To verify the existence and relevance of control mechanisms that impede the expropriation of resources by the managers of nonprofits and that improve efficiency, we use a representative sample of Spanish nongovernmental development organizations (NGDOs). The authors study how the donors’ structure and board of trustees relates to organizational efficiency. Results show that the presence of an active institutional donor provides a control mechanism for these NGDOs, thus favoring the efficient allocation of resources, and that the structure of the board of trustees is irrelevant in this respect. Results are robust to alternative measures of technical and allocative efficiency.
21 October 2008 in Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly
Recently, many empirical studies have examined the determinants of corporate boards of directors. Using an agency theory framework, the authors explain how nonprofit boards are structured. Although nonprofits cannot disburse profits to their contributors, the role played by their boards of trustees in monitoring and advising managers is analogous to that of corporate boards of directors. Using a sample of Spanish foundations, the authors show that nonprofit board determinants, such as organizational complexity and financing structure, are similar in many ways to those of corporate boards. However, nonprofit age illustrates the different natures of these organizations and their voluntary boards.