Brian Guay

Brian Guay

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Brian Guay

Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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10 August 2023 in Nature Human Behaviour
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Journal Article
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BGBrian Guay
Brian Guay
ABAdam J. Berinsky
Adam J. Berinsky
GPGordon Pennycook
Gordon Pennycook
DRDavid Rand
David Rand

21 August 2023 in Nature Human Behaviour
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Journal Article
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ACAidan Combs
Aidan Combs
GTGraham Tierney
Graham Tierney
BGBrian Guay
Brian Guay
FMFriedolin Merhout
Friedolin Merhout
CBChristopher A. Bail
Christopher A. Bail
AVAlexander Volfovsky
Alexander Volfovsky

23 June 2021 in American Journal of Political Science
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Journal Article
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BGBrian Guay
Brian Guay
CJChristopher D. Johnston
Christopher D. Johnston

31 March 2025 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Journal Article
Open access
BGBrian Guay
Brian Guay
TMTyler Marghetis
Tyler Marghetis
CWCara Wong
Cara Wong
DLDavid Landy
David Landy
Americans dramatically overestimate the size of African American, Latino, Muslim, Asian, Jewish, immigrant, and LGBTQ populations, leading to concerns about downstream racial attitudes and policy preferences. Such errors are common whenever the public is asked to estimate proportions relevant to political issues, from refugee crises and polarization to climate change and COVID-19. Researchers across the social sciences interpret these errors as evidence of widespread misinformation that is topic-specific and potentially harmful. Here, we show that researchers and journalists have misinterpreted the origins and meaning of these misestimates by overlooking systematic distortions introduced by the domain-general psychological processes involved in estimating proportions under uncertainty. In general, people systematically rescale estimates of proportions toward more central prior expectations, resulting in the consistent overestimation of smaller groups and underestimation of larger groups. We formalize this process and show that it explains much of the systematic error in estimates of demographic groups ( N = 100 , 170 estimates from 22 countries). This domain-general account far outperforms longstanding group-specific explanations (e.g., biases toward specific groups). We find, moreover, that people make the same errors when estimating the size of racial, nonracial, and entirely nonpolitical groups, such as the proportion of Americans who have a valid passport or own a washing machine. Our results call for researchers, journalists, and pundits alike to reconsider how to interpret misperceptions about the demographic structure of society.

1 July 2021 in Public Opinion Quarterly
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BGBrian Guay
Brian Guay
JLJesse Lopez
Jesse Lopez
An extensive literature examines how partisanship divides public opinion on hot-button political issues, but little is known about its potential to polarize attitudes on bipartisan issues. Recent work shows that while Americans hold strong preferences for bipartisanship, their attitudes toward bipartisan issues quickly become polarized when associated with partisan identities. While prior research has examined the effect of these associations in lab settings, tests outside the lab are far more rare. In this research note, we aim to provide such a test by leveraging a bipartisan issue that became associated with partisan identities suddenly in 2018: the presidential alert. While the presidential alert—a product of bipartisan efforts to improve the government's capacity to send emergency communications in the wake of Hurricane Katrina—received little notice when signed into law, it gained widespread media attention during its inaugural test in 2018. We rapidly recruited a sample of US adults immediately before the alert was sent, such that participants in our study received the alert on their phones while completing a survey. We exploited the timing of the alert to randomize whether respondents answered questions about the alert moments before or after receiving it. Across two experiments we find little evidence that associating the alert with the Trump administration had any polarizing effect on attitudes, even when explicitly associated with a partisan cue, suggesting that at least some bipartisan attitudes are not as easily polarized as prior work implies.

23 February 2026 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Journal Article
Open access
BGBrian Guay
Brian Guay
TMTyler Marghetis
Tyler Marghetis
CWCara Wong
Cara Wong
DLDavid Landy
David Landy