Wholesale electricity markets use different market designs to handle congestion in the transmission network. We compare nodal, zonal and discriminatory pricing in general networks with transmission constraints and loop flows. We conclude that in large games with many producers and certain information, the three market designs result in the same efficient dispatch. However, zonal pricing with countertrading results in additional payments to producers in export-constrained nodes, which leads to inefficient investments in the long-run.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that electricity producers use production failures to disguise strategic reductions of capacity in order to influence prices, but systematic evidence is lacking. We use an instrumental variable approach and data from the Swedish electricity market to examine such behavior. In a market without strategic withholding, reported production failures should not depend directly on the market price. We show that marginal producers in part base their decision to report a failure on prices, which indicates that production failures are a result of economic incentives as well as of technical problems.
Skills needed in jobs and skills mismatches are important topics for research and policy in the field of economic development and the labour market. Understanding skill needs is essential for improving education and training policies, as labour markets experience dynamic transformation driven by rapid technological progress and increased complexity of work. On the other hand, knowledge economy is considered an important driver force of economic growth. This paper aims to assess skill needs in knowledge production and transfer occupations. We analyse data from online job advertisements and from the European Skills and Jobs Survey in order to provide a comprehensive picture of skills needed in occupations related to science, technology and ICT, as well as teaching positions from higher education in Europe. We find that workers involved in knowledge production and transfer activate in highly changing and challenging working environments. They differentiate themselves by other professionals and technicians mostly by the increased need for ICT skills, problem-solving, communication and learning skills, the ability to collaborate and adaptability. Our results are relevant for designing better education and training programs targeting occupations supporting knowledge production and transfer.
This paper develops a stylized analytical model that analyses reliability management of multiple TSOs. First we analyse the possibilities for TSO cooperation on reserves dispatch and procurement, with a focus on European network codes. Then we propose a model that theoretically analyses cross-border reserve cooperation. We distinguish two degrees of cooperation: reserves exchange and reserves sharing. Our model first determines the non-cooperative TSO equilibrium i.e. the autarkic provision of reserves. Next we compare this with the socially optimal (cooperative) policy of generation reserves procurement. The paper shows why reserves sharing is economically superior to reserves exchange. Sharing allows cost arbitrage and pooling of reserve needs while reserves exchange only takes care of cost arbitrage. The benefits of reserves exchange and reserves sharing depends on cost asymmetry and correlation of reserve needs between the TSO zones.