The application of renewable energy has become increasingly widespread worldwide because of its advantages of resource abundance and environmental friendliness. However, the deployment of hybrid renewable energy systems (HRESs) varies greatly from city to city due to large differences in economic endurance, social acceptance and renewable energy endowment. Urban policymakers thus face great challenges in promoting local clean renewable energy utilization. To address these issues, this paper proposes a combined multi-objective optimization method, and the specific process of this method is described as follows. The Hybrid Optimization Model for electric energy was first used to examine five different scenarios of renewable energy systems. Then, the Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to an Ideal Solution was applied using eleven comprehensive indicators to determine the best option for the target area using three different weights. To verify the feasibility of this method, Xiongan New District (XND) was selected as an example to illustrate the process of selecting the optimal HRES. The empirical results of simulation tools and multi-objective decision-making show that the Photovoltaic-Diesel-Battery off-grid energy system (option III) and PV-Diesel-Hydrogen-Battery off-grid energy system (option V) are two highly feasible schemes for an HRES in XND. The cost of energy for these two options is 0.203 and 0.209 $/kWh, respectively, and the carbon dioxide emissions are 14,473 t/yr and 345 t/yr, respectively. Our results provide a reference for policymakers in deploying an HRES in the XND area.
In the paper, a new class of dynamic game models with a moving information horizon or dynamic updating is studied. In this class of games, players do not have full information about the game structure (motion equations, payoff functions) on the interval on which the game is defined. It is supposed that the players at each stage of the dynamic game have only truncated information about the game structure defined by the information horizon. Cooperative and noncooperative settings are considered in the paper. Results are illustrated using the oligopoly advertising game model, and comparison between the solution in the initial game model and in the game model with moving information horizon is presented. Simulation results are presented.