing Android DTA approaches only concern the explicit information flow caused by data dependence, while completely ignore the impact of implicit information flow caused by control dependence. These problems limit their adoption in the latest Android system and make them ineffective in detecting the state-of-the-art malware whose privacy-breaching behaviors are inactivated in the analyzed environment (e.g., the emulator) or conducted via implicit information flow. In this paper, we present TaintMan, an ART-compatible DTA framework that can be deployed on unmodified and non-rooted Android devices. In TaintMan, the taint enforcement code is statically instrumented into both the target application and the system class libraries to track data flow and common control flow. A specially designed execution environment reconstruction technique, named reference hijacking, is proposed to force the target application to reference the instrumented system class libraries. By enforcing on-demand instrumentation and on-demand tracking, the performance overhead is significantly reduced. We have developed TaintMan and deployed it on two popular stock smartphones (HTC One S equipped with Android-4.0 and Motorola MOTO G equipped with Android-5.0). The evaluation with malware samples and real-world applications shows that TaintMan can effectively detect privacy leakage behaviors with an acceptable performance overhead.

19 October 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JHJianjun Huang
Jianjun Huang
BXBo Xue
Bo Xue
JJJiasheng Jiang
Jiasheng Jiang
WYWei You
Wei You
BLBin Liang
Bin Liang
YWYanjun Wu
Yanjun Wu
Third-party library (TPL) detection is important for Android app security analysis nowadays. Unfortunately, the existing techniques often suffer from poor scalability. In some situations, the detection time cost is even unacceptable. Although a few existing methods run relatively fast, they cannot provide enough effectiveness, especially for non-structure-preserving obfuscated apps, e.g., repackaged and flattened. In this paper, we treat TPLs detection as a set inclusion problem to effectively and efficiently analyze obfuscated apps, and develop a scalable two-stage detection approach, Libloom . Specifically, the package and class signatures are encoded into two levels of Bloom filters respectively. At the first stage, the package filters are used to identify a limited number of candidate TPLs via set overlapping measurement to avoid unnecessary class-level set analysis. Subsequently, with the class filters, a similarity score is computed between the query app and each candidate to detect the integrated TPLs, and a novel entropy-based metric is presented to specially handle the repackaged and flattened apps. We have evaluated Libloom on some large-scale benchmarks involving tens of thousands of TPL instances. The experiment results demonstrate that Libloom outperforms state-of-the-art tools in both effectiveness and efficiency. Especially, the proposed two-stage method can run about ten times faster than the straightforward class-level analysis on flattened apps, and without loss of accuracy.

1 April 2014
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
PWPeng Wang
Peng Wang
BLBin Liang
Bin Liang
WYWei You
Wei You
JLJingzhe Li
Jingzhe Li
WSWenchang Shi
Wenchang Shi
Android apps are usually rich in GUIs and users interact with the GUIs to use the functions provided by an app. To make Android apps reliable, GUI testing is an effective method. Automation and high GUI coverage is necessary in the testing for the sake of minimizing human effort and maximizing effectiveness. However, the existing work is insufficient to meet such requirements. In this paper, we identify several challenges for conducting GUI traversal on Android, such as component recognition, event injection and UI traversal. We present a tool named Droid Crawle to address the challenges for automatically exploring the GUIs of Android apps with high GUI coverage. The evaluation of Droid Crawler shows that it is efficient and effective to automatically capture the GUI tree of the target application with high GUI coverage.

25 June 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Computers
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JHJianjun Huang
Jianjun Huang
JJJiasheng Jiang
Jiasheng Jiang
WYWei You
Wei You
BLBin Liang
Bin Liang
Dynamic symbolic execution (DSE) has been successfully adopted for vulnerability detection in desktop and mobile platforms. Unfortunately, we cannot simply extrapolate those techniques to smart contracts. The major challenge is that smart contracts exhibit a nonuniform data access mode. Other than accessing the data via uniform addresses, smart contracts compromise multiple addressing modes, including flat address mode and key-value mode. More seriously, accessing a key-value table usually involves additional hash operations to obtain the keys. In this paper, we propose a DSE framework to resolve the nonuniform data access in smart contracts. More specifically, we exactly track the symbolic variables with concrete addresses and compute the actual/hash keys for table-like accesses. We also take the symbolic keys into account to distinguish data accesses incidentally with the same concrete keys resulting from artificially generated values. We describe the DSE framework in operational semantics. On top of the framework, we implement an integer overflow detector Nova and a multi-transactional vulnerability detector Mtvd . The experiments show that Nova outperforms state-of-the-art analysis tools in detecting the integer overflows with much higher precision and recall, 94.2 and 93.0 percent, respectively. Mtvd successfully reports three ether leaking vulnerabilities and one suicidal issue from real-world smart contracts.

12 April 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
XLXuwei Liu
Xuwei Liu
WYWei You
Wei You
YYYapeng Ye
Yapeng Ye
ZZZhuo Zhang
Zhuo Zhang
JHJianjun Huang
Jianjun Huang
XZXiangyu Zhang
Xiangyu Zhang
In recent years, coverage-based greybox fuzzing has proven to be an effective and practical technique for discovering software vulnerabilities. The availability of American Fuzzy Loop (AFL) has facilitated numerous advances in overcoming challenges in fuzzing. However, the issue of mutating complex file formats, such as PDF, remains unresolved due to strict constraints. Existing fuzzers often produce mutants that fail to parse by applications, limited by bit/byte mutations performed on input files. Our observation is that most in-memory representations of file formats are simple, and well-designed applications have built-in printer functions to emit these structures as files. Thus, we propose a new technique that mutates the in-memory structures of inputs and utilizes printer functions to regenerate mutated files. Unlike prior approaches that require complex analysis to learn file format constraints, our technique leverages the printer function to preserve format constraints. We implement a prototype called FuzzInMem and compare it with AFL as well as other state-of-the-art fuzzers, including AFL++, Mopt, Weizz, and FormatFuzzer. The results show that FuzzInMem is scalable and substantially outperforms general-purpose fuzzers in terms of valid seed generation and path coverage. By applying FuzzInMem to real-world applications, we found 29 unique vulnerabilities and were awarded 5 CVEs.