Michael S Fanselow

Prof. Michael S Fanselow

University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, USA
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

30Years (1997-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2010 in Neuron
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MFMichael S Fanselow
Michael S Fanselow
HDHong-Wei Dong
Hong-Wei Dong

1 June 1999 in Neuron
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MFMichael S Fanselow
Michael S Fanselow
JLJoseph E LeDoux
Joseph E LeDoux

1 February 2005 in Annual Review of Psychology
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Journal Article
Closed access
MFMichael S Fanselow
Michael S Fanselow
APAndrew M Poulos
Andrew M Poulos
Mammalian associative learning is organized into separate anatomically defined functional systems. We illustrate the organization of two of these systems, Pavlovian fear conditioning and Pavlovian eyeblink conditioning, by describing studies using mutant mice, brain stimulation and recording, brain lesions and direct pharmacological manipulations of specific brain regions. The amygdala serves as the neuroanatomical hub of the former, whereas the cerebellum is the hub of the latter. Pathways that carry information about signals for biologically important events arrive at these hubs by circuitry that depends on stimulus modality and complexity. Within the amygdala and cerebellum, neural plasticity occurs because of convergence of these stimuli and the biologically important information they predict. This neural plasticity is the physical basis of associative memory formation, and although the intracellular mechanisms of plasticity within these structures share some similarities, they differ significantly. The last Annual Review of Psychology article to specifically tackle the question of mammalian associative learning ( Lavond et al. 1993 ) persuasively argued that identifiable “essential” circuits encode memories formed during associative learning. The next dozen years saw breathtaking progress not only in detailing those essential circuits but also in identifying the essential processes occurring at the synapses (e.g., Bi & Poo 2001 , Martinez & Derrick 1996 ) and within the neurons (e.g., Malinow & Malenka 2002 , Murthy & De Camilli 2003 ) that make up those circuits. In this chapter, we describe the orientation that the neuroscience of learning has taken and review some of the progress made within that orientation.

1 June 2000 in Behavioural Brain Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MFMichael S Fanselow
Michael S Fanselow

18 August 2015 in Learning & Memory
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Journal Article
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JPJennifer N. Perusini
Jennifer N. Perusini
MFMichael S Fanselow
Michael S Fanselow
In this review, we discuss the usefulness of the distinction between fear and anxiety. The clinical use of the labels is ambiguous, often defining one in terms of the other. We first consider what a useful, objective, and scientifically valid definition would entail and then evaluate several fear/anxiety distinctions that have been made in the neurobiological literature. A strong distinction should specify the difference in conditions that lead to fear versus anxiety. Additionally, fear and anxiety should generate distinct sets of behaviors. Ideally, the two states should be supported by distinguishable neuroanatomical circuits. Such a conceptualization would be consistent with the National Institute of Mental Health's Research Domain Criteria (RDoc). The majority of neurobiological approaches to the fear versus anxiety distinction fail to differentiate the two states in terms of behavior, often using the exact same behavioral measures as indicators. Of the two that do, only Predatory Imminence Theory provides a distinction both in terms of cause and effect. Indeed, that approach provides a ready distinction of anxiety, fear, and panic in terms of both antecedent conditions and response selection rules. Additionally, it appeals to distinct neural circuits to generate these modes of action.

17 May 2006 in Journal of Neuroscience
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Journal Article
Open access
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BWBrian J. Wiltgen
Brian J. Wiltgen
MSMatthew J. Sanders
Matthew J. Sanders
SAStephan G. Anagnostaras
Stephan G. Anagnostaras
JSJennifer R. Sage
Jennifer R. Sage
MFMichael S Fanselow
Michael S Fanselow
Lesions of the rodent hippocampus invariably abolish context fear memories formed in the recent past but do not always prevent new learning. To better understand this discrepancy, we thoroughly examined the acquisition of context fear in rats with pretraining excitotoxic lesions of the dorsal hippocampus. In the first experiment, animals received a shock immediately after placement in the context or after variable delays. Immediate shock produced no context fear learning in lesioned rats or controls. In contrast, delayed shock produced robust context fear learning in both groups. The absence of fear with immediate shock occurs because animals need time to form a representation of the context before shock is presented. The fact that it occurs in both sham and lesioned rats suggests that they learn about the context in a similar manner. However, despite learning about the context in the delay condition, lesioned rats did not acquire as much fear as controls. The second experiment showed that this lesion-induced deficit could be overcome by increasing the number of conditioning trials. Lesioned animals learned normally after multiple shocks, regardless of freezing level or trial spacing. The last experiment showed that animals with complete hippocampus lesions could also learn about the context, although the same lesions produced devastating retrograde amnesia. These results demonstrate that alternative systems can acquire context fear but do so less efficiently than the hippocampus.