Mohammad M. Khabbazan

Dr. Mohammad M. Khabbazan

Technical University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
20 December 2016
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
Mohammad Reza FarzaneganMohammad Reza Farzanegan
Mohammad Reza Farzanegan
MKMohammad M. Khabbazan
Mohammad M. Khabbazan
HSHossein Sadeghi
Hossein Sadeghi


6 June 2018 in Environmental and Resource Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
ERElnaz Roshan
Elnaz Roshan
MKMohammad M. Khabbazan
Mohammad M. Khabbazan
HHHermann Held
Hermann Held

28 March 2022 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
Naimeh MohammadiNaimeh Mohammadi
Naimeh Mohammadi
MKMohammad M. Khabbazan
Mohammad M. Khabbazan
The Energy transition is fiercely competitive. The incumbents of fossil-based energy are in conflict with the advocate coalitions of transition in energy policy changes. Such changes do not occur as sudden punctuation via an external shock, but rather incrementally and over time, by incorporating power insights such as lobbies, coalitions, and campaigns. This article provides a framework grounded in theoretical power theories and draws additional insights from policy mix studies. It investigates how focusing events and feedback loops shape the coalition of interest groups in policymaking through implementations of power mechanisms. Our framework is tested through two different power stories of energy transition in Iran and Germany. Our findings reveal that the centrally planned economy of Iran leaves society with a negligible or passive role in the energy transition. The passive role of society in the energy transition is mainly caused by subsidizing energy. In addition, the financial and economic crisis resulting from other macro-economic challenges, such as sanctions, may exacerbate the minor involvement of civil society in the slow expansion of renewables in Iran. By contrast, as a robust economy with a corporatist tradition, Germany has made a strong advocacy coalition of energy transition that resulted in political incentives for substantial renewable energy deployment. Regarding the theoretical question of the power dynamics in divergent countries’ energy transitions, the proposed framework based on the interest group coalitions and power mechanism offers an understanding of the social character of energy transitions.

1 December 2021 in Energy Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MKMohammad M. Khabbazan
Mohammad M. Khabbazan
CHChristian von Hirschhausen
Christian von Hirschhausen

MKMohammad M. Khabbazan
Mohammad M. Khabbazan
The EU has established the world’s first cross-border emission-trading systems (ETS) for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, currently covering aviation, emission-intensive sectors, and electricity (EITE). The EU Commission has offered to apply emissions trading in new sectors where emissions from maritime transport will be incorporated into the current EU ETS, while a separated emissions trading system will cover emissions from road transport and the building sector. This paper employs a multi-regional multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with two simultaneous international emission permit markets. After examining the abatement costs for the EU regions, various policy scenarios are implemented to study the welfare effects of forming an ETS covering the sectors other than EITE (NEIT) and its linking with the EITE sectors under two different baselines and four emission reduction targets. The results provide several important insights: (i) Marginal abatement costs in Germany and the Eastern European Union region (EEU) are significantly lower than in the rest of the EU regions. (ii) The carbon price in the emission permit market covering NEIT is significantly higher than the carbon price in the emission permit market covering EITE. (iii) Germany and EEU appear as notable suppliers of emission permits in both markets. (iv) There is a significant aggregate welfare gain under the scenario in which the ETS covering NEIT co-exists parallel with the ETS covering EITE. (v) The aggregate welfare in the EU under the full integration of EITE and NEIT may fall below its value under the scenario with two parallel emission permit markets.