Burak Öz

Burak Öz

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Burak Öz

Technical University of Munich, Munich, Germany and Flashbots, Munich, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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27 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
BÖBurak Öz
Burak Öz
BKBenjamin Kraner
Benjamin Kraner
NVNicolò Vallarano
Nicolò Vallarano
BKBingle Stegmann Kruger
Bingle Stegmann Kruger
FMFlorian Matthes
Florian Matthes
CTClaudio J. Tessone
Claudio J. Tessone
We present a novel analysis of a competitive dynamic present on Ethereum known as "waiting games", where validators can use their distinct monopoly position in their assigned slots to delay block proposals in order to optimize returns through Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) payments, a type of incentive outside the Proof-of-Stake incentive scheme. However, this strategy risks block exclusion due to missed slots or potential orphaning. Our analysis reveals evidence that, although there are substantial incentives to undertaking the risks, validators are not capitalizing on waiting games, leaving potential profits unrealized. Moreover, we present an agent-based model to test the eventual consensus disruption caused by waiting games under different settings, arguing that such disruption only occurs with significant delay strategies. Ultimately, this research provides in-depth insights into Ethereum's waiting games, illuminating the trade-offs and potential profit opportunities for validators in this evolving blockchain landscape.

2 December 2025 in Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
BÖBurak Öz
Burak Öz
CTChristof Ferreira Torres
Christof Ferreira Torres
CSChristoph Schlegel
Christoph Schlegel
BMBruno Mazorra
Bruno Mazorra
JGJonas Gebele
Jonas Gebele
FMFlorian Matthes
Florian Matthes
Decentralized finance (DeFi) markets spread across Layer-1 (L1) and Layer-2 (L2) blockchains rely on arbitrage to keep prices aligned. Today most price gaps are closed against centralized exchanges (CEXes), whose deep liquidity and fast execution make them the primary venue for price discovery. As trading volume migrates on-chain, cross-chain arbitrage between decentralized exchanges (DEXes) will become the canonical mechanism for price alignment. Yet, despite its importance to DeFi-and the on-chain transparency making real activity tractable in a way CEX-to-DEX arbitrage is not-existing research remains confined to hypothetical opportunity analyses and conceptual overviews. In this paper, we study cross-chain arbitrage with a year-long measurement. We analyze transactions from September 2023 to August 2024 across nine blockchains and identify 242,535 executed arbitrages totaling 868.64 million USD volume. Activity clusters on Ethereum-centric L1-L2 pairs, grows 5.5x over the study period, and surges-higher volume, more trades, lower fees-after the Dencun upgrade (March 13, 2024) which cut costs for rollups. High-volume activity typically involves long-tail assets and moderately correlate with major asset prices. Most trades use pre-positioned inventory (66.96%) and settle in 9s, whereas bridge-based arbitrages take 242s, underscoring the latency cost of today's bridges. Market concentration is high: the five largest addresses execute more than half of all trades, and one alone captures almost 40% of daily volume post-Dencun. We conclude that cross-chain arbitrage fosters vertical integration, centralizing sequencing infrastructure and economic power and thereby exacerbating censorship, liveness, and finality risks; decentralizing block building and lowering entry barriers are critical to countering these threats.

8 April 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
BÖBurak Öz
Burak Öz
FRFilip Rezabek
Filip Rezabek
JGJonas Gebele
Jonas Gebele
FHFelix Hoops
Felix Hoops
FMFlorian Matthes
Florian Matthes

13 October 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JGJonas Gebele
Jonas Gebele
TMTimm Mutzel
Timm Mutzel
BÖBurak Öz
Burak Öz
FMFlorian Matthes
Florian Matthes

29 May 2026 in Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SYSen Yang
Sen Yang
BÖBurak Öz
Burak Öz
FWFei Wu
Fei Wu
FZFan Zhang
Fan Zhang
Decentralization has an important geographic dimension that conventional metrics, such as stake distribution, often overlook. Where validators operate affects resilience to regional shocks (e.g., outages, natural disasters, or government intervention) as well as fairness in reward access. Yet major blockchain protocols do not encode geographical location in their rules; instead, validator locations emerge from a combination of economic incentives, regulatory constraints, infrastructure availability, and validator deployment choices. When certain locations offer systematic advantages, validators may strategically co-locate to maximize expected rewards, as observed in Ethereum, where validators cluster along the Atlantic corridor, which exhibits favorable latency. In this paper, we propose a formal model of validators' geographical positioning incentives under Ethereum's protocol design, capturing the interaction between its two block-building paradigms, local and external block building, and the geographical distribution of validators and information sources. We analytically characterize the model under a mean-field approximation and complement this analysis with an agent-based simulation calibrated with real-world latency data to quantify how these incentives translate into geographical concentration under heterogeneous geographic and infrastructural conditions. Our results show that Ethereum's block-building architecture is not geographically neutral. Both paradigms generate location-dependent payoffs and incentives to relocate closer to payoff-relevant parties in order to reduce propagation delays, although through different underlying mechanisms. Asymmetric access to information sources further amplifies geographical centralization. We also demonstrate that consensus parameters, such as attestation thresholds and slot times, modulate latency sensitivity and can amplify these effects, acting as protocol-level levers. Finally, we discuss the implications of our findings for protocol design and outline potential mitigation directions informed by our analysis.