20 September 2024 in Trends in Biotechnology
Neuroprivacy, or the privacy of neural data, has attracted considerable interest. Here, we explore the implications of neuroprivacy in human brain organoid research, detailing different interpretations of this right. Findings suggest a limited connection between neuroprivacy and brain organoid research, underscoring the importance of further examination of this critical issue.
2 October 2020 in Theoria
14 March 2025 in EMBO Reports
Japan is developing regulations for stem cell–based embryo models, guided by domestic ethical considerations. Key challenges remain, including classification, oversight, and public engagement, highlighting the need for a balanced and transparent framework. [Image: see text]
2 August 2024 in The American Journal of Bioethics
25 December 2025 in AJOB Neuroscience
This paper explores the complementarity of Nishida Kitarō's relational ontology with Western bioethics in addressing novel moral dilemmas arising from advanced neural technologies, including brain organoids, human-animal chimeras, and biocomputational systems. Nishida's philosophy transcends the subject-object dichotomy by emphasizing the interconnectedness and co-creative nature of all beings, thereby reframing traditional questions of moral status, personhood, and consent. We examine recent scientific advances and policy debates to demonstrate that Nishida's approach not only enriches ethical understanding but also provides more nuanced guidance that can account for both the technological dynamism and cultural diversity of contemporary research. We argue that this relational, context-dependent ethics, grounded in humility and continuous reflection, fosters an inclusive attitude toward emerging forms of life. Nishida's framework coexists harmoniously with Western philosophy and deepens our grasp of the relational networks that interconnect humans, animals, and even machine- or organoid-based intelligence. We propose an agile, forward-looking model of ethics to respond to the transformative developments of neural innovation.
21 April 2024 in The Journal of Ethics
Welfare subjectivists face a dilemma. On the one hand, traditional subjectivist theories—such as the desire-fulfillment theory—are too permissive to account for the well-being of typical mature human beings. On the other hand, more “refined” theories—such as the life-satisfaction theory—are too restrictive to account for the well-being of various welfare subjects, including newborns, those with profound cognitive impairments, or non-human animals. This paper examines a class of welfare subjectivism that addresses this dilemma with sensitivity to the diversity in welfare subjects. First, the most-sophisticated-attitude view (MSA) is introduced. MSA holds that an object, $$x$$ , is good for a subject, $$S$$ , in proportion to the strength of $$S$$ ’s pro-attitude towards $$x$$ if and only if the pro-attitude at issue is $$S$$ ’s most sophisticated type. Typically, the well-being of typical mature human beings is assessed in terms of one’s authentic whole-life satisfaction, whereas that of human newborns is assessed in terms of something less sophisticated such as pleasure. MSA offers the rationale for this difference based on an underexplored version of perfectionism: procedural perfectionism. Next, provided that MSA may involve an implausibly strong claim, this paper examines two moderate variations of MSA that accept the partial relevance of less sophisticated types of valenced attitude. Finally, it is illustrated how MSA and its variations have plausible implications regarding the well-being of enhanced or dis-enhanced people.