Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo

Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo

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Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

19Years (2008-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 May 2008 in American Political Science Review
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JHJohn D. Huber
John D. Huber
CMCecilia Martinez-Gallardo
Cecilia Martinez-Gallardo
We examine the stability of individual ministers across parliamentary democracies. Our data show that this stability is only loosely related to the stability of cabinets, making it impossible to rely primarily on arguments about cabinet duration to explain patterns of individual stability. We argue that to explain patterns of individual stability, it is useful to focus on the problems that party leaders have in identifying which individuals have the qualities necessary to do their jobs well. The institutional powers of ministers, coalition attributes, and party-specific variables should affect the uncertainty that party leaders have about which individuals will be successful ministers, on one hand, and the ability of party leaders to replace unsuccessful ministers, on the other. Our empirical tests support these arguments. The analysis therefore has implications for expectations regarding the circumstances under which minister stability should positively or negatively influence the policymaking performance of government.

22 January 2014 in Political Behavior
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RCRyan E. Carlin
Ryan E. Carlin
GLGregory J. Love
Gregory J. Love
CMCecilia Martínez-Gallardo
Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo

20 September 2011 in Comparative Political Studies
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CMCecilia Martínez-Gallardo
Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo
This article challenges a key part of the conventional view of coalitions in presidential systems that sees them as short-lived and ad hoc. The author shows instead that there is wide variation in the durability of governing coalitions across these regimes. She develops a theory of the incentives of parties to participate in the government and the circumstances under which scholars might expect to see the existing governing coalition break down. The author draws on data from 121 cabinets in 12 Latin American countries between the late 1980s and the mid-2000s to show that the dissolution of the cabinet is more likely when the president places less value on coalition building as a policy-making strategy and when parties find it costly to participate in the government. In particular, the author shows that strong unilateral institutional powers tend to diminish the incentives of presidents to compromise with other parties; in contrast, effective legislatures and high rates of approval for the executive contribute significantly to more stable governments.

17 November 2014 in Comparative Political Studies
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RCRyan E. Carlin
Ryan E. Carlin
GLGregory J. Love
Gregory J. Love
CMCecilia Martínez-Gallardo
Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo
The importance of institutions in shaping citizens’ ability to punish or reward politicians for economic outcomes is well established. Where institutions divide authority, politicians can blame each other and citizens find it harder to assign responsibility for policy failures; where institutions clarify lines of authority, citizens can better hold politicians accountable. However, this argument assumes that citizens perceive policy responsibility as shared among political actors and this is not always the case. Looking at security policy, we argue that when policy responsibility is concentrated in a single actor the effect of institutions on blame attribution is different from what the economic voting literature predicts. Divided government in this context makes blame-shifting less effective and makes it more likely that citizens will punish incumbents. By contrast, the ability of executives to control the narrative around security failures by blaming the perpetrators, especially during unified government, can help them avoid blame.

10 June 2022 in Party Politics
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CMCecilia Martínez-Gallardo
Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo
NCNicolás de la Cerda
Nicolás de la Cerda
JHJonathan Hartlyn
Jonathan Hartlyn
LHLiesbet Hooghe
Liesbet Hooghe
GMGary Marks
Gary Marks
RBRyan Bakker
Ryan Bakker
The degree to which party systems are ideologically and programmatically structured is central to democracy. This article analyzes differences in the extent and nature of programmatic structuration in Latin America and Europe, using a new original data source, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey-Latin America (CHES-LA), in combination with the long-standing CHES-Europe. First, we demonstrate the reliability of CHES-LA in relation to CHES-Europe, and substantiate its validity by comparing it to other expert, elite and party manifesto surveys in Latin America. Using confirmatory factor analysis, we then show that while party system structuration in Latin America is somewhat lower than in Europe, it is also of a decisively different nature. In Latin America economic and socio-cultural policy positions are largely captured in a single overlapping dimension; in Europe, by contrast, competition occurs overwhelmingly along two dimensions, each with distinct clusters of policy positions.

3 February 2021 in Comparative Political Studies
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RCRyan E. Carlin
Ryan E. Carlin
THTimothy Hellwig
Timothy Hellwig
GLGregory J. Love
Gregory J. Love
CMCecilia Martínez-Gallardo
Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo
MSMatthew M. Singer
Matthew M. Singer
Public evaluations of the economy are key for understanding how citizens develop policy opinions and monitor government performance. But what drives economic evaluations? In this article, we argue the context in which information about the economy is distributed shapes economic perceptions. In high-quality information environments—where policies are transparent, the media is free, and political opposition is robust—mass perceptions closely track economic conditions. In contrast, compromised information environments provide openings for political manipulation, leading perceptions to deviate from business cycle fluctuations. We test our argument with unique data from eight Latin American countries. Results show restrictions on access to information distort the public’s view of economic performance. The ability of voters to sanction governments is stronger when democratic institutions and the media protect citizens’ access to independent, unbiased information. Our findings highlight the importance of accurate evaluations of the economy for government accountability and democratic responsiveness.