1 July 2021 in Management Science
Because greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions from the supply chains of just the 2,500 largest global corporations account for more than 20% of global emissions, rationalizing emissions in supply chains could make an important contribution toward meeting the global CO2 emission-reduction targets agreed upon in the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. Accordingly, in this paper, we consider supply chains with joint production of GHG emissions, operating under either a carbon-tax regime, wherein a regulator levies a penalty on the emissions generated by the firms in the supply chain, or an internal carbon-pricing scheme. Supply chain leaders, such as Walmart, are assumed to be environmentally motivated to induce their suppliers to abate their emissions. We adopt a cooperative game-theory methodology to derive a footprint-balanced scheme for reapportioning the total carbon emissions amongst the firms in the supply chain. This emission responsibility-allocation scheme, which is the Shapley value of an associated cooperative game, is shown to have several desirable characteristics. In particular, (i) it is transparent and easy to compute; (ii) when the abatement-cost functions of the firms are private information, it incentivizes suppliers to exert pollution-abatement efforts that, among all footprint-balanced allocation schemes, minimize the maximum deviation from the socially optimal pollution level; and (iii) the Shapley value is the unique allocation mechanism satisfying certain contextually desirable properties. This paper was accepted by Jayashankar Swaminathan, operations management.
1 December 2021 in Management Science
Since 2016, Canada’s federal government has pledged to factor in upstream emissions during the environmental impact assessment of fossil fuel energy projects. The upstream emissions attributable to a proposed project could be compared against a rejection threshold—a maximum permissible level of emissions—or the firm could be mandated to offset the attributed emissions. We adopt a cooperative game-theoretic model and propose the nucleolus mechanism to apportion upstream emission responsibilities in a fossil fuel supply chain, represented by a directed tree, wherein the nodes correspond to various entities in the supply chain such as extractors, distributors, refineries, and end consumers. The nucleolus allocation avoids the distortionary effects of double counting and exhibits a certain consistency property that is especially important in a regulatory context wherein fossil fuel supply chains span multiple legal jurisdictions. We develop a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the nucleolus and further prove that it arises as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium allocation of a noncooperative game induced by two easily stated and verifiable policies, thereby providing an implementation framework. We then demonstrate the strong Nash stability of the nucleolus mechanism subject to the two policies, study its sensitivity to parameter changes, and characterize it on the basis of fairness considerations. Furthermore, under the common assumption that the emissions allocated to a firm and the resulting financial penalties do not impact the revenues from the firm’s core operations, we also provide lower-bound guarantees on the welfare gains it delivers to firms in the fossil fuel supply chain and on the incentives it offers such firms to adopt emission abatement technologies. Finally, we contextualize our discussion with a case study on a proposed expansion of the Trans Mountain pipeline in Western Canada. This paper was accepted by Chung Piaw Teo, optimization.
26 June 2011 in Mathematical Programming
1 December 1982 in Mathematical Programming
4 May 2012 in Discrete Applied Mathematics
1 December 2014 in Discrete Applied Mathematics
HRHarshavardhan Ravichandran
Harshavardhan Ravichandran