This article analyzes a Fuel Automobile (FA) supply chain and an electric-and-fuel automobile supply chain in a duopoly setting, under a government’s subsidy incentive scheme that is implemented to promote the use of Electric Automobiles (EAs) for the control of air pollution. Benefiting from such a scheme, each EA consumer can enjoy a subsidy from the government. It is shown that the incentive scheme is more effective in increasing the sales of EAs when consumers’ bargaining power is stronger. The impact of the incentive scheme on consumers’ net surplus is the largest among all components in the social welfare. A higher subsidy may not result in a greater reduction in the environmental hazard. Moreover, a larger number of service and charging stations can reduce the negative impact of the incentive scheme on the FA market while enhancing its positive impact on the EA market. An incentive scheme with the centralized control with no subsidy is also considered and it is found that the incentive scheme is more effective in promoting EAs and protecting the environment. [Supplementary materials are available for this article. Go to the publisher's online edition of IIE Transactions for the Appendices to this article.]
We analyze the problem of allocating cost savings from sharing demand information in a three-level supply chain with a manufacturer, a distributor, and a retailer. To find a unique allocation scheme, we use concepts from cooperative game theory. First, we analytically compute the expected cost incurred by the manufacturer and then use simulation to obtain expected costs for the distributor and the retailer. We construct a three-person cooperative game in characteristic-function form and derive necessary conditions for the stability of each of five possible coalitions. To divide the cost savings between two members, or among three supply chain members, we use various allocation schemes. We present numerical analyses to investigate the impacts of the demand autocorrelation coefficient, ρ, and the unit holding and shortage costs on the allocation scheme.
1 May 2014 in European Journal of Operational Research