The rapid development of digital technologies and their active implementation in all spheres of the economy, on the one hand, contribute to increased control over the activities of economic entities, and on the other hand, create new challenges associated with the dynamic development of cybercrime. The purpose of the article is to analyze the global trends in cybercrime in 2016-2023 (by calculating national levels of cybercrime) and to model the mechanisms of combating it in order to form a global, open and safe cyberspace, protect the population from cyber threats and cyber fraud, increase the effectiveness of financial monitoring procedures and control over transactions in cyberspace. The article presents the dominant directions, evolutionary, temporal and spatial patterns of the development of crime in cyberspace, clustering of the countries, and identification of leaders and outsiders in the field of cybercrime (through visualization density maps based on the construction of self-organized Kohonen maps). The results of the calculations confirm a significant increase in the level of cybercrime in the world since 2016 (in particular, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and active digital transformation). A comparative analysis of the indicator across countries made it possible to distinguish those with the highest rates of cybercrime (Slovenia, Iceland, Moldova, Georgia) and those with a significantly higher level of cyber security (Greece, Belgium, France, Germany).

While Russia transitioned from hybrid to conventional warfare in Ukraine, NATO recognized cyberspace as another domain where allied response can be invoked. The European Union also decided to enhance the cybersecurity capabilities of the organization and its member states, making social resilience a priority area. It is recognized that the security of cyberspace and related systems is not just an economic issue but one that affects the whole society, necessitating a more complex strategy and regulation. The EU has taken steps to mitigate the cyber risks associated with hybrid warfare, enhancing network and cognitive security. However, offensive cyber operations could increasingly lead to open armed conflict. During existing conflicts, some cyber operations may undermine public confidence and further escalate the situation. The EU and its Member States must pay closer attention to escalation dynamics in their legislation and practices. It is crucial to scrutinize cyber policies, set specific targets and deadlines, and regularly update them. This will require stakeholders to find the appropriate regulatory levels and align national regulations, practices, and standards.

The societal effects of cybersecurity are widely discussed, but it remains less clear how software security regulations specifically contribute to building a resilient society, particularly in relation to Sustainable Development Goals 5 (Gender Equality), 10 (Reduced Inequalities), and 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions). This study investigates this connection by examining key EU and U.S. strategies through comparative legal analysis, software development (SDLC) case studies, and a normative–sociological lens. Our findings reveal that major regulations—such as the EU’s Cyber Resilience Act and the U.S. SBOM rules—are not merely reactive, but proactively embed resilience as a fundamental mode of operation. This approach structurally reallocates digital risks from users to manufacturers, reframing software security from a matter of compliance to one of social fairness and institutional trust. We conclude that integrating ‘resilience by design’ into technology rules is more than a technical fix; it is a mechanism that makes digital access fairer and better protects vulnerable populations, enabling technology and society to advance cohesively.

While the digital environment offers new opportunities to realise children’s rights, their right to participation remains insufficiently reflected in digital policy frameworks. This study analyses the right of the child to be heard in the academic literature and in the existing international legal and EU regulatory frameworks. It explores how children’s participation right is incorporated into EU and national digital policies and examines how genuine engagement can strengthen children’s digital resilience and support their well-being. By applying the 7C model of coping skills and analysing its interaction with the right to participation, the study highlights how these elements mutually reinforce the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Through a qualitative analysis of key strategic documents and the relevant policy literature, the research identifies the tension between the formal acknowledgment of children’s right to participate and its practical implementation at law- and policy-making levels within the digital context. Although the European Union’s examined strategies emphasise children’s participation, their practical implementation often remains abstract and fragmented at the state level. While the new BIK+ strategy shows a stronger formal emphasis on child participation, this positive development in policy language has not yet translated into a substantive change in children’s influence at the state level. This nuance highlights that despite a positive trend in policy rhetoric, the essential dimension of genuine influence remains underdeveloped.

The digital transformation of state functions has produced a profound paradox: technologies that enhance welfare provision simultaneously enable unprecedented surveillance and control. While optimistic accounts celebrate e-government and Digital-Era Governance for increasing efficiency and citizen engagement, critical scholarship warns of surveillance capitalism and digital authoritarianism. This article introduces the Cyberfare State as a new theoretical framework that transcends the utopia–dystopia binary, conceptualising digital governance as the dialectical unity of welfare and warfare functions in cyberspace. Drawing on historical welfare-state and warfare-state models, the analysis distinguishes two ideal-typical configurations: the smart total-control Cyberfare State, characteristic of authoritarian regimes, which fuses state and corporate power to maximise surveillance and offensive capability; and the cooperating Cyberfare State, viable only under rule-of-law constraints, which requires sustained, rights-compliant collaboration among state, private-sector, and individual actors. The cooperating model’s viability hinges on systemic cybersecurity education and the integration of citizens as active co-producers of national resilience, yet persistent educational deficits and reliance on sporadic awareness campaigns leave individuals as the weakest link. Failure to implement comprehensive reform risks irreversible societal harm and strategic disadvantage against authoritarian rivals. The Cyberfare State framework thus offers a roadmap for transatlantic democracies to navigate hybrid threats while preserving democratic values.

This research begins with a simple but essential question: In predictive vehicle maintenance, where should raw data from a car be stored? Some argue that it makes sense to keep it within the vehicle, managed directly by its control units. Others prefer sending it to a backend system for evaluation by larger models. We found that this decision cannot be made based solely on technical reasoning. The legal conditions surrounding personal data, cybersecurity, product responsibility, and AI-based systems in the European Union carry equal weight in shaping feasibility. These regulations not only impose constraints but also actively influence the design and application of such technologies in real-world scenarios. The findings suggest that legal barriers frequently limit implementation more than current technical capabilities. Addressing these constraints early in the design process is crucial, as they define not only what types of data processing are permitted but also how predictive maintenance services can be delivered to users. To support responsible development, this study proposes a legal-technical framework tailored to the European regulatory landscape. It aligns predictive maintenance systems with key European Union regulations, including the GDPR, Cybersecurity Act, Cyber Resilience Act, and AI Act.