Online peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, one of the most successful technology-enabled initiatives in the fintech revolution, has drastically changed the way individual investors and borrowers meet and transact. While prior research has found herding among investors at the listing level, such social behavior has been underexplored at a macro, platform level. In this study, we attempt to fill this gap by examining whether subsequent investors follow their predecessors’ actions when choosing which platform to invest, and if so, how various platform attributes and regulations moderate herding behavior. We collected a novel data set from leading platforms in a large P2P lending market. Our baseline analysis reveals that herding exists at the platform level. Using a multilevel model, we further identify several interesting moderators: the investor’s herding behavior is accentuated by platforms’ market share and the cumulative amount funded, but attenuated by their time in operation. Finally, we find that government regulatory events dampen the magnitude of the herding effect, suggesting that more information disclosure and stricter operation standards reduce the value of observational learning. The results from our analysis provide implications for P2P lending investors, platform designers, and policymakers.
3 April 2021 in Production and Operations Management
This research investigates whether and how predecessors’ usernames—as evaluated from a perspective of perceived anonymity—affect successors’ herding momentum through the varying extent of perceived source credibility. Using a unique data set collected from a leading debt-based crowdfunding platform, we classify lenders’ usernames as either anonymous or real-seeming, with the latter referring to usernames that seem to reveal one’s legal name. We find that successors demonstrate weaker herding momentum toward predecessors who are presented with real-seeming usernames than anonymous ones. This finding, which we attribute to a lower extent of perceived credibility resulting from a nonconforming behavior, challenges the conventional wisdom that considers anonymity a negative factor for source credibility. Further, we demonstrate the importance of risk-related factors, in that the uncovered positive effect of perceived anonymity on herding is accentuated in the early stage of the fundraising period. Our findings provide actionable insights for platform owners to utilize the user heterogeneity with respect to perceived anonymity and hence perceived credibility in herding. These findings are also informative for borrowers who desire to exert effort to encourage participation from the crowd.
Lending-based real estate crowdfunding, which involves the use of real estate to secure loans, has emerged as a promising alternative with lower risk than peer-to-peer lending. This study provides insights into understanding how lenders’ investment behavior is shaped by various information in such an emerging market. Using a data set from a large platform over 17 months, the authors find that lenders as a whole prefer loans secured by a borrower’s house to those secured by a mortgage, as reflected in quicker and larger lending transactions. Experienced lenders tend to invest more aggressively, in both time and amount, but exhibit a weaker preference for loans secured by a borrower’s house. A rise in housing prices is associated with quicker lending decisions, and this association is found to be stronger for loans secured by a borrower’s house. When stock market volatility is large, lenders tend to slow down their investments; such a tendency is attenuated for loans secured by a mortgage. The authors suggest that lender heterogeneity in responding to different collateral types should be incorporated into the platform’s design of an automatic transaction or a recommender system. Moreover, platform managers should consider economic conditions at the macro level when deploying their marketing strategy.
This research examines the economic impact of membership-based free-shipping (MFS) programs when introduced as an augmentation to widely accepted contingent free-shipping (CFS) policies. Under CFS, consumers waive the shipping surcharge if the order exceeds a certain threshold, whereas under MFS, consumers pay an upfront fee and enjoy the free-shipping perk throughout the membership period. We develop a stylized model that considers consumer heterogeneity in two dimensions: (1) disutility from acquiring an auxiliary product—a product that consumers would not otherwise purchase—to qualify for CFS; and (2) shopping frequency over a given period. Our analysis suggests that the introduction of MFS allows the e-tailer to segment the market further, which could lead to a higher product price. When the disutility from acquiring an auxiliary product is moderate, the e-tailer should charge a high membership fee to target only frequent shoppers who forgo CFS. However, the e-tailer should lower the fee to lure also (1) frequent shoppers who would otherwise take CFS, when the disutility is high; or (2) infrequent shoppers who would otherwise forgo CFS, when the disutility is low. In all cases, although the collected fee revenue can never compensate for the cost arising from offering the free-shipping perk, the loss can be recouped as a desirable outcome of a more segmented market. Our research generates insights into the optimal design of e-tailers’ shipping policies, shedding light on the practical challenges that confront e-tailers.
3 July 2019 in Journal of Management Information Systems
Online platforms, such as App Store and Kindle, are facing a common dilemma: while the implementation of technology-based protection impedes piracy and hence boosts demand from legal users (positive effect), the resulting restriction meanwhile imposes some level of disutility on the same due to inconvenience (negative effect). This paper investigates a monopolistic platform’s optimal protection level and pricing strategy under an agency business model (content agency model or advertising agency model). We find that the platform’s protection strategy hinges on the relative magnitude of the two opposing effects of protection. When the negative effect dominates, the minimal protection is optimal. However, as the positive effect becomes more salient, the platform has an incentive to increase the protection level. We also find that although the demand of non-pure platform users always increases as the level of content substitutability rises under the minimal and maximal protection regions, it is not necessarily the case under the medium protection region. The study advances our understanding of the content protection against piracy from a platform’s perspective. Our findings also provide insights into business model decision when platform protection is endogenously determined.