Sumanth Rao

Sumanth Rao

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Sumanth Rao

UC San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

4Years (2023-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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24 October 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
BDBen Du
Ben Du
KIKatherine Izhikevich
Katherine Izhikevich
SRSumanth Rao
Sumanth Rao
GAGuatam Akiwate
Guatam Akiwate
CTCecilia Testart
Cecilia Testart
KCKc Claffy
Kc Claffy
The Internet Routing Registry (IRR) is a set of distributed databases used by networks to register routing policy information and to validate messages received in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). First deployed in the 1990s, the IRR remains the most widely used database for routing security purposes, despite the existence of more recent and more secure alternatives. Yet, the IRR lacks a strict validation standard and the limited coordination across different database providers can lead to inaccuracies. Moreover, it has been reported that attackers have begun to register false records in the IRR to bypass operators' defenses when launching attacks on the Internet routing system, such as BGP hijacks. In this paper, we provide a longitudinal analysis of the IRR over the span of 1.5 years. We develop a workflow to identify irregular IRR records that contain conflicting information compared to different routing data sources. We identify 34,199 irregular route objects out of 1,542,724 route objects from November 2021 to May 2023 in the largest IRR database and find 6,373 to be potentially suspicious.

13 May 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SRSumanth Rao
Sumanth Rao
ELEnze Liu
Enze Liu
GHGrant Ho
Grant Ho
GVGeoffrey M. Voelker
Geoffrey M. Voelker
SSStefan Savage
Stefan Savage
Email service has increasingly been outsourced to cloud-based providers and so too has the task of filtering such messages for potential threats. Thus, customers will commonly direct that their incoming email is first sent to a third-party email filtering service (e.g., Proofpoint or Barracuda) and only the "clean" messages are then sent on to their email hosting provider (e.g., Gmail or Microsoft Exchange Online). However, this loosely coupled approach can, in theory, be bypassed if the email hosting provider is not configured to only accept messages that arrive from the email filtering service. In this paper we demonstrate that such bypasses are commonly possible. We document a multi-step methodology to infer if an organization has correctly configured its email hosting provider to guard against such scenarios. Then, using an empirical measurement of edu and com domains as a case study, we show that 80% of such organizations making use of popular cloud-based email filtering services can be bypassed in this manner. We also discuss reasons that lead to such misconfigurations and outline challenges in hardening the binding between email filtering and hosting providers.

12 October 2026
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
KIKatherine Izhikevich
Katherine Izhikevich
BDBen Du
Ben Du
SRSumanth Rao
Sumanth Rao
MTManda Tran
Manda Tran
AUAlisha Ukani
Alisha Ukani
LILiz Izhikevich
Liz Izhikevich
Geolocation plays a critical role in understanding the Internet. In this work, we analyze and fix operator-misreported geolocation. Using DNS root servers to detect speed of Internet violations, we conservatively infer that at least 2% of vantage points in the largest community-vantage point collection, RIPE Atlas, were not located at their operator-reported geolocation between January 2019 and April 2026. To increase the accuracy of future studies that use operator-reported geolocation, we open source our simple methodology, implement a reporting campaign of violating probes within RIPE, work with operators to fix the misreported geolocations, and release a continually updated dataset of RIPE vantage points that likely misreport geolocation.