INTRODUCTION The idea that a person's “race” is not the indelible mark of one's bloodline, phenotype, or some other biologistic notion no longer raises eyebrows, but it remains for the most part politely ignored by quantitatively oriented, survey-based social science researchers. Although we acknowledge that race, like ethnicity, is a social construct marked by fluidity, multiplicity, and contingency, we continue to measure racial and ethnic identities as fixed, categorical variables. This gap between theory and practice may be consequential if indeed it is the case that a fluid, continuous reality is measured in fixed, categorical terms. In this chapter, a new approach to measuring ethnoracial self-identification is presented, one that aims to define the parameters of this gap by explicitly taking variations in racial or ethnic self-identification as the object of inquiry. Specifically, the chapter compares the standard approach to ethnoracial self-identification in surveys against a new measurement approach in which respondents are given “identity points” to allocate across a relevant set of social identity categories. This identity point allocation scheme allows respondents, as they see fit, to identify with as many racial or ethnic groups and to weight the strength of their self-identification across these groups. This new approach not only allows us to test for the sensitivity of ethnoracial self-identification to a question format but, in doing so, also presents a visibly different portrait of racial or ethnic self-identification than is found in most social surveys.
This chapter studies the implications of the socioeconomic and demographic factors on public opinion among Asian Americans. The first part reviews the present social science research on Asian-American political attitudes, and then discusses the outlines of Asian-American political partisanship and attitudes on some relevant political issues. It ends with a study of the observations on the challenges of gathering opinion data among Asian Americans and a discussion of research strategies, and also refers to some data taken from the 2008 National Asian-American Survey.
2 January 2021 in Australian Journal of Political Science
In 2017 the Australian government appointed a Royal Commission of inquiry into malfeasance in the banking sector. This article reports findings from a 2018 survey on attitudes to financial regulation and a survey experiment testing different media treatments. Attitudes on financial regulation are distinct from left-right positions on redistributive issues; we find no significant relationship between partisan identification and preferences for financial regulation. In the experimental treatment, all three frames catalysed anger and disgust from readers. However, neither of the two strong partisan frames moved policy preferences. The non-partisan frame – which included messages associated with both left and right, and which linked both parties to systemic capture by the banks – was the only article that had any effect on policy preferences, but only with non-partisan identifiers. Our results suggest that persuasive frames focused on the capture of politics by banking interests can move opinions of swing voters on financial regulation.
In the past decade, an important literature in the social sciences has examined public attitudes toward immigrants in host societies. In it, a prominent experimental method—the conjoint design, where participants are tasked with rating or choosing between randomized profiles—has been used reliably to understand how immigrant characteristics shape admission preferences. We collate replication datasets from 100 individual studies spanning 1,475,403 immigrant profiles with 26 randomized attributes evaluated by 142,817 survey respondents from 36 countries. Meta-analyses reinforce well-established findings: Economic, cultural, humanitarian, and procedural factors all influence evaluations. Meta-reanalyses show that preferences are broadly similar across countries and demographic groups. However, they also reveal two additional patterns: Economic considerations have become more influential over time, and evaluations of individual immigrants differ sharply depending on where people stand on the broader immigration debate. These findings shed light on ongoing debates and point to fruitful areas for future research.
Around the world, the growing power of giant technology firms has outpaced regulatory oversight, raising urgent questions about how public opinion can be mobilized in support of meaningful reform. When do broad coalitions emerge in support of stronger regulation? This study investigates corporate scandals as windows of opportunity—focusing events—that can galvanize public support for new regulations and amplify issue salience. To assess this possibility, we conducted a two-wave survey experiment that we fielded simultaneously in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. After collecting pre-treatment data in a separate, dedicated survey wave, our subjects were later assigned to read media coverage describing the 2018 Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal. The results confirm our preregistered hypothesis: in all four countries, exposure to scandal coverage significantly increases support for technology regulation and elevates the issue’s salience. Anger mediates this shift, and increased issue salience correlates with a greater willingness to engage in political action around technology policy. At a moment of heightened concern about the concentration of economic and political power in a handful of mammoth technology firms, these findings illuminate the microfoundations of how focusing events can break political inertia and catalyze regulatory reform.
That someone like me could serve as president of the American Political Science Association is a testament to one story about America. It is a story of success that we celebrate, even as such stories erase and conceal other stories about the United States.