Amid increasing upstream raw-material disruptions and battery supply uncertainty, NEV manufacturers may obtain emergency supply from vertically integrated competitors after a disruption, but must incur technology conversion costs. We develop a differentiated Cournot duopoly model with an outsourcing manufacturer and an integrated manufacturer to compare equilibrium, profit, and welfare outcomes with and without emergency procurement cooperation. The results show that cooperation has a clear feasibility boundary jointly determined by market potential, relative costs, and conversion costs, giving rise to competition-only, cooperation-only, and coopetition regimes. The cooperation option reshapes pre-disruption quantity decisions: the outsourcing manufacturer increases regular procurement, while the integrated manufacturer reduces its own-brand output by a larger amount. Within the cooperation region, higher conversion costs continuously reduce the outsourcing manufacturer’s profit, whereas the integrated manufacturer’s profit can be U-shaped. Greater product substitutability makes cooperation more fragile and widens the divergence between private profit incentives and supply-chain resilience. Consumer surplus and social welfare may also move in different directions, depending on the outsourcing manufacturer’s benchmark market share and conversion cost. A Nash-bargaining extension confirms the robustness of the activation condition and pre-disruption quantity-adjustment mechanism, while reducing emergency markups and improving consumer surplus.
Balancing decarbonization with grid reliability requires managing renewable volatility through Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) or Capacity Remuneration Mechanisms (CRMs) alongside carbon emission trading (CET). However, their comparative systemic impacts remain unclear. This study evaluates the strategic equivalence of CET-RPS and CET-CRM regulations using a Stackelberg duopoly model. We endogenize grid-side storage investment and parameterize source-storage synergy to establish a rigorous equivalence mapping anchored in a unified macroeconomic penetration target. The results reveal that the CRM exhibits dual systemic impacts contingent on technological readiness. Immature conditions necessitate excessive capacity prices, inducing speculative over-investment. Conversely, mature synergy creates a substitution effect that efficiently offsets public compensation budgets. Furthermore, the dynamic policy phase boundary demonstrates that stricter decarbonization targets require higher technological readiness for the CRM to dominate the RPS in social welfare. Additionally, imposing stringent administrative capacity derating factors on storage fails to alter its physical deployment, instead unintentionally transferring wealth to conventional high-carbon generators. Regulators must therefore synchronize capacity market deployment with storage technology maturity and adopt dynamic capacity accreditation to prevent such distributional distortions.