‘Sustainable AI’ sets itself apart from other AI ethics frameworks by its inherent regard for the ecological costs of AI, a concern that has so far been woefully overlooked in the policy space. Recently, two German-based research and advocacy institutions have published a joint report on Sustainability Criteria for Artificial Intelligence. This is, to our knowledge, the first AI ethics document in the policy space that puts sustainability at the center of its considerations. We take this as an opportunity to highlight the foundational problems we see in current debates about AI ethics guidelines. Although we do believe the concept of sustainability has the potential to introduce a paradigm shift, we question whether the suggestions and conceptual grounding found in this report have the strength to usher it in. We show this by presenting this new report as an example of current approaches to AI ethics and identify the problems of this approach, which we will describe as ‘checklist ethics’ and ‘ethics of carefulness’. We argue to opt for an ‘ethics of desirability’ approach. This can be completed, we suggest, by reconceptualizing sustainability as a property of complex systems. Finally, we offer a set of indications for further research.
With the introduction of the concept of Sustainable AI, considerations of the environmental impact of the technology have begun to enter AI ethics discussions. This, Aimee van Wynsberghe suggests, constitutes a new “third wave of AI ethics” which yet needs to be ushered in. In this paper, we ask what is entailed by Sustainable AI that should warrant such special accentuation. Do we find simply run-of-the-mill AI ethics applied to an environmental context? Or does Sustainable AI constitute a true a “game-changer”? We engage in a discussion about what the “waves of AI ethics” ought to mean and the criteria for labelling a wave as such. We argue that the third wave of AI ethics rests on a turn towards a structural approach for uncovering ethical issues on a broader scale, often paired with an analysis of power structures that prevent the uncovering of these issues.
Technological objects have become world objects which becomes increasingly apparent by their different impacts on the global natural environment culminating in current natural crises. We argue that the philosophy of technology, due to its empirical turn to concrete technological objects, cannot provide the necessary conceptual tools to account for these natural impacts and the different uncertainties this creates. In this paper we give an account of this shortcoming of the philosophy of technology by giving an account of the relation between this philosophy and extractivism; the exponential acceleration of extracting natural resources to develop technological objects. Hence, we make the case that extractivism is an environmental-social condition of the possibility for technological objects to come into existence. We do this by carrying out a scale critique of the philosophy of technology, specifically the empirical turn, from its focus on concrete technological objects to the global environmental-social context in which they arise. We lay bare the occluding mechanisms within the political-economy of extractivism and the empirical turn that blind the philosophy of technology for extractivism. As a consequence, the philosophy of technology needs to be broadened, which we do by relying on Māori philosophy, specifically its relational and broader conceptions of time and space. By doing so, we provide the philosophy of technology with conceptual tools to account for extractivism and provide fruitful ground to develop conceptions of technological objects that benefit all, human and non-human, and everything.