For proponents of the view that anthropogenic climate change will become a 'threat multiplier' for instability in the decades ahead, the Syrian civil war has become a recurring reference point, providing apparently compelling evidence that such conflict effects are already with us. According to this view, human-induced climatic change was a contributory factor in the extreme drought experienced within Syria prior to its civil war; this drought in turn led to large-scale migration; and this migration in turn exacerbated the socio-economic stresses that underpinned Syria's descent into war. This article provides a systematic interrogation of these claims, and finds little merit to them. Amongst other things it shows that there is no clear and reliable evidence that anthropogenic climate change was a factor in Syria's pre civil war drought; that this drought did not cause anywhere near the scale of migration that is often alleged; and that there exists no solid evidence that drought migration pressures in Syria contributed to civil war onset. The Syria case, the article finds, does not support 'threat multiplier' views of the impacts of climate change; to the contrary, we conclude, policymakers, commentators and scholars alike should exercise far greater caution when drawing such linkages or when securitising climate change. (C) 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.orgflicensesiby/4.0/)
It has often been predicted that large numbers of people will be displaced by climate change and that this will lead to violent conflict. At the core of this prediction is a simple causal model which assumes that climate change will result in resource scarcities, which in turn will drive migration as well as violent conflict. Academic research into the links between climate change, migration and conflict has questioned such predictions; their theoretical foundation and empirical support are thin. This does not mean that climate change will be irrelevant for future patterns of migration, including migration that may be linked to violent conflict. However, it has become clear that the links between climate change, migration and conflict are complex and defy simple and sensationalist conclusions. After outlining the state of the art on climate migration and the environment–migration–conflict nexus, this article sketches the environmental, economic and sociopolitical consequences of climate change contributing to migration and the different functions of migration in this context, for instance as an adaptive strategy to environmental change. It then delineates the different theorized pathways from migration to conflict escalation, evaluates their analytical value and develops a more differentiated model of the assumed links between climate change, migration and conflict.
For a growing number of commentators, the Syrian uprising is explained by a prolonged drought period immediately preceding the outbreak of conflict in Syria in 2011. In this narrative, the marginalized ‘climate migrants’ are seen as a decisive factor for the onset of conflict. In this paper the author dispels these assumptions by arguing for a more complex approach that takes into consideration pre-existing internal migration patterns – social, demographic, political and economic drivers of migration – as well as new local-level data showing that ‘climate migrants’ could not have orchestrated an uprising of this magnitude for lack of reliable social networks.