Mingming Leng

Prof. Mingming Leng

Lingnan University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

22Years (2005-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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19 June 2013 in Decision Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
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JHJian Huang
Jian Huang
MLMingming Leng
Mingming Leng
MPMahmut Parlar
Mahmut Parlar

1 August 2012 in European Journal of Operational Research
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Journal Article
Closed access
JHJian Huang
Jian Huang
MLMingming Leng
Mingming Leng
LLLiping Liang
Liping Liang

11 January 2013 in IIE Transactions
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Journal Article
Closed access
JHJian Huang
Jian Huang
MLMingming Leng
Mingming Leng
LLLiping Liang
Liping Liang
JLJian Liu
Jian Liu
This article analyzes a Fuel Automobile (FA) supply chain and an electric-and-fuel automobile supply chain in a duopoly setting, under a government’s subsidy incentive scheme that is implemented to promote the use of Electric Automobiles (EAs) for the control of air pollution. Benefiting from such a scheme, each EA consumer can enjoy a subsidy from the government. It is shown that the incentive scheme is more effective in increasing the sales of EAs when consumers’ bargaining power is stronger. The impact of the incentive scheme on consumers’ net surplus is the largest among all components in the social welfare. A higher subsidy may not result in a greater reduction in the environmental hazard. Moreover, a larger number of service and charging stations can reduce the negative impact of the incentive scheme on the FA market while enhancing its positive impact on the EA market. An incentive scheme with the centralized control with no subsidy is also considered and it is found that the incentive scheme is more effective in promoting EAs and protecting the environment. [Supplementary materials are available for this article. Go to the publisher's online edition of IIE Transactions for the Appendices to this article.]

28 June 2022 in Energy
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Journal Article
Closed access
YDYeming Dai
Yeming Dai
YWYanxin Wang
Yanxin Wang
MLMingming Leng
Mingming Leng
XYXinyu Yang
Xinyu Yang
QZQiong Zhou
Qiong Zhou

1 February 2009 in Operations Research
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Journal Article
Closed access
MLMingming Leng
Mingming Leng
MPMahmut Parlar
Mahmut Parlar
We analyze the problem of allocating cost savings from sharing demand information in a three-level supply chain with a manufacturer, a distributor, and a retailer. To find a unique allocation scheme, we use concepts from cooperative game theory. First, we analytically compute the expected cost incurred by the manufacturer and then use simulation to obtain expected costs for the distributor and the retailer. We construct a three-person cooperative game in characteristic-function form and derive necessary conditions for the stability of each of five possible coalitions. To divide the cost savings between two members, or among three supply chain members, we use various allocation schemes. We present numerical analyses to investigate the impacts of the demand autocorrelation coefficient, ρ, and the unit holding and shortage costs on the allocation scheme.

1 May 2014 in European Journal of Operational Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CLChunlin Luo
Chunlin Luo
MLMingming Leng
Mingming Leng
JHJian Huang
Jian Huang
LLLiping Liang
Liping Liang