2 July 2020 in Journal of European Public Policy
The view that silos are endemic in organisations in general and the European Civil Service in particular has become increasingly widespread. Yet, silos are rarely investigated theoretically or empirically. What is a silo? What are the individual and organisational factors associated with silos? We propose a functionalist approach to silo definition and identification, which links individual and organisational tasks to expected intra-organisational interactions: we operationalise silos as clusters of employees lacking communication with other parts of the organisation, and analyse civil servants and departments as bipartite networks of communication using stochastic blockmodelling. We explore the existence of silos in two European bureaucracies, which differ in mission, size and workforce composition: the European Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council. We do not find evidence of silo-isation in either bureaucracy, but rather task-based patterns of interaction. Our approach can be extended to include other theoretical perspectives, e.g., socialisation effects.
19 June 2018 in Journal of Public Policy
The literature on transnational regulatory networks identified interdependence as their main rationale, downplaying domestic factors. Typically, relevant contributions use the word “network” only metaphorically. Yet, informal ties between regulators constitute networked structures of collaboration, which can be measured and explained. Regulators choose their frequent, regular network partners. What explains those choices? This article develops an Exponential Random Graph Model of the network of European national energy regulators to identify the drivers of informal regulatory networking. The results show that regulators tend to network with peers who regulate similarly organised market structures. Geography and European policy frameworks also play a role. Overall, the British regulator is significantly more active and influential than its peers, and a divide emerges between regulators from EU-15 and others. Therefore, formal frameworks of cooperation (i.e. a European Agency) were probably necessary to foster regulatory coordination across the EU.
3 October 2018 in Journal of European Public Policy
The literature has found that regulatory networks foster exchange of information between regulators, but failed to specify the mechanism whereby regulators network for expertise. This paper posits that informal networks constitute a compensatory mechanism for lacking resources. The hypothesis guiding analysis is that lower resources (operationalised as staff resources) are associated with higher network activism (operationalised as a higher proportion of outgoing ties), particularly for regulators with intermediate levels of resources, for whom the benefits of networking are most likely to outweigh the costs. I test this hypothesis in the empirical case of European national energy regulators, using recent and original data on their bilateral collaboration ties. The results of the statistical analysis lend support to the hypothesis. The results suggest that the interdependence engendered by the European Union improves European regulatory governance by improving national regulatory practice, more than would be possible on the basis of national resources alone.
10 March 2020 in Journal of European Public Policy
European Administrative Networks (EANs) are well-studied platforms of collaboration between national authorities. To understand EANs, the literature typically relies on few explanatory variables: network origins, objectives, and outputs. This external view of EANs leaves important questions unanswered, notably concerning power redistribution and regulators’ perception of EANs. This article highlights the importance of network internal structures as an explanatory variable for understanding EANs. We contend that internal structures are ‘opportunity structures’ for regulators to set agendas and share resources. We investigate the case of the European Competition Network (ECN) – a highly structured, hierarchical and formalized enforcement network – drawing on structured interviews with 15 National Competition Agencies (NCAs) carried out in 2014. We find that the ECN’s formal internal structures afford all NCAs access to the agenda, foster perceptions of effectiveness, and promote informal sharing of expertise outside the network. Future research should incorporate internal structures into analyses of administrative networks.
14 April 2019 in Governance
12 April 2022 in Policy Studies Journal
Policy forums bring individual actors together to deliberate on specific policy issues. The literature found that actors' perceptions of forum performance depend on both their individual characteristics (goals, expertise, resources) and forum processes (trust, learning, beliefs). However, we do not know how different combinations of actors, embodying different types of knowledge or expertise, relate to forum performance. We distinguish between policy and institutional specialization. Forum participants can be policy specialists, who are experts on the policy issue, and/or institutional specialists, who are expert of the policy process in the governance system. The former excel at problem definition and facilitation; the latter enable inclusivity. We surmise that higher proportions of specialized actors positively affect the group's perceptions of forum performance in terms of both process and outcomes, particularly in high conflict forums. We test this claim using survey data on 55 policy forums working on adaptation to sea level rise in the San Francisco Bay Area, collected in summer 2018. The empirical findings lend support to our hypothesis as concerns policy specialists but not as concerns institutional specialists. Further research should devote more effort to study how actor composition affects forum performance.