Serguei Netessine

Serguei Netessine

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Serguei Netessine

The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

27Years (2000-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 December 2007 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SKSang-Hyun Kim
Sang-Hyun Kim
MCMorris A. Cohen
Morris A. Cohen
SNSerguei Netessine
Serguei Netessine
Performance-based contracting is reshaping service support supply chains in capital-intensive industries such as aerospace and defense. Known as “power by the hour” in the private sector and as “performance-based logistics” (PBL) in defense contracting, it aims to replace traditionally used fixed-price and cost-plus contracts to improve product availability and reduce the cost of ownership by tying a supplier's compensation to the output value of the product generated by the customer (buyer). To analyze implications of performance-based relationships, we introduce a multitask principal-agent model to support resource allocation and use it to analyze commonly observed contracts. In our model the customer (principal) faces a product availability requirement for the “uptime” of the end product. The customer then offers contracts contingent on availability to n suppliers (agents) of the key subsystems used in the product, who in turn exert cost reduction efforts and set spare-parts inventory investment levels. We show that the first-best solution can be achieved if channel members are risk neutral. When channel members are risk averse, we find that the second-best contract combines a fixed payment, a cost-sharing incentive, and a performance incentive. Furthermore, we study how these contracts evolve over the product deployment life cycle as uncertainty in support cost changes. Finally, we illustrate the application of our model to a problem based on aircraft maintenance data and show how the allocation of performance requirements and contractual terms change under various environmental assumptions.

1 April 2003 in Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SNSerguei Netessine
Serguei Netessine
NRNils Rudi
Nils Rudi
A standard problem in operations literature is optimal stocking of substitutable products. We consider a consumer-driven substitution problem with an arbitrary number of products under both centralized inventory management and competition. Substitution is modeled by letting the unsatisfied demand for a product flow to other products in deterministic proportions. We obtain analytically tractable solutions that facilitate comparisons between centralized and competitive inventory management under substitution. For the centralized problem we show that, when demand is multivariate normal, the total profit is decreasing in demand correlation.

1 March 2010 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KJKinshuk Jerath
Kinshuk Jerath
SNSerguei Netessine
Serguei Netessine
SVSenthil K. Veeraraghavan
Senthil K. Veeraraghavan
Companies in a variety of industries (e.g., airlines, hotels, theaters) often use last-minute sales to dispose of unsold capacity. Although this may generate incremental revenues in the short term, the long-term consequences of such a strategy are not immediately obvious: More discounted last-minute tickets may lead to more consumers anticipating the discount and delaying the purchase rather than buying at the regular (higher) prices, hence potentially reducing revenues for the company. To mitigate such behavior, many service providers have turned to opaque intermediaries, such as Hotwire.com, that hide many descriptive attributes of the service (e.g., departure times for airline tickets) so that the buyer cannot fully predict the ultimate service provider. Using a stylized economic model, this paper attempts to explain and compare the benefits of last-minute sales directly to consumers versus through an opaque intermediary. We utilize the notion of rational expectations to model consumer purchasing decisions: Consumers make early purchase decisions based on expectations regarding future availability, and these expectations are correct in equilibrium. We show that direct last-minute sales are preferred over selling through an opaque intermediary when consumer valuations for travel are high or there is little service differentiation between competing service providers, or both; otherwise, opaque selling dominates. Moreover, contrary to the usual belief that such sales are purely mechanisms for disposal of unused capacity, we show that opaque selling becomes more preferred over direct last-minute selling as the probability of having high demand increases. When firms randomize between opaque selling and last-minute selling strategies, they are increasingly likely to choose the opaque selling strategy as the probability of high demand increases. When firms with unequal capacities use the opaque selling strategy, consumers know more clearly where the opaque ticket is from and the efficacy of opaque selling decreases.

1 April 2015 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
BABuket Avci
Buket Avci
KGKaran Girotra
Karan Girotra
SNSerguei Netessine
Serguei Netessine
The transportation sector's carbon footprint and dependence on oil are of deep concern to policy makers in many countries. Use of all-electric drive trains is arguably the most realistic medium-term solution to address these concerns. However, motorist anxiety induced by an electric vehicle's limited range and high battery cost have constrained consumer adoption. A novel switching-station-based solution is touted as a promising remedy. Vehicles use standardized batteries that, when depleted, can be switched for fully charged batteries at switching stations, and motorists only pay for battery use. We build a model that highlights the key mechanisms driving adoption and use of electric vehicles in this new switching-station-based electric vehicle system and contrast it with conventional electric vehicles. Our model employs results from repairable item inventory theory to capture switching-station operation; we embed this model in a behavioral model of motorist use and adoption. Switching-station systems effectively transfer range risk from motorists to the station operator, who, through statistical economies of scale, can better manage it. We find that this transfer of risk can lead to higher electric vehicle adoption than in a conventional system, but it also encourages more driving than a conventional system does. We calibrate our models with motorist behavior data, electric vehicle technology data, operation costs, and emissions data to estimate the relative effectiveness of the two systems under the status quo and other plausible future scenarios. We find that the system that is more effective at reducing emissions is often less effective at reducing oil dependence, and the misalignment between the two objectives is most severe when the energy mix is coal heavy and has advanced battery technology. Increases in gasoline prices (by imposition of taxes, for instance) are much more effective in reducing carbon emissions, whereas battery-price-reducing policy interventions are more effective for reducing oil dependence. Taken together, our results help a policy maker identify the superior system for achieving the desired objectives. They also highlight that policy makers should not conflate the dual objectives of oil dependence and emissions reductions as the preferred system, and the policy interventions that further that system may be different for the two objectives. This paper was accepted by Yossi Aviv, operations management.

1 June 2014 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
TTTom Fangyun Tan
Tom Fangyun Tan
SNSerguei Netessine
Serguei Netessine
We analyze a large, detailed operational data set from a restaurant chain to shed new light on how workload (defined as the number of tables or diners that a server simultaneously handles) affects servers' performance (measured as sales and meal duration). We use an exogenous shock—the implementation of labor scheduling software—and time-lagged instrumental variables to disentangle the endogeneity between demand and supply in this setting. We show that servers strive to maximize sales and speed efforts simultaneously, depending on the relative values of sales and speed. As a result, we find that, when the overall workload is small, servers expend more and more sales efforts with the increase in workload at a cost of slower service speed. However, above a certain workload threshold, servers start to reduce their sales efforts and work more promptly with the further rise in workload. In the focal restaurant chain, we find that this saturation point is currently not reached and, counterintuitively, the chain can reduce the staffing level and achieve both significantly higher sales (an estimated 3% increase) and lower labor costs (an estimated 17% decrease). This paper was accepted by Noah Gans, special issue on business analytics.

1 February 2007 in Management Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MGManu Goyal
Manu Goyal
SNSerguei Netessine
Serguei Netessine
This paper studies the impact of competition on a firm’s choice of technology (product-flexible or product-dedicated) and capacity investment decisions. Specifically, we model two firms competing with each other in two markets characterized by price-dependent and uncertain demand. The firms make three decisions in the following sequence: choice of technology (technology game), capacity investment (capacity game), and production quantities (production game). The technology and capacity games occur while the demand curve is still uncertain, and the production game is postponed until after the demand curve is revealed. We develop best-response functions for each firm in the technology game and compare how a monopolist and a duopolist respond to a given flexibility premium. We show that the firms may respond to competition by adopting a technology which is the same as or different from what the competitor adopts. We conclude that contrary to popular belief, flexibility is not always the best response to competition—flexible and dedicated technologies may coexist in equilibrium. We demonstrate that as the difference between the two market sizes increases, a duopolist is willing to pay less for flexible technology, whereas the decision of a monopolist is not affected. Further, we find that a firm that invests in flexibility benefits from a low correlation between demands for two products, but the extent of this benefit differs depending on the competitor’s technology choice. Our results indicate that higher demand substitution may or may not promote the adoption of flexibility under competition, whereas it always facilitates the adoption of flexibility without competition. Finally, we show that contrary to intuition, as the competitor’s cost of capacity increases, the premium a flexible firm is willing to pay for flexibility decreases.