Giulio Zizzo

Giulio Zizzo

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Giulio Zizzo

IBM Research Europe Dublin Ireland

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 July 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
DGDaniel Gibert
Daniel Gibert
JPJordi Planes
Jordi Planes
QLQuan Le
Quan Le
GZGiulio Zizzo
Giulio Zizzo
Malware detectors based on machine learning (ML) have been shown to be susceptible to adversarial malware examples. However, current methods to generate adversarial malware examples still have their limits. They either rely on detailed model information (gradient-based attacks), or on detailed outputs of the model - such as class probabilities (score-based attacks), neither of which are available in real-world scenarios. Alternatively, adversarial examples might be crafted using only the label assigned by the detector (label-based attack) to train a substitute network or an agent using reinforcement learning. Nonetheless, label-based attacks might require querying a black-box system from a small number to thousands of times, depending on the approach, which might not be feasible against malware detectors.This work presents a novel query-free approach to craft adversarial malware examples to evade ML-based malware detectors. To this end, we have devised a GAN-based framework to generate adversarial malware examples that look similar to benign executables in the feature space. To demonstrate the suitability of our approach we have applied the GAN-based attack to three common types of features usually employed by static ML-based malware detectors: (1) Byte histogram features, (2) API-based features, and (3) String-based features. Results show that our model-agnostic approach performs on par with MalGAN, while generating more realistic adversarial malware examples without requiring any query to the malware detectors. Furthermore, we have tested the generated adversarial examples against state-of-the-art multimodal and deep learning malware detectors, showing a decrease in detection performance, as well as a decrease in the average number of detections by the antimalware engines in VirusTotal.

16 October 2024 in Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
GCGiandomenico Cornacchia
Giandomenico Cornacchia
GZGiulio Zizzo
Giulio Zizzo
KFKieran Fraser
Kieran Fraser
MHMuhammad Zaid Hameed
Muhammad Zaid Hameed
ARAmbrish Rawat
Ambrish Rawat
MPMark Purcell
Mark Purcell
The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) in diverse applications underscores the pressing need for robust security measures to thwart potential jailbreak attacks. These attacks exploit vulnerabilities within LLMs, endanger data integrity and user privacy. Guardrails serve as crucial protective mechanisms against such threats, but existing models often fall short in terms of both detection accuracy, and computational efficiency. This paper advocates for the significance of jailbreak attack prevention on LLMs, and emphasises the role of input guardrails in safeguarding these models. We introduce MoJE (Mixture of Jailbreak Expert), a novel guardrail architecture designed to surpass current limitations in existing state-of-the-art guardrails. By employing simple linguistic statistical techniques, MoJE excels in detecting jailbreak attacks while maintaining minimal computational overhead during model inference. Through rigorous experimentation, MoJE demonstrates superior performance capable of detecting 90% of the attacks without compromising benign prompts, enhancing LLMs security against jailbreak attacks.

26 November 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
DGDaniel Gibert
Daniel Gibert
GZGiulio Zizzo
Giulio Zizzo
QLQuan Le
Quan Le
Machine learning-based (ML) malware detectors have been shown to be susceptible to adversarial malware examples. Given the vulnerability of deep learning detectors to small changes on the input file, we propose a practical and certifiable defense against patch and append attacks on malware detection. Our defense is inspired by the concept of (de)randomized smoothing, a certifiable defense against patch attacks on image classifiers, which we adapt by: (1) presenting a novel chunk-based smoothing scheme that operates on subsequences of bytes within an executable; (2) deriving a certificate that measures the robustness against patch attacks and append attacks. Our approach works as follows: (i) during the training phase, a base classifier is trained to make classifications on a subset of continguous bytes or chunk of bytes from an executable; (ii) at test time, an executable is divided into non-overlapping chunks of fixed size and our detection system classifies the original executable as the majority vote over the predicted classes of the chunks. Leveraging the fact that patch and append attacks can only influence a certain number of chunks, we derive meaningful large robustness certificates against both attacks. To demonstrate the suitability of our approach we have trained a classifier with our chunk-based scheme on the BODMAS dataset. We show that the proposed chunk-based smoothed classifier is more robust against the benign injection attack and state-of-the-art evasion attacks in comparison to a non-smoothed classifier.


1 January 2023
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
ARAmbrish Rawat
Ambrish Rawat
GZGiulio Zizzo
Giulio Zizzo
SKSwanand Kadhe
Swanand Kadhe
JEJonathan Epperlein
Jonathan Epperlein
SBStefano Braghin
Stefano Braghin