Michael Parker

Dr. Michael Parker

Georgetown University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 August 2014 in IET Systems Biology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MPMichael Parker
Michael Parker
YZYuan Zhong
Yuan Zhong
XDXinbin Dai
Xinbin Dai
SWShiliang Wang
Shiliang Wang
PZPatrick Zhao
Patrick Zhao
This study provides a timely comparative genomic and transcriptomic analysis of the terpene synthase (TPS) gene family in Medicago truncatula (bears glandular and non‐glandular trichomes) and Arabidopsis thaliana (bears non‐glandular trichomes). The authors’ efforts aimed to gain insight into TPS function, phylogenetic relationships and the role of trichomes in terpene biosynthesis and function. In silico analysis identified 33 and 23 putative full‐length TPS genes in Arabidopsis and Medicago , respectively. All AtTPS and MtTPS fall into the five established angiosperm TPS subfamilies, with lineage‐specific expansion of Subfamily A in Arabidopsis and Subfamily G in Medicago. Large amounts of tandem duplication have occurred in both species, but only one syntenic duplication seems to have occurred in Arabidopsis , with no such duplication apparent in Medicago . Expression analysis indicates that there is much more trichome‐localised TPS expression in Medicago than in Arabidopsis . However, TPS genes were expressed in non‐glandular trichomes in both species. One trichome‐specific gene has been identified in each Medicago and Arabidopsis along with flower‐, seed‐, stem‐ and root‐specific genes. Of these, MtTPS11 is a promising candidate for trichome‐specific genetic engineering, a technology that may be possible for both plants according to the findings of this manuscript. These results suggest that non‐glandular trichomes may play a role in plant chemical defense and/or ecological communication instead of only in physical defence. Finally, the general lack of correlation between expression patterns and phylogenetic relationships in both species suggests that phylogenetic analysis alone is insufficient to predict gene function even for phylogenetically close paralogs.

1 June 2024 in Applied Biosafety
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AKArianne Kane
Arianne Kane
MPMichael Parker
Michael Parker
Introduction: Synthetic DNA technology is rapidly emerging as a key driver of innovation in the fields of medicine, biotechnology, and more. But it also poses significant risk, particularly in lowering barriers to the production of dangerous pathogens and toxins. At present, oversight of this technology is voluntarily coordinated among synthetic DNA providers and stakeholders, and detailed understanding of security processes, infrastructures, and insights from these providers is imperative to understand how to best mitigate the inherent risks of this technology. Objectives: In this study, we aimed to determine the trends, outliers, strengths, and gaps in current DNA provider security practices through a broad survey of the gene synthesis field. Methods: We interviewed synthetic DNA providers and stakeholders about their customer and sequence screening procedures. Respondents were divided into groups based on membership in the International Gene Synthesis Consortium, nationality, whether they were a new or established company, and whether they synthesize de novo DNA or not. We then performed meta-analysis and intergroup analysis to elucidate larger trends and points of variance. Results: In total, we interviewed 18 companies. We found that synthetic DNA providers and stakeholders tend to operate under a “zero-trust model” for screenings and utilize common governmental and private resources to navigate international import/export policies. Major variabilities were identified in the sensitivity of screening, monitoring and evaluation practices, screening pipelines, and approaches to synthetic oligonucleotide screening. In addition, we identified a significant vulnerability of lacking awareness among providers of formal law enforcement reporting procedures. Conclusion: Collectively, we observed significant heterogeneity in security practice throughout the field, reflective of the current lack of codified oversight for DNA synthesis. The results presented in this study provide insight into the specifics, strengths, and shortcomings of current DNA provider security practices, and are important considerations for the biosecurity community in ongoing deliberations of if, when, and how to approach oversight of synthetic DNA technology.

30 September 2016
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MPMichael Parker
Michael Parker
Recent advances in sequencing technologies have opened the door for the classification of the human virome. While taxonomic classification can be applied to the viruses identified in such studies, this gives no information as to the type of interaction the virus has with the host. As follow-up studies are performed to address these questions, the description of these virus-host interactions would be greatly enriched by applying a standard set of definitions that typify them. This paper describes a framework with which all members of the human virome can be classified based on principles of ecology. The scaffold not only enables categorization of the human virome, but can also inform research aimed at identifying novel virus-host interactions.

26 May 2025 in Applied Biosafety
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GGGene D. Godbold
Gene D. Godbold
KTKrista L. Ternus
Krista L. Ternus
KFKevin Flyangolts
Kevin Flyangolts
NWNicole Wheeler
Nicole Wheeler
MPMichael Parker
Michael Parker
JGJoshua Gil
Joshua Gil
Screening synthetic nucleic acid orders for sequences of concern is a necessary part of a healthy biosecurity regime, but it exacts costs for nucleic acid providers. Taxonomy is and will remain a critical part of the decision-making process for screening, especially for viral sequences. But, moving forward, the function of a sequence will also be determinative of its level of concern, or lack thereof. Stakeholders continue to debate which functions are “of concern.” However these are ultimately adjudicated, nonviral sequences with unknown or hypothetical functions which, by definition, can bear no resemblance to sequences with concerning functions, must be considered innocent of harmful effects. To qualify as a nonviral sequence of concern, the sequence to which it is the best match must be demonstrated in the published literature to have a function of concern.

3 October 2018 in bioRxiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
MPMichael Parker
Michael Parker
SGSmita Gopinath
Smita Gopinath
CPCorey E. Perez
Corey E. Perez
MLMelissa M. Linehan
Melissa M. Linehan
JCJason Crawford
Jason Crawford
BLBrett Lindenbach
Brett Lindenbach
The detection of nucleic acids by pattern recognition receptors is an ancient and conserved component of the innate immune system. Notably, RNA virus genomes are sensed by mammalian cytosolic RIG-I–like receptors, thereby activating interferon-stimulated gene (ISG) expression to restrict viral replication. However, recent evidence indicates that the cGAS-STING DNA sensing pathway also protects against RNA viruses. So far, the mechanisms responsible for DNA sensing of RNA viruses, which replicate without known DNA intermediates, remain unclear. By using cGAS gene knockout and reconstitution in human and mouse cell cultures, we discovered that DNA sensing and cGAMP synthase activities are required for cGAS-mediated restriction of vesicular stomatitis virus and Sindbis virus. The level of cGAMP produced in response to RNA virus infection was below the threshold of detection, suggesting that only transient and/or low levels of cGAMP are produced during RNA virus infections. To clarify the DNA ligands that activate cGAS activity, we confirmed that cGAS binds mitochondrial DNA in the cytosol of both uninfected and infected cells; however, the amount of cGAS-associated mitochondrial DNA did not change in response to virus infection. Rather, a variety of pre-existing cytosolic DNAs, including mitochondrial DNA and endogenous cDNAs, may serve as stimuli for basal cGAS activation. Importantly, cGAS knockout and reconstitution experiments demonstrated that cGAS drives low-level ISG expression at steady state. We propose that cGAS-STING restricts RNA viruses by promoting a preparatory immune activation state within cells, likely primed by endogenous cellular DNA ligands. Importance: Many medically important RNA viruses are restricted by the cGAS-STING DNA-sensing pathway of innate immune activation. Since these viruses replicate without DNA intermediates, it is unclear what DNA ligand(s) are responsible for triggering this pathway. We show here that cGAS’s DNA binding and signaling activities are required for RNA virus restriction, similar to the mechanisms by which it restricts DNA viruses. Furthermore, we confirmed that cGAS continuously binds host DNA, which was unaffected by RNA virus infection. Finally, cGAS expression correlated with the low-level expression of interferon-stimulated genes in uninfected cells, both in vitro and in vivo . We propose that cGAS-mediated sensing of endogenous DNA ligands contributes to RNA virus restriction by establishing a baseline of innate immune activation.

26 May 2025 in Risk Analysis
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
CAClaire Atkerson
Claire Atkerson
MPMichael Parker
Michael Parker
Throughout the past century, assessments of the risks and benefits posed by high‐consequence biological agents have guided US decision‐making on weapons research, countermeasure development, and security policy. However, the dispersed nature of these biothreat risk assessments has presented various difficulties, such as duplicative effort, inconsistent approaches, and sectoral echo chambers. In this paper, we set out to evaluate the world's largest repository of biothreat risk assessments to better understand the historical risk assessment landscape, contextualize current risk assessment output, and extract major themes that may shape future risk assessment development and evaluation. To these ends, we developed a decade‐by‐decade systematic review of the motivations, context, and conclusions of collected biothreat risk assessments. Our results identify particularly important themes and ideas that have shaped modern biosecurity policy, exhibiting the waxing and waning of approaches and perceptions throughout time. Analysis of these biothreat risk assessments identifies key trends, contextualizes modern risk assessment practices, and gives insight into the trajectory of the field moving forward. Collectively, the lessons learned give perspective on the relative success of approaches and modes of thinking in biothreat risk assessment, providing essential insights for risk assessors of the future.