19 August 2019 in Management Research: Journal of the Iberoamerican Academy of Management
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the differential effects that institutions have on country IPO activity. With a sample of 64 countries over a 15-year period (2000-2014), the authors test the variables rule of law, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity on subsamples of developed (27) and emerging (37) countries to explore their influence on domestic IPO activity level. For developed countries, only uncertainty avoidance and masculinity are significant. Within emerging countries, it is uncertainty avoidance and rule of law that are significant. Using different country classification frameworks could yield more detailed and focused results on the influence that country-level variables have on IPO activity. Multinational firms could use these findings for decisions related to their potential subsidiary IPOs. This is a novel empirical work relating institutions to IPO activity, using emerging and developed country subsamples. It also focuses on IPO activity instead of IPO underpricing/performance and contributes to extend the scope of the IPO literature to global non-Anglo contexts. Analizar los efectos diferenciales que las instituciones tienen en OPIs (ofertas públicas iniciales) a nivel país. En una muestra de 64 países en un periodo de 15 anos (2000-14) probamos las variables: estado de derecho, aversión a la incertidumbre y masculinidad en submuestras de países: desarrollados (27) y emergentes (37) para explorar su influencia en el número de OPIs a nivel país. En países desarrollados la aversión a la incertidumbre y masculinidad son significativas. Dentro de países emergentes, la aversión a incertidumbre y estado de derecho son significativas. Usar diferentes métodos para clasificar países podría resultar en resultados mas detallados y enfocadas para entender la influencia que variables a nivel país tienen en el nivel de OPIs. Empresas multinacionales podrían usar estos resultados para decisiones relacionadas a sus subsidiarias potenciales. Este es un trabajo novedoso que relaciona a las instituciones con la actividad OPI usando submuestras de países desarrollados y emergentes. También se enfoca en actividad OPI en lugar de subvaluación/desempeño OPI y contribuye a extender la literatura OPI a contextos no anglo sajones. OPIs, Emergentes, Desarrollados, Instituciones and Cultura Este artículo se pudo hacer gracias al apoyo parcial de la Asociación Mexicana de Cultura A.C. Analisar os efeitos diferenciais que as instituições têm na atividade de IPO (Oferta pública inicial en inglés) dos países. Em uma amostra de 64 países em um período de 15 anos (2000-14). Testamos as variáveis: estado de direito, evitação de incerteza e masculinidade em subamostras de países desenvolvidos (27) e, emergentes (37) para explorar sua influência no nível de atividade doméstico do IPO. Para os países desenvolvidos, apenas a evitação de incertezas e a masculinidade são significativas. Nos países emergentes, a evitação de incertezas e o estado de direito são significativos. O uso de diferentes estruturas de classificação de países poderia produzir resultados mais detalhados e focados na influência que as variáveis de nível de país têm na atividade de IPO. As empresas multinacionais poderiam usar essas descobertas para decisões relacionadas a seus possíveis IPOs subsidiários. Este é um novo trabalho empírico que relaciona instituições à atividade de IPO usando subamostras de países emergentes e desenvolvidos. Também se concentra na atividade de IPO, em vez da infravaloración/performance do IPO, e contribui para estender a literatura do âmbito IPO para os contextos globais não-anglo. IPOs, Emergentes, Desenvolvidos, Instituições, Cultura
24 December 2024 in Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science
Purpose: This paper studies the determinants of the debt maturity of Mexican-listed companies by analysing the effects on the extensive (issuing or liquidating debt) and the intensive (debt maturity renegotiation) margins.Design/methodology/approach: This study, using a Tobit model for panel data and measuring maturity as a time variable, shows that size, liquidity and leverage, among other firm characteristics, as well as the market interest rate, explain debt maturity. Additionally, the study employs the McDonald and Moffitt decomposition to determine whether the explanatory variables of maturity have a more significant effect on the decision to issue or liquidate debt or on debt maturity renegotiations.Findings: The results obtained highlight that the market interest rate negatively affects debt maturity. On the other hand, variables like size, liquidity, collateral and leverage demonstrate a positive relationship with the dependent variable. In addition, the extensive margin has a higher impact on corporate debt than the intensive margin, suggesting that firms prefer to liquidate or issue new debt rather than renegotiate preexisting contracts.Research limitations/implications: The main limitation of this study is the use of an unbalanced panel. The lack of data limits the application of specific methodologies suggested by the literature as a way to test the robustness of the estimates.Originality/value: First of all, this study adds empirical evidence of debt maturity decisions by publicly traded firms in a middle-income country such as Mexico to the existing literature on maturity choice. Second, the study treats debt maturity as a time-censored, limited variable. Finally, the authors have used the McDonald and Moffitt (1980) methodology to decompose the effect of each independent variable into extensive and intensive margins.
29 September 2022 in Contaduría y Administración
Multi-lender choice: Corporate bonds vs syndicated loans in mexican firms
19 November 2008 in Review of Economic Design
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by accepting the settlement of an arbitrator. The impact of pragmatic arbitrators-that enforce concessions that precede their appointment-is compared with that of arbitrators that act on principle-ignoring prior concessions. We show that while the impact of arbitration always depends on how costly that intervention is relative to direct negotiation, the range of scenarios for which it has an impact, and the precise effect of such impact, does change depending on the behavior-pragmatic or on principle-of the arbitrator. Moreover the requirement of mutual consent to appoint the arbitrator matters only when he is pragmatic. Efficiency and equilibrium are not aligned since agents sometimes reach negotiated agreements when an arbitrated settlement is more efficient and vice versa. What system of arbitration has the best performance depends on the arbitration and negotiation costs, and each can be optimal for plausible environments. © Springer-Verlag 2008.Peer Reviewe